

A N  
A C C O U N T  
OF SOME OF THE MOST  
REMARKABLE EVENTS  
OF  
T H E W A R  
BETWEEN THE  
*PRUSSIANS, AUSTRIANS, and RUSSIANS,*  
FROM 1756 TO 1763:

A N D  
A T R E A T I S E  
On several BRANCHES of the  
M I L I T A R Y A R T,  
WITH PLANS AND MAPS.

Translated from the *Second Edition* of the GERMAN ORIGINAL of

J. G. T I E L K E,

B Y

Captain C. CRAUFURD,  
OF THE QUEEN'S REGIMENT OF DRAGOON GUARDS,  
And Captain R. CRAUFURD,  
OF THE 75th REGIMENT, LATE OF THE 101st.  
THE SECOND VOLUME.

“ C'est peu que d'un soldat le courage s'estime,

“ Si, Maître de son art, il ne tend au sublime.”

*L'Art de la Guerre de Main de Maître.*

L O N D O N :

PRINTED FOR THE TRANSLATORS;

AND SOLD BY J. WALTER, AT HOMER'S-HEAD, CHARING-CROSS.

M.DCC.LXXXVIII.



V O L. II.

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C O N T E N T S.

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THE CAMPAIGN  
OF THE  
*PRUSSIAN* and *RUSSIAN*  
ARMIES  
IN THE YEAR 1758;  
INCLUDING  
THE BATTLE of ZORNSDORF,  
AND  
THE SIEGE of COLBERG,  
ALSO  
A PLAN PROPOSED BY  
THE AUTHOR  
FOR TAKING COLBERG  
BY SURPRISE AND STORM  
THE FOLLOWING WINTER,  
WITH PLANS.

A 2



TO  
HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS  
THE  
DUKE OF YORK,

&c. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c.

THIS WORK

Is humbly inscribed

By

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS'S

Most devoted,

Greatly obliged,


And most faithful Servants,

CHARLES CRAUFURD,

Captain, Queen's Regiment of Dragoon Guards,

ROBERT CRAUFURD,

Captain in the 75th Regiment.



## THE

## AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

THE distinguishing approbation with which the Publick has honoured my first volume would have greatly exceeded my expectation, even were I infected by vanity and self-conceit, which is far from being the case. I feel that my endeavours to be of service to the world have met with an ample reward, and consequently I am stimulated by every motive to continue my utmost exertions, in order to shew myself in some measure worthy of that praise, which has been so liberally bestowed on me.

It is incumbent on every member of Society to do his utmost towards eluci-

viii The AUTHOR's PREFACE.

dating and perfecting the different Arts and Sciences; he may then be said really to benefit mankind; and particularly so if he makes material improvements in the military art. In order to be convinced of the justice of this last assertion, we have only to consider, what a horrid evil war is, when its naturally dreadful operations are not restrained, and, as it were, refined and humanized, by being moulded into a complicated and most extensive Science. In its rude and unimproved state it reduces men below the level of beasts; and the reason which they are endued with, and which is supposed to constitute their great superiority over the brute creation, serves only to make them more sensible of its miserable effects, and to make them appear themselves in a more detestable and barbarous light. By reading the military history of all nations previous to their cultivation of the art  
of

The AUTHOR's PREFACE. ix

of war, and the civilization of their inhabitants by means of the introduction of the Arts and Sciences amongst them, we may be fully satisfied of these truths. As mankind becomes more enlightened, do cruelties and inhuman excesses of all sorts diminish ; and, in proportion as we approach nearer to perfection in the science of arms, will battles, and perhaps even wars, become more rare. Surely then, the endeavouring to extend military improvements is a pursuit worthy the attention of every friend to society.

The expeditions, attacks, defences, and retreats of small detachments are particularly instructive for officers in inferior stations, and as well deserve to be handed down to posterity, as the movements of a more extensive nature. In general, however, they are only known to the particular regiments or

3 corps

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corps who are employed in the execution of them, and at last they are buried in oblivion, together with the names of those who perhaps merit lasting reputation for their able conduct. I shall, therefore, be much obliged to all Officers who will be so good as to favour me with scrupulously exact and well founded accounts of any such operations, at which they themselves were present, or with which they have had opportunities of becoming accurately acquainted; and I shall make use of their information in a manner that will reflect credit on them, at the same time that it affords instruction to my readers.

The Journal of the Russian army may perhaps appear too tedious and extensive, and seem filled with too many minute details; but they are necessary, in order to give an exact idea of the army of a particular country, and of

## The AUTHOR's PREFACE. xi

its method of making war; moreover, it often happens, that what appears at first sight a trivial circumstance, may, from its immediate influence on the general combination, be of consequence to the student of history. It is impossible to weed a journal of that flatness which is naturally connected with it.

A strict attention to veracity, and an invariable impartiality, being duties from which a historian should never deviate, I shall be often obliged to say, that particular regiments or corps gave way, or did not perform so much as was expected from them. As it is impossible that I should wish to injure the reputation of any individual, much less that of whole corps, it would be unjust in any Officer to attribute the remarks of this sort, that I may be obliged to make, to malicious intentions. It often happens that some particular

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ticular accident or sudden panick, of which it is impossible to divine the reason, causes the misbehaviour of a regiment or corps to-day, which to-morrow will perform the most brilliant actions; and what is it possible for Officers to do, when soldiers lose their courage, and of course their obedience? When you consider how little the private soldier is personally interested in a victory, it is almost to be wondered at that these misfortunes do not happen more frequently. The great actions which I relate of both armies will sufficiently prove that I am not partial to either.

I return thus publickly my sincere thanks to those able Officers who have favoured me with their remarks on my first volume, and who have assisted me with their information in compiling the second. The best intention to adhere  
strictly

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strictly to truth does not secure you from error, particularly in writing history. In my first volume I was mistaken in a few facts, which I corrected by the addition of a small supplement, collected from the information that I received from different quarters, after the publication of the first edition. I shall continue to observe the same rule; and I therefore beg, that those Officers who served in the campaigns of which I treat, will be so obliging as to send me corrections of my errors; but I must request, that, in doing this, they will determine to lay aside all partiality, and divest themselves, for the time, of the least prepossession in favour of either party: a determination which I made when I commenced historian, and to which I have invariably adhered.



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SECTION

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SECTION I.

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JOURNAL  
OF THE OPERATIONS  
OF THE  
RUSSIAN AND PRUSSIAN ARMIES,  
FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN  
TO THE BATTLE OF ZORNSDORF.

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*Il faut beaucoup d'acquit, de l'art, et des talens,  
Pour choisir son terrain, et pour prendre ses Camps.  
Cette utile science est sur—tout estimée.*

L'Art de la Guerre de Main de Maître.

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THE Russians, under the orders of  
Field Marshal Apraxin, obtained,  
at Gross Jägerndorf in Prussia, in the  
year 1757, a complete victory over a  
Prussian corps, commanded by Field  
Marshal Lehwald: but, instead of pur-  
suing their advantage, they retired with  
B the

## 2 JOURNAL of the CAMPAIGN.

the utmost precipitation about forty German miles, and went into winter quarters in Courland, Livonia, and Poland, leaving in the kingdom of Prussia nothing but a corps of ten or twelve thousand men, which remained near Memel, the only fortified town in their possession. As the advanced season of the year made their return very improbable, the whole of Marshal Lehwald's corps, excepting two garrison \* battalions, and fifty Hussars, was directed to march into Pomerania, in order to check the progress of the Swedes. The retreat of the Russian army was at that time too puzzling a riddle to be guessed, as indeed were many other events of

\* In the Prussian army there are Regiments on the establishment which are merely intended for garrison duty, and are called *Garrison-Regiments*.—They are by no means invalids, but they are on a lower footing than, and in every respect inferior to, the field regiments. In cases of necessity they have been made use of in the field, and particularly in the seven years German war. *Translators.*

that war, of which some have since been unveiled, others remain still in obscurity.

The Saxon Lieutenant General Sibilky, who was conspicuous, in the year 1745, for bravery and military knowledge, and who had the command of all the Russian light troops during the campaign of 1757, advised Field Marshal Apraxin in the strongest manner against this retreat; but, finding that his advice had no effect, he left the army in disgust, and went to Warsaw, from whence he wrote to the Empress of Russia, in order to justify himself, and to give her Majesty an exact account of the whole affair.—I shall here insert his letter\* word for word, as it is of importance, and per-

\* It is to be found in p. 44 of the fourth volume of a book, entitled, "Die Dantziger Beyträge zur neuen "Staats und Kriegs Geschichte."—*Author.*

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haps may not be known to all my readers.

“Most noble and puissant Empress!

“By intrusting me with the com-

“mand of a corps of troops belonging

“to the army that was employed in the

“kingdom of Prussia, Your Majesty

“gave me so particular and so valuable

“a token of your royal favour, that it

“is impossible for any words to express

“the feelings of unbounded gratitude

“which fill my heart. Such favours,

“received from such a hand, have

“awakened in me the most ardent zeal

“for your Majesty’s service, and I re-

“gret that I have not already paid the

“debt of gratitude, by the sacrifice of

“my life on the bed of honour; for it

“is now perhaps too late, and I fear

“that I shall die, without having had

“an opportunity of sufficiently proving

“the sincerity of my professions.

“How

“How great, most puissant Empress!  
“was my astonishment, when, on my  
“arrival in the enemy’s country, I be-  
“came a witness of the depredations  
“and cruelties committed by the Cos-  
“sacks, and saw them burn and destroy  
“wherever they went, contrary to all  
“the rules of war and humanity\*. I  
“immediately foresaw the difficulty  
“which this must inevitably occasion,

\* In a correspondence which took place immediately after the battle of Gross Lagerndorf, between Field Marshals Apraxin and Lehwald, the latter made heavy complaints of these depredations. Marshal Apraxin endeavoured to throw the blame on the inhabitants, by alleging, that they had taken up arms, and committed hostilities on his troops; but this was denied by the former. However that may have been, it is certain, that many Russian officers and soldiers, particularly Cossacks, were taken prisoners, and many killed by the inhabitants of the new Marche of Brandenburg, more especially during the battle of Zornsdorf, which of course greatly encreased the animosity, and was the occasion of many innocent persons suffering. I cannot determine whether the inhabitants were the aggressors, or whether their conduct was the consequence of desperation, occasioned by the ill treatment which they had received.—*Author.*

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“ in procuring provisions for your Ma-  
“ jesty’s army. But my astonishment  
“ was greatly encreased, nay, I was  
“ quite confounded, when I saw all the  
“ advantages neglected, which your  
“ Majesty’s troops might have reaped  
“ from the victory that they gained  
“ over the enemy. The disorderly flight  
“ of the Prussians afforded us the finest  
“ opportunity of almost completing their  
“ destruction, and I suffered the mortifi-  
“ cation of not being able to obtain  
“ the command of three regiments of  
“ infantry, with which I would have  
“ undertaken the pursuit: my advice  
“ on that head was grounded on expe-  
“ rience, and on a due consideration of  
“ the circumstances, which gave every  
“ reason to hope a continuance of un-  
“ interrupted success. But I had the  
“ misfortune not to be attended to; al-  
“ though I clearly proved the certainty  
“ of succeeding, and although I offered,  
“ on

"on every occasion, to be answerable  
 "for the execution of whatever I pro-  
 "posed. Soon after this I had occa-  
 "sion to lament the unexpected reso-  
 "lution of the council of war, which  
 "determined the retreat of your Ma-  
 "jesty's troops.—What could be more  
 "ill-judged than to retreat with an  
 "army, victorious, eager to engage,  
 "fully supplied with ammunition and  
 "provisions, and half of which was  
 "sufficient to conquer the enemy, who  
 "already appeared dismayed and de-  
 "jected!—I did not approve this reso-  
 "lution of the council of war, because,  
 "in doing so, I should have acted in op-  
 "position to my duty; I did not sign  
 "it, because, in that case, I should have  
 "wounded my conscience. As I now  
 "saw that the operations of the year  
 "were at an end; that nothing was  
 "done respecting Königsberg, though  
 "that city had already drawn up arti-

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"cles of capitulation, and only waited  
 "for the opportunity of submitting it-  
 "self to your Majesty's arms, and crav-  
 "ing your royal protection; and as I  
 "found that the intention was to go  
 "thus unseasonably into winter quar-  
 "ters, I judged my presence with the  
 "army to be no longer necessary; I  
 "therefore requested Field Marshal  
 "Count Apraxin to give me my dismis-  
 "sion, by virtue of the power with  
 "which he was invested, and to allow  
 "me to return to Warsaw; he con-  
 "sented, and took upon him to answer  
 "for it to Your Majesty, as appears by  
 "a letter signed by himself, of which I  
 "annex a copy."

"I hope that Your Majesty will par-  
 "don my departure from the army,  
 "and that you will be graciously pleased  
 "to permit me to throw myself at Your  
 "Royal feet, and in the humblest man-  
 "ner

"ner to make an offer of my services,  
 "insignificant as they are, in case of  
 "a continuance of military operations.  
 "Should Your Majesty be graciously  
 "pleased to employ me, I shall seize  
 "every opportunity of proving my  
 "total subjection to Your Royal will,  
 "and my ardent Zeal for Your Majesty's  
 "service. I shall endeavour to be of  
 "as much use as my abilities will per-  
 "mit; and I should not in the least  
 "scruple to sacrifice my life, as a proof  
 "of that great veneration, with which  
 "I have the honour to subscribe my-  
 "self, &c.

"SIBILSKY Baron de  
 "Warfaw, 14th of  
 "November, 1757.

"WOLFSBERG."

The Empress of Russia was extreme-  
 ly displeased at the retreat of her army  
 out of Prussia, and, in consequence,  
 gave orders for a strict enquiry into  
 Marshal Apraxin's conduct, directing at  
 the

the same time, that General Sibilsky's letter should be laid before him. Her Majesty also caused a manifesto to be delivered to the Imperial, French, and Polish Ambassadors, containing expressions of her high displeasure at what had happened, and assurances that the war should be prosecuted with vigor on Her part.—During this Winter the Court of Petersburg plainly shewed, that it was determined to support its allies most strenuously, and to carry on the war against the King of Prussia with as much activity as possible.

The command of the army was transferred from Marshal Apraxin to General Fermer; and the former was cited before a Court of Enquiry at Narva. He justified himself by producing orders which he had received from the Chancellor, Bestuchef.—The Generals Fermer and Braun were also directed to deliver

liver up the orders which they had received from the Chancellor, to the end that they might be inspected by General Schuwalow. The disgrace of Bestuchef \* was the immediate consequence ;

\* Mr. Busching, in the second volume, page 417, and 432, of his Magazine, says, that the Chancellor Bestuchef thought the death of the Empress was near at hand, and ordered the victorious army to retreat out of Prussia, meaning to employ it against the Arch-Duke.

Those who have made themselves acquainted with civil and military history, are not surpris'd at such occurrences as these, which are incident almost to all armies. The Commands of a monarch are often neglected, his views frustrated, his interests sacrificed, and the welfare of his armies sported with, owing to the operation of private hatred and envy, or from motives as little admissable when compared with the publick good.—Any person who wishes to have striking exemplary proofs of this need only read the account of the war in Hungary, particularly of the Campaigns in the years 1737, 38, and 39, which was published in the year 1772, under the title of, *Geheime Nachrichten von dem Kriege in Ungarn, in den Feldzügen 1737, 38, and 39.*—After perusing this, my readers will not perhaps be so much surpris'd at several events and expeditions that they may read of in my work, the causes of which it would be unadvisable, if not impossible, to disclose.

Author.

and,

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and, in the year 1759, he was sent with his whole family to Goretobo in Siberia, from whence he was allowed to return in the year 1764, by the Empress, Catherine the Second, who restored him to his places, and gave him the rank of Field-marshal.

General Fermer received the most positive orders to advance with the army, and to regain possession of the Kingdom of Prussia. The Prussians were immediately informed of this; and the two battalions of the Garrison regiment of Putkammer, under the Lieutenant Colonels Unruh and Wutenau, the first of whom commanded at Konigsberg, the latter at Pillaw, retired into Pomerania, and took with them seven carriages loaded with money, and the greatest part of the stores and artillery that were in the magazines.

On

On the 16th of January, the Russian army marched from Memel, thirty thousand strong, and on the same day Lieutenant General Refanow was ordered to take possession of the island Rufs\*. Lieutenant General Romanzow, with another detachment, was ordered to seize on Tilsit; but he failed in his attempt to cut off the garrison, as they had retired in time.

The army marched in five columns, under the Lieutenant Generals, Soltikow, Refanow, Romanzow, and the Major Generals, Prince Lubomirsky, Panin, Leontiew, and assembled on the 19th at Rautenburg, which was the general rendezvous.—From thence they moved to Labian, where the advanced corps, under the command of Quarter Master

\* A small island at the Northern mouth of the river Niemen.—*Translators.*

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General Stoffeln, arrived on the 20th. General Fermer went to Labian the same day, but on the 21st he returned to Kaymen, to which place he had already detached Brigadier Stojanow, with three regiments of Hussars, and the Tschoujew \* Cossacks; Colonel Jakoblew,

\* This is a Pulk of Cossacks, who are armed like the rest, but they are on the same establishment as the Hussars, and receive regular pay.—They are clothed in red, and the officers have commissions and rank like the other offices of the army. This Pulk was not only very brave, but also particularly well disciplined. It would be doing them an unpardonable injustice to compare them in the least to the other Cossacks, who do not deserve to be honoured with the name of Soldiers, being without either pay or discipline. The officers of these latter are not better than the privates (excepting perhaps a few Colonels, who, through their remarkable bravery, obtain established rank in the army), and on detachment, a Captain or Major is under the command of a Cornet of the regulars, and liable to receive corporal punishment from him. The establishment of the Russian army, seems to make it in some measure necessary to retain the Cossacks and \* Calmucks, and in Campaigns against the Poles, Turks

\* We suppose on account of their deficiency in regular light Troops.—*Translators.*

and

Jakoblew, with four hundred grenadiers, and eight pieces of artillery, and  
Briga-

and Tartars, they are perhaps an indispensable evil; but in wars with all other European nations, they may certainly be said to be more hurtful than useful to an army. They are only bold when they meet with no danger or opposition; they deprive their own army of subsistence, by laying waste the whole adjacent country; and by their cruelties and depredations they reduce the inhabitants to a state of desperation, who consequently, out of revenge, do every mischief they can to the troops, both secretly and openly.

There are many different colonies of Cossacks, but the largest, and most known are, the Don Cossacks, the Zaporog, or Zaporovian Cossacks, and the Ukrain Cossacks. The Don Cossacks are superior to the rest. General Mannstein speaks in high terms of the bravery which these latter displayed on many occasions, and particularly at the taking of Oczakow, when they fought on foot, and stormed with much intrepidity. However, they were never held in any esteem in the campaigns between the Russians and Prussians, so that perhaps one may now apply to them what General Mannstein, who gives an account of the principal colonies of these people, says of the Ukrain Cossacks—"They served in the Russian army against the Turks, but they were of no other use than to increase the numbers; and one may on good grounds conclude, that their former bravery is totally extinguished."—In their last campaigns al-

most

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Brigadier Demikow, with nine squadrons of cavalry.

The council of regency of Konigsberg sent deputies to the Commander in Chief at Kaymen, to implore the protection of the Empress of Russia, and to request that they might be al-

most the only duty that they did was the escorting provision waggons.

Every Cossack carries a pike, a sword, and one or a brace of pistols, in a girdle, or hanging by his side. Some have also a rifle gun. They ride well, manage their pikes dextrously, and are remarkable for their fidelity: but they plunder all the inhabitants who are not their declared friends, and treat them with inhumanity.

The regular Russian troops yield to none in Europe in point of exact discipline, and perhaps surpass, in this respect, most armies. The Russian grenadiers, who, in conjunction with the Austrians, under the command of General Laudon, took Schweidnitz by a coup de main, remained on the walls under arms, and not a man moved out of his rank, or attempted to run into the houses to plunder. Cyrus's soldiers are said to have done the same at the taking of the city of Sardis; but I doubt whether many such examples are to be met with in history.—*Author.*

## SECTION I. 17

lowed to continue in the enjoyment of their privileges.

On the 22d, Quarter Master General Stoffeln, accompanied by all the Quarter Masters, &c. marched with the first line from Kaymen to Konigsberg. The advanced corps consisted of the Tschoujew Cossacks, and three regiments of Hussars, under the command of Brigadier Stojanow; of nine squadrons of dragoons, under Brigadier Demikow; and eight companies of grenadiers, with eight pieces of cannon, under Colonel Jakoblew. At the same time General Braun received orders to quit his cantonments, and advance into Prussia, by marching with the regiments under his command from Tilsit to Insterburg. Colonel Jakoblew took possession of the city of Konigsberg with his grenadiers; and on the same day General Fermer arrived there, accompanied by General Soltikow, together with the Russian and  
C foreign

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foreign volunteers, and was received with great rejoicings. I pass over in silence the Russian Manifesto, and the articles of capitulation of the city of Konigsberg, as they are in general well known, and as I consider them of little importance to my readers.

On the 23d, the fourth grenadier regiment, and the infantry regiment of Troitzkoi, formed the garrison of the town, under the command of Major General Refanow; and on the 24th the nobility, as well as all the subjects, without exception, were obliged to swear allegiance to the Empress. The Prussian arms were every where taken down, and the Russian substituted in their place; all the payments of the taxes, &c. were made into the Russian coffers; and the whole kingdom of Prussia was considered as a conquered country. The Empress continued to

S E C T I O N I. 19

the town and kingdom the enjoyment of their privileges; and General Refanow was appointed Governor of Königsberg.

Major Wigand, together with Major Gerbel of the engineers, and Prince Repnin Adjutant of the Guards of Preobraschenski, marched with a battalion of infantry to take possession of the fortrefs of Pillau.

On the 24th of January, the council, as well as all the different civil departments, were obliged to swear allegiance in the churches; and the sick were sworn in their houses. Major General Leontiew received orders to form the rear guard with his brigade, and the regiments of Siberia and Novogorod, and to take his quarters in Labian. Brigadier Nummers was likewise directed to march to Schacken, with the

C 2 regiments

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regiments of Smolensko and Refan, and to canton his troops on his arrival there.

On the 25th it was ordered, that from the day on which the Russian troops took possession of the country, all payments on account of the revenue should be delivered into the Empress's coffers; and that no disbursements should be made, without orders being given for that purpose.

The army quitted by degrees their settled quarters, and went by brigades into cantonments.

As most of what was fit for use had been taken away by the Prussians, the cannon and military stores found in Konigsberg and Pillau were not of such importance, that a list of them would be of any consequence to my readers.

S E C T I O N I. 21

On the 28th, an agreement was closed with one Salurgus, a merchant, respecting the delivery of a quantity of rye; and every regiment was ordered to take twenty lasts from him, and to make a provision of biscuit for fourteen days.

On the 30th, General Braun reported, that he was on the march from Tilsit, with his division.

On the 31st, upon intelligence being received that some Prussian troops were stationed in the suburbs of Elbing, Lieutenant General Count Romanzow was ordered to detach a field officer, with four hundred Hussars, to that place, with directions to cut off the Prussians, to take possession of the environs, and to make the Chief Magistrate, as well as all the inhabitants, take the oath of allegiance.

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On the 1st of February, the Council Chamber of Konigsberg was directed to collect two thousand horses from the adjacent country, in order that the best of them might be picked out, and distributed to the regiments.

On the 2d of February General Braun received orders to march with his division to Schippenbeil.

On the 3d, General Stoffeln was sent with a command, consisting of five hundred Hussars of the regiment of Serbien, under Major Tockeli, and the Tschoujew Cossacks, under Colonel Bulazell, to Marienburg, and other places on the Vistula, in order to reconnoitre the country, to procure provisions, and to secure any pontoons that he might find on the river.

On

On the 4th, five hundred horses were delivered from the country, of which one hundred were picked out for the artillery, and the rest distributed to the regiments, as bāt and baggage-horses.

On the 6th, the country made a second delivery of five hundred horses, which were likewise distributed to the artillery and the different regiments. The Commissary General of provisions, Prince Wolkonskoi, arrived at Königsberg. Brigadier Nummers was appointed president of the Council Chamber of Königsberg; and Brigadier Hartois of that of Gumbinnen. General Romanzow sent into head-quarters the Prussian Captain Diesfeld, with a non-commissioned officer and ten privates, who were all taken prisoners at Elbing.

On the 7th Major General Schilling was ordered to march, with three Cui-

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raffier regiments, from their cantonments, to Schirul, Olita, and through Serey to Oletzko; as was Colonel Gaugrave to march with two Cuirassier regiments, to Kowno. Lieutenant General Prince Dolgorucky was ordered to take three regiments of infantry from Prince Gallitzin's division, and to march with them towards Grodno, and join the corps of observation; and Prince Gallitzin received orders to follow this corps through Samogitia, with the rest of the regiments under his command.

On the 8th, it was made publickly known in Konigsberg, that the foreign commerce, as well as every other, should be quite free and unrestrained, with the exception of grain, of which such a quantity only was allowed to be sent out of the city as was wanted in the country for bread and seed,

On

On the 12th, the heavy artillery was brought from Memel to Königsberg, consisting of fourteen cannon, six \* unicorns, and three mortars. General Stoffeln reported, that he had taken possession of the town, Marienwerder, and had found some chests of arms, which the Prussians had left behind them, and some saddlery, cloathing, accoutrements, ammunition, &c. ; as also, in the magazine, 714 bushels of rye-flour, with 13 casks of salt ; and, in the harbour of the Vistula, 38 wooden pontoons, and a large vessel laden with cables and other tackle.

The Russian army, which had now returned into the kingdom of Prussia, and of which the infantry was assembled, and the cavalry on the march, consisted of the following regiments :

\* A species of artillery, which will be explained in the sequel.—*Translators.*

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### Five Cuirassier Regiments.

The Imperial Regiment, } each 690  
The Third Regiment, } men \*.

Regiments of Kiow, } each  
Nowotroitzkoi, } 414  
Kasan, } men.

\* General Mannstein reckons the strength of the three old Cuirassier regiments together 1640; so that each regiment contained five hundred and forty odd; but perhaps when he saw them they were incomplete, as was the case at the time alluded to in the text.

At this period Russia had in all six Cuirassier regiments, three old, and three new. The first remained in Russia. They were very brave, but miserably mounted; for they had lost many horses on the long march, and in the first campaign, and were under the necessity of remounting themselves where and how they could. There were no horses fit for the Cuirassiers in Russia, and they were obliged to buy them from Holstein. The Russian cavalry have no bags or portmanteaux; but all their baggage, of which they carry a great deal, and more than the infantry, is loaded on waggons. Their coats are blue, turned up and lined with red, and red waistcoats.—*Author.*

Five

# SECTION I. 27

## Five Regiments of Horse Grenadiers\*.

Regiments of	{ Saint Petersburg,	} each 414 men.
	Riga,	
	Refan,	
	Narva,	
	Kargapol,	

Four

\* The horse-grenadiers are the flower of their dragoons, but they were not better mounted; their horses were weak and small, and very much worked down. Their uniform is like that of the dragoons, viz. blue coats, turned up and lined with red, and straw-coloured waistcoats. They have a cap, which is a good defence against sun and rain, at the same time that it is very ornamental.

General Mannstein, in one part of his account of the Russians, reckons the strength of a complete regiment of Dragoons twelve hundred and thirty-one men; and in another only seven hundred. I have never been able to come at their true strength; but, according to the publick accounts, a regiment was only four hundred and fourteen strong. It is certain that they were very weak at the time I allude to in the text.

A clever cavalry officer, who saw the Russian cavalry during their last war † against the Turks, has assured

† It must be observed, that this was written in the year 1776.—  
*Translators.*

me,

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### Four Dragoon Regiments.

Regiments	{	of Tobol,	}	each 414 dra-
		Archangelgorod,		goons, and
		Tweer,		138 horse-
		Niefegrod,		grenadiers.

### Six Regiments of Hussars \*.

Regiments	{	of Serbien,	}	each 600 men.
		Hungary,		
		Moldavia,		
		Gurfini,		

1 squadron of new Serbien, } together  
 2 ditto of Slavano Serbien, } 500 men.  
 Schorwad, 1000 men.

me, that they are very much improved, not only in their horses, which, especially in the Cuirassier regiments, are large and strong, but also particularly in point of manœuvring. He saw them exercise; and asserts, that they are not inferior to any German cavalry.—*Author.*

\* These are good, brave, and well mounted for hussars.

The hussar furnishes his own horse, arms, &c. and keeps himself constantly equipped; towards which he receives one hundred and twenty rubels yearly.—*Author.*

One

# SECTION I. 29

One regular Regiment of Cossacks,  
called Tschoujew, 500 men.

36 Infantry Regiments \*.

*VIZ.*

1st Grenadier Regiment,	} Of two battalions each. Every battalion di- vided into five companies. Every regiment 2000 men strong.
2d Ditto,	
3d Ditto,	
4th Ditto,	

2d

\* The Grenadiers are very fine, both in point of men and cloathing. Their caps, which are a sort of helmet with plumes, give them a Roman appearance. The officers plumes are made of feathers; the soldiers, of yarn. They dress their hair in three curls, which they fasten themselves with little pieces of wood. It is astonishing to see these men, when they come off a fatiguing march, in bad weather, and bad roads, appear perfectly clean and well dressed an hour after their arrival in camp.

The Musketeers are very inferior to the Grenadiers; and they do not attend so much to their dress.

Every private in the Grenadiers wears large ruffles, and has both shoes and boots.

All the Infantry wear green coats, turned up and lined with red, and red waistcoats and breeches. On the

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2d regiment of Moscow.

Regiment of Wiburg.

Wiet,	} Each regiment of two battalions, making 10 mus- keteer, and 2 gre- nadier companies; in all, 1152 mus- keteers, and 400 grenadiers, per regiment.
Niefen,	
Permia,	
Niefegrod,	
Uglitsch,	
Asoph,	
Archangelgorod,	
Narva,	
Siberia,	
Troitzkoi,	
Kiow,	
Kafan,	
Schluffelburg,	}
Obscheron,	

the waistcoats they have little green lappels, and capes. In the summer they go in their waistcoats, and carry their coats on the waggons; they have also cloaks, which they roll and carry on their backs. General Mannstein calls the establishment of a musketeer regiment, including officers, 1575 men; but he does not reckon them in the field, at above 1000; that is, each battalion 500; and they could not be reckoned at more in this Campaign.—*Author.*

Saint

Saint Petersburg, }

Woron, }

Novogorod, }

Murom, }

Smolensko, }

Refan, }

Rastow, }

Ezernikow, }

Prul, }

Ladoga, }

Neus, }

Suldal, }

Belosero, }

Piskoff, }

Kexholm, }

Wologda. }

Each regiment of  
two battalions,  
making 10 mus-  
keteer, and 2 gre-  
nadier companies;  
in all, 1152 mus-  
keteers, and 400  
grenadiers, per  
regiment.

The new Corps, or Corps of Obser-  
vation \*.

\* These Regiments were lately raised. They were like the rest of the Infantry in every respect, only that they had, instead of swords, a sort of hatchet with a wooden handle, which was short, but strong, and as broad as a large hand.

These regiments were also incomplete.—*Author.*

This

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This corps consisted of Legions, or strong Regiments, of four battalions each, in all 20 battalions, and 32 companies of Grenadiers, viz.

1. Grenadier Regiment or Legion, 3540 men.

1st Musketeer Regiment	} Each 3216, Musketeers, and 816 Grenadiers.
or Legion.	
3d	
4th	
5th	

The strength therefore of the Russian army, if the regiments had been complete (which was far from being the case \*), would have been as follows :

\* Every tent or mess, both of Infantry and Cavalry, has a small waggon, which is conducted by one of the men of that tent or mess ; every provision waggon is conducted, in general, by soldiers ; and every Field Officer and Captain has always some men with him, under the appellation *Ordonnances*. The consequence of all this is, that on the day of battle full a fourth part of the fighting men are absent.—*Author*.

Cui-

# SECTION I. 33

Cuirassiers,	2622
Horse Grenadiers,	2622
Dragoons,	1656
Hussars, *	4400
Regular Cossacks,	500

—————  
Total of regular Cavalry 11800 Men.

## Infantry.

Grenadiers of the main army,	20800
Ditto of the new corps,	6804

—————  
Total of grenadiers, 27604  
—————

\* There is a mistake in the recapitulation. The Author gives you in the List, six regiments of Hussars : four of them at 600 each, one at 500, and one at 1000 : the numbers therefore are

2400	It seems as if he
500	had accounted for
1000	the regular Cos-
—	sacks twice, both

Total. 3900 as Hussars and separately. The sum total of the Cavalry therefore is, 11300, which will make an alteration of 500, in the sum total of regular troops.—*Translator.*

D

Muske-

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#### Musketeers.

Of the main army, 36864

Of the new corps, 12864

---

49728

---

Total of regular troops, 89132

---

#### Cossacks.

Don } Cossacks, \* { 9000  
Nobodi } { 5000

Calmucks, † 2000

---

Total 16000

---

The

\* It is impossible to ascertain their exact strength, even if you are serving with the army : besides, many of them remained in Prussia and Poland to cover the magazines.—*Author.*

† When General Fermer took the command of the army, he sent home not only a great part of the Cossacks, but also most of the Calmucks, because these latter are still more difficult to discipline than the former. I should think, therefore, that this number is too great, at least I saw very few Calmucks in the army.

These

The artillery, exclusive of the field pieces belonging to the regiments, which were 3 pounders, consisted of the following pieces, viz.

These Calmucks, or Calmuck Tartars, inhabit the borders of the Caspian Sea, and the banks of the river Wolga.

They are a free People, but under the protection of Russia; in return for which, they serve when called upon, and (according to General Mannstein) they receive as pay, only a rubel yearly, and a pellice of sheepskin. They are properly Wanderers; they have neither towns or villages, but live in tents of felt, and are constantly moving to such places as afford them most forage for their cattle, in which their whole property consists. They are extremely ugly, and such a resemblance prevails amongst them, that it is almost impossible to distinguish one from the other. Their faces are flat, and almost square; their eyes, like those of the Chinese, very small and sunk deep in their heads; their noses broad and flat: their mouths and ears particularly large; and their ears stand off from their heads.

They carry bows and arrows, with which they shoot remarkably far and true, but in wet windy weather, the shot is not so much to be feared. Some carry also rifle guns, and one or a brace of pistols. They are much more cruel than the Cossacks, and have the same dread of fire\*. They are of the heathen religion.

*Author.*

\* It seems rather inconsistent, that they should carry fire arms, and yet have such a dread of fire.—*Translators.*

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Cannon,	{ 12 pounders,	20
	{ 8 ditto,	26
	{ 6 ditto,	10
	Mortars,	6
	Schuwalows,	50
	Howitzes,	20
Unicorns,	{ 96 lbers,	{ 2
	{ 48 lbers,	{ 12
	{ 24 lbers,	{ 30
	{ 12 lbers,	{ 20
	3 and 6lb. unicorns,	28
	3 lb. unicorns for the dragoons.	18

—  
Total 242 \*

The brigade or field artillery consisted, therefore, chiefly in howitzes, of which they had three different sorts, of various calibres, viz.

\* This includes all the artillery belonging to the army and the corps of observation, but the whole was never with the army at one time.—*Author.*

I com-

## SECTION I.

37

- 1 common howitzes,
- 2 Unicorns,
- 3 Schuwalows, or secret howitze.

The first are like those of other armies, only that they have them of an extraordinary size.

The chamber of the Unicorn is of the conick form. The barrel is 10 calibres long. The center line of the trunnions divides the length of the barrel into two equal parts, and is a quarter of the height of the barrel from the bottom. They are of different calibres, from 3 to 96 lb. In pl. I. fig. 12. I have given a side-view of the barrel; and in fig. 13. a perpendicular section through the middle of it, in order that it may be the more easily compared to the 3 lber Schuwalow.

Even the dragoons and horse grenadiers have unicorns attached to them,

D 3

whose

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whose calibre is of three pound of iron, and on their axletree they have two cohorn mortars, of the calibre of 6lb of iron for small shells.

The Unicorns carry very far, but not with any great degree of certainty, and are troublesome to load; when it is necessary to fire with them at a great distance (and of course with considerable elevation), they are laid on a particular kind of carriage, some of which are always taken with the army for that purpose, and resemble ship-carriages without wheels.

The side pieces of these carriages are made of strong beams, which are exactly fitted and laid upon each other, and which are fastened by bolts. It is easy to see that the shells cannot be thrown with any great accuracy.

The

# SECTION I. 39

The Schuwalows take their name from a general Schuwalow of the artillery, who invented them. They had, by some accident, got into great repute in the preceding campaign. Those who have any knowledge of artillery will be best able to judge of their utility, by the help of pl. I. where I have given an exact drawing of one in all its parts. As the exterior periphery of the barrel is not parallel to the bore (by which it is probably intended to conceal the interior construction), there is a great quantity of superfluous metal; this makes them much heavier than they need be, and renders them cumbersome and unwieldy on marches, and in all movements. Their loading is also so troublesome and slow, that an active cavalry is in upon them before they can be loaded a second time, which was the case at Zornsdorf, where seventeen of them were lost. They did not at that

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battle do so much execution as had been expected from them, and were never afterwards so greatly esteemed as before.

These pieces were served by a separate corps, which was called the secret artillery; and even the officers of the rest of the artillery were not allowed to approach the Schuwalows, much less to inspect and examine them; more effectually to prevent which, they had caps locked on the muzzles,

The length of the barrel, fig. 1. is 18 diameters of the shot, and carries 3 lb. of iron. The diameter of the shot is divided into 24 parts for the scale. The horizontal diameter (or width) of the bore, is equal to that of 24lb. of iron; the perpendicular diameter (or height) 3lb; the chamber cylindrical; the width of the muzzle equal to the diameter

diameter of 8 lb.; the height equal to the diameter of 24 lb.; its shape is the same as that of the muzzle of a musketoon; and the axis of the muzzle-piece is equal in length to the height at the mouth; fig. 2.

Plan f. shews the rest of the construction.

The barrel is elevated or depressed by means of a screw. The cartridge, Fig. 10. is covered with flannel, and contains in general 5 lb. but when the distance of the object is very great, 6 lb. of crown powder\*—Of whatever nature the body may be that is fired out of it, its weight is 21 lb. The cartridge is introduced into the chamber by means of a hollow tin cylinder, into which the rammer is passed.

\* Crown powder is that which is made in the Imperial Powder Mills, and delivered out to the army. It has a fixed strength; and, under the name of crown powder, you get good weight, and the best sort of powder.—*Author.*

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The tubes (for firing) are made of a kind of sea-rush, with a quick match drawn through, and above they have a cup filled with mealed powder, &c. In the limber they carry 40 flannel cartridges, and 40 shells of a particular sort, or tin case shot; it is of course understood, that different kinds of bodies are fired as shot, or thrown as shells, out of the Schuwalows.

Viz. 1.) A sort of shells which are exactly of the same shape as the case shot, Fig. 8. and 9. and therefore are something in the form of a flask. These neither go far nor true on account of their shape.

2.) Fire-balls, whose form is like that of the former, but have five fire-holes.

3.) Grape-

3.) Grape-shot composed of seven iron balls, Fig. 6. and 7. which they carry to the distance of 1200 paces.--- The balls for that piece, which is represented in the plan, are of three pound each.

4.) Case-shot, containing 48 seven-ounce leaden balls, which they carry 600 paces.

5.) Case-shot, containing 168 two-ounce leaden balls, for 300 paces distance \*.

The uniform of the artillery and engineers is red, with black facings, cuffs, and linings, and straw-coloured waistcoats. The officers have black velvet; and those of the artillery are

\* Four of these Schuwalows were sent, in the year 1759, as a present, from the Empress of Russia, to the Empress of Germany.—*Author,*

richly

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richly laced with gold; those of the engineers with silver.

At the opening of the campaign the army was divided into three divisions as follows.

### Commander in Chief, General Fermer.

	1st.	2d.	3d. Division.
	General Braun.		
	Lieutenant Generals		
	Romanzow.	Soltikow.	Prince Gallitzin.
Major Generals	Baumann.	Panin,	Palmbach.
	Schilling.	Leontiew.	And Mannteufel.
	Prince Lubomirsky.		
	Mannteufel.		
Brigadiers	Demikow.	Treyden,	Plimenikow.
	Dietz.	Uwarow.	
	Berg.		
	Stojanow.		
	5. Regiments Cuirassiers.		
	5. Horse Grenadiers.		
	4. Hussars.	1 Regiment Hussars.	1 Regiment Hussars.
	4. Dragoons.		
	1. Regular Cossacks.		
	16. Infantry.	10. Ditto Infantry.	10. Ditto Infantry.
			Besides

Besides the above, you must reckon Brigadier Krasnotschockow, and the Colonel of the same name; also the irregular Cossacks, and the Calmucks from the river Wolga, with their Commander.

The Corps of Observation.

Lieutenant General Count Tschernitscheff.

Major General Wolgusky.

Brigadier Fast.

Five Regiments or Legions of Infantry, each of four Battalions.

This division of the army was soon changed, as will be seen in the sequel. In the Russian army there is no established order of battle according to rank; so that the regiments are continually changing their situations in the  
1
line,

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line, without any attention to seniority\*.

In order that the transporting the stores, provisions, and forage, might not fall so heavy on the inhabitants of Courland, two thousand carriages, with horses, &c. were collected in Prussia, and employed in conveying stores of all sorts from Courland to Konigsberg. The council chamber of Gumbinnen was likewise directed to send fifteen

\* This is a very good regulation. The paying so much attention to the rank and seniority of regiments, has often been productive of bad consequences, as the military history of France particularly proves. It is so much attended to by that nation, that if the regiments, who on account of their seniority are entitled to the Honour of making the first attack, are not at hand, the attack is postponed till they arrive, and most probably the favourable opportunity is lost by this delay, or the enemy gains time to intrench himself, and of course to render the attack more difficult and bloody: on the other hand, if this army is acting on the defensive, the Enemy may find out how it is drawn up, and direct his attack on the youngest and worst Regiments. *Author.*

hundred

hundred carriages to Grodno, to remove the magazine from thence to Tilsit.—General Braun advanced with two brigades to Raftenburg.

On the 16th of February Lieutenant Generals Romanzow and Soltikow received orders to leave their cantonments on the 22d, and to move towards the Vistula, as follows: viz. Six infantry regiments of generals Romanzow's and Treyden's brigades, to march straight towards Elbing; Major General Panin, with his brigade, to Marienburg and Pillau; and Major General Leontiew to Riesenburg and Gardenfee. The Council Chamber of Konigsberg was ordered immediately to appoint Commissaries, and to direct them, to procure forage every where for the regiments on their march, and to deliver the quantity required, taking receipts for the deliveries. The field officers, who were stationed

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at Grodno and Kowno with the magazines, also received orders to have 20000 Puds \* of flower in readiness for the regiments that would march through.

On the 17th of February, a report arrived from Prince Dolgorucky, from Mittau, purporting, that the regiments of Butyri and Plescow had begun their march, and that he expected to arrive himself at Ianischki on the 16th. An agreement was closed with the Polish General Stein, respecting the delivery of flower and groats on the Vistula.

On the 19th, General Fermer informed the Council of Regency of Konigsberg, and the different subordinate Chambers, that the Empress had appointed him Governor General of the Kingdom of Prussia.

\* One Pud is forty pounds. *Author.*

On the 22d, General Soltikow quitted his cantonments with his division, and began his march towards Elbing.

On the 23d Quarter Master General Stoffeln reported, that he was on his march from Marienwerder to Dantzig Werder \*; that previous to his departure, he had detached the Tschoujew Regiment under Major Preradewilsch to the city of Raftenburg; and that he had sent a party of Hussars, under the command of Major Tockeli, over the Vistula, with directions to advance as far as Butow in Pomerania, in order to watch the motions of the enemy. He published a manifesto in Poland, purporting, that all those who were willing to deliver hay and grain into the Russian magazines, on conditions of being im-

\* This means the isle of Dantzig. - See ~~Buching's~~ Geography, 7th German edition, 1st Part, p. 1230.  
*Translators.*

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mediately paid for the same, had only to announce themselves to him, and they would receive a certain sum in advance.

Notice was sent to General Braun, that General Romanzow had received directions to give up the command of the infantry regiments under his orders, to the eldest Colonel, of the cavalry, to Brigadier Demikow, and of the hussars, to Brigadier Stojanow, as he himself was to be intrusted with the command of a particular expedition. At the same time General Soltikow received orders to march to Elbing, and to occupy that place.

General Refanow took General Romanzow's place in the first division. Brigadier Treyden remained in Konigsberg as commandant of the town, and was invested with the command of the  
fourth

fourth Grenadier Regiment, and the Regiment of Troitzkoi, which lay in the town, as also of the Regiment of Permia, stationed in Pillau and Memel.

On the 25th General Stoffeln reported, that the cantonments were fixed and arranged for the General and Staff Officers, and for those regiments which had formed a Cordon along the Vistula.

On the 26th General Romanzow went to Stolpzi. Prince Wolkoniskoi was made temporary Governor of Konigsberg; and Colonel Iakoblew was appointed his assistant.

On the 2d of March the heavy artillery marched from Konigsberg to Marienwerder; to which place General Fermer repaired on the same day, after having been presented by the inha-

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bitants of Königsberg with 3000 ducats, as an acknowledgment for the order and discipline which he had maintained amongst the troops.

Lieutenant General Soltikow took possession of the Polish city of Elbing, notwithstanding the opposition that was made to him by the magistrate; for it was absolutely necessary that the Russians should have Elbing and Thorn, in order to be masters of the Vistula.

On the 4th of March General Fermer arrived at Elbing.

Prince Gallitzin was on the point of marching from Guldenberg to Thorn, and on the 6th 500 Cossacks joined his division, in order that he might detach them from Thorn, after he had occupied it, as occasion should require.

On

On the 8th, General Fermer went through Marienburg to Marienwerder.

On the 9th, Rear Admiral Kaschkin reported, that he had found at Memel 29 vessels, and in the Haff \* 64, which might be used as transports for conveying provisions, &c. and that ten more would soon be built. He immediately received directions to rig the new-built vessels, and to inform the proprietors of the others, through the Council Chamber of Königsberg, that they must keep them in complete order for service, and they should be paid accordingly.

Major Tockeli, who was posted with 235 Hussars and Cossacks on the other side of the Vistula, at Mewe and Neuburg, reported, that two detachments which he had sent out, the one to Bu-

\* This is the Currisch Haff, a large basin or harbour at the mouth of the river Niemen. *Translators.*

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tow on the borders of Pomerania, the other towards Silesia as far as the Polish town Komtsche, had returned without having seen or heard of any Prussian troops.

On account of the scarcity of forage, the squadrons which lay in Marienwerder were ordered to march back to Schippenbeil and Bartenstein, where they would join their respective divisions, which were on the march to those places, and be supplied from the Magazines.

On the 11th, Prince Gallitzin was ordered to have the works of Thorn inspected by the Engineers, as soon as he had taken possession of the town, and to have any necessary repairs executed without delay.

In

S E C T I O N I. 55

In consequence of a scarcity of Forage, it was ordered on the 12th, that no more horses should remain with each division, than were absolutely necessary for transporting the artillery and baggage; the rest were to be sent back into the country.

The 1st and 3d Divisions were directed to receive, from the Council Chamber at Gumbinnen, 2000 artillery and baggage horses.

General Braun reported, that his division had formed a Cordon as directed, and that he had taken his own quarters at Graudentz.

On the 13th, Prince Gallitzin arrived before the gates of Thorn with two regiments, and after he had, upon his promise of supporting a strict discipline amongst the troops, obtained from the

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magistrate a formal submission to the authority of the Empress, he made Colonel Derthen take possession of the Town with 400 Grenadiers, and caused a redout to be constructed, to cover the bridge over the Vistula.

The taking possession of these two Towns, viz. Elbing and Thorn, created a jealousy in Poland. The Generalissimo of the army of the crown, Count Branicki, made strong representations against it to the Russian Court, but the step was justified in a long and explicit answer, by the High Chancellor Woronzow.

Dantzic was, without doubt, the place of the greatest importance to the Russians, being so well adapted for their depot and place of arms, on account of its convenient harbour. The Russian Envoy, therefore, proposed to the chief  
magistrate

magistrate to allow the Empress's troops to take possession of one gate only, and the outworks, which proposition the French and Saxon Envoys supported in the strongest manner, having received directions from their respective courts to that purpose; but the magistrate declared, that he intended to observe the strictest neutrality, and immediately began to put the town in such a state of defence, as to secure it against a surprise.

The Russians having now extended and covered their quarters by occupying Elbing and Thorn, General Fermer fixed his head quarters in Marienwerder on the 19th of March. The army remained in their present situation till the month of May, and nothing happened, except a trifling skirmish at Butow, in which a few Prussian Dragoons were taken

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taken prisoners by a Russian detachment.

General Fermer kept up during this time the strictest discipline ; and he informed the Council Chambers in the different towns, that such as might have any complaints to make of injuries sustained from the troops, or of any irregularities committed by them, had only to apply to the military Council established at Konigsberg, and they would have immediate redress. He had also from the first made the best arrangements for establishing Magazines, and for supplying the army with every necessary. He had collected 30,000 sledges, and taken every measure to prevent the operations being checked in this campaign, as they were in the last, by a scarcity of provisions.

On

On the 14th Colonel Krasnotschokow and Major Tockeli received orders to patrol very diligently on the frontiers of Pomerania; also to make the inhabitants erect beacons at proper distances on the heights on the other side of the Vistula, and place the necessary guard to each, with directions to light them if any Prussian troops approached the Cordon.

On the 16th, Prince Gallitzin was ordered to construct a tête du Pont at Thorn, on the other side of the river. The different commanding officers were directed to be on their guard, to hold themselves in readiness to march, and to support good discipline amongst the troops in their cantonments.

Major General Nothhelfer of the artillery arrived at Marienwerder with  
the

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the first brigade of field artillery, which was subdivided into four brigades.

In consequence of the departure of Prince Wolkonskoi for Petersburg, the command of the Magazine at Konigsberg devolved on Brigadier Treyden, who was directed to remove it to Head Quarters, where it would be received by the deputy Commissary General of Provisions, Maslow.

On the 18th of March the bakers at Konigsberg had prepared 1170 kuhls of Biscuit, each khul weighing 210 pounds. The allowance was a khul per month for four men.

According to the report of Lieutenant Colonel Buddenbrock, 35,012 kuhls of flower, groats, corn and barley were delivered into the Magazines, on the 21st of March, so that the army was amply supplied.

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On the 11th of April General Panin was ordered to cross the Vistula, with the four regiments under his command, and the artillery belonging to them.

An express was despatched to Lieutenant General Tschernitscheff, to inform him, that the Empress had appointed General Braun to the command of the corps of Observation, in the place of General Soltikow; but that this corps still remained subject to the orders of the Commander in Chief, General Fermer.

On the 12th, General Soltikow succeeded General Braun in the command of the 1st division, and General Resanow took that of the 2d division.

In consequence of General Fermer's having requested, that the magistrate of Dantzic would admit the Russian troops

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troops into the outworks only, some deputies arrived from that city at the General's Quarters on the 13th. They were treated with much respect, and were dismissed with assurances, that, according to their desire, nothing more would be required of Dantzic, until they should have received answers to the expresses which they had despatched to the Russian and Polish courts.

Brigadier Stojanow, in consequence of information being received that the Prussians had a post in Butow, marched against it with 300 of the Serbien and Slavano-Serbien Hussars, and the Tschoujew Cossacks, and approached the town on the 14th instant. The Prussians immediately lighted their beacons, and a detachment of Hussars and Dragoons drew up before the place. The Russians, after a short skirmish, drove them back through the Town, and took  
five

S E C T I O N I. 63

five men and some horses, having, on on their side, only a few men wounded. About the same time, four regiments of Infantry, two of Hussars, and one of Cossacks, crossed the Vistula, and joined 2000 Don Cossacks, who were already posted on the other side of that river. As there was a great flood in the Vistula, it was impossible to throw a bridge over it before the middle of April.

On the 17th of April, the commanding officers were ordered to hold their divisions in readiness to march at the shortest notice.

On the 19th, intelligence was received, that Captain Prince Dadian had arrived at Königsberg with the 2d column of Artillery, as also Colonel Wilmoth with another division of it.

Count

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Count Tschernitscheff reported, that he had arrived at Grodno, and was expecting at that place the grenadier and third musketeer Legions of the corps of Observation, on whose arrival Prince Dolgorucky's brigade would advance from Grodno. Also, that the other regiments, which were moving in different columns, would hasten their march as much as possible.

As none of the Patroles or reconnoitring parties had yet brought in any account of the Prussian army, Major Lucka was detached on the 12th of April from General Panin's corps at Dirschau, with a considerable body of light troops, to procure intelligence of it, if possible.

On the 23d of April, rear Admiral Kaschkin reported, that the galleys and bombketch under his command at  
Memel

Memel and Liebau were in failing order. On the same day General Panin announced the arrival of the two infantry regiments on the Vistula, which were sent as a reinforcement to his corps.

On the 24th, the deputy commissary General of provisions, Maslow, arrived at head quarters, with the Proviant train, and the whole of his department.

General Fermer went to Graudentz to make some necessary arrangements.

A detachment, which had been sent out to reconnoitre, brought intelligence, that the Prussian General Platen was stationed with a corps at Butow.

Major Iucka returned with his detachment, and reported, that he had crossed the great road leading from Dantzic into Pomerania, and had advanced

F

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vanced almost to the sea shore; also that he had approached within eight wersts\* of the frontiers of Pomerania, without having seen any thing of the enemy; but had learnt, that a Prussian regiment of Dragoons lay in Stolpe, and that some Hussars were stationed in Lauenburg, and Butow.

Brigadier Stojanow was sent out to reconnoitre the country and examine the roads.

About the end of May the Russian army began to move.

On the 21st of May the Corps of Observation marched from Grodno to Rynka, in order to approach the Vistula.

On the 31st Prince Gallitzin's division encamped at Bromberg, and practised its different evolutions and exercises.

\* Seven Wersts make a German mile. *Author.*

General

## SECTION I. 67

General Nothelfer reported, that the fourth brigade of the artillery belonging to the 3d division had crossed the Vistula. Different reconnoitring parties brought intelligence, that the Prussian General Platen was at Wœhski, a German mile from Butow, with 16,000 men, and was busy in intrenching himself.

On the 1st of June, Brigadier Demikow was made Major General, and was detached with 2000 Cossacks, 3000 Hussars, and 2000 horse Grenadiers, from General Romanzow's corps, towards the frontiers of Pomerania and the New Marche, where he levied contributions, and brought off all the cattle and horses that he could find.

About the end of December of the foregoing year, the Prussian troops which returned from Prussia, under

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the command of Marshal Lehwald, had so entirely checked the progress of the Swedes, that these latter were obliged to shut themselves up in Stralsund; and in Prussian Pomerania they only kept possession of Anclam, and the Penamund Fort. Anclam capitulated on the 4th of January, and the garrison, consisting of three officers and 94 men, surrendered as prisoners of war. The fort remained blockaded by the Prussians.

A corps, commanded by the Prince of Holstein Gottorp, advanced into the Dutchy of Mecklenburg, and levied considerable contributions in money, forage, provisions, and recruits. On the 27th of January he took possession of Wismar, and on the 6th of February, of Rostock.

About the middle of February, the Prince of Holstein, and Major General

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Count Finkenstein, advanced into the dutchy of Luneburg, with the two regiments of Dragoons, Holstein and Finkenstein, three squadrons of the Huffars of Ruefch, and two of Malachowsky, and proceeded from thence to the allied army.

In the beginning of March, Marshal Lehwald resigned the command of the army, in consequence of his age and infirmities, and it was given to Lieutenant General Count Dohna. He immediately made preparations for the siege of the Penamund fort, which was begun on the ninth of March, and finished with the capitulation of the garrison on the 13th.

On the third of April, the Swedes attempted to retake the fort by water, but did not succeed. They had, on this occasion, a captain and 16 men killed

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and an officer and 63 men taken prisoners.

Soon after this, Major General Platen was detached with his regiment of dragoons, and some infantry, to Stolpe in Farther Pomerania, in order to check the incursions of the Cossacks.

On the 4th of June the Russian General Prince Gallitzin reported, that the Schorwad regiment, consisting of 1000 hussars, had arrived at Bromberg.

On the 9th of June, General Panin received orders to quit his camp at Dirschau, and to march with his division through Stargard to Conitz.

General Romanzow crossed the Vistula with the cavalry, and marched in-

to the camp that was marked out at Neuenburg.

Major Gerbel, with two other Officers of the Engineers, were sent forward to Tuchol and Conitz, towards which places the army was to direct its march, with orders to reconnoitre the banks of the Netze river, and to examine in what parts it could most easily be passed: they were to make their report as soon as possible.

On the 10th of June, the Russian main army began to cross the Vistula.

On the 13th, the Prussian troops, who had been employed in the blockade of Mecklenburg Schwerin, were ordered to raise it.

On the 15th all the Prussian regiments, who had been in winter quar-

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ters in Mecklenburg, moved into Hither Pomerania, and, by an order from the King, 500,000 thalers of the contributions levied in Mecklenburg were returned to the inhabitants. Part of these troops followed General Platen into Farther Pomerania, as a reinforcement to his corps; the rest remained in cantonments till the 18th; on which day Count Dohna raised the blockade of Stralsund, drew his troops together, and on the 19th encamped at Treuen near Loitz. The King of Prussia did not think it advisable to make this army advance again into Prussia, well knowing, that, by attempting to cover too great an extent of country, you in general weaken your line of defence, and thus leave the whole open. For the same reason, at the breaking out of the war, he had evacuated Wesel, and all his Westphalian territory. By this means he procured the great advantage  
of

## SECTION I. 73

of being able to keep the different armies and corps, into which he was obliged to divide his troops, sufficiently together to support each other, which enabled him to make head against the superior armies of his enemies, and whilst he kept one of these in check by clever movements, or well chosen positions, to fall upon another before they were aware of it, with an equal, if not a superior force. These are advantages which the Prussian army is well calculated to seize and make use of. The King is the main spring, which gives motion to the whole. In any sudden change of circumstances, no time is lost in long deliberations, or tedious applications to superior authority, nor is there any danger of the enemy's becoming acquainted with the plan of operations.—Every thing originates with the King—he is on the spot—his decisions are quick; and  
none

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none are intrusted but those in whom he can perfectly confide. The different Prussian corps, therefore, may be considered as the wheels of the same machine, actuated by the same spring, and working with an exact corresponding motion.

There was another advantage attending the evacuating the kingdom of Prussia, which amply counterbalanced the harm that the Russians did to the country, by levying contributions of money and provisions. The further from home and from their sea-ports that they were obliged to carry on the war, the more expensive and more difficult did it of course become. If they could have taken possession of Dantzic, and made use of its harbour, their advance into the country would certainly have been more to be dreaded. But the Prussians undoubtedly knew  
by

by this time what they had to expect from the city of Dantzic, and the Court of Warsaw. The Russians could not establish themselves further forward in Pomerania or Brandenburg, on account of the fortresses, Colberg, Stettin, and Custrin; and, at most, they could only possess themselves of a tract along the frontiers of Poland, in which indeed it was impossible to take their winter quarters; nor could they maintain it for any time; first, because they were not in possession of any fortified towns; and secondly, because they were obliged to have their magazines so far in their rear.--Moreover, the kingdom of Prussia did not suffer near so much, in consequence of submitting to the Russians, and being considered in the light of a conquered country, as if it had been made the theatre of the campaign. In that case, as there are no fortresses in the interior of the kingdom, the Prussians,

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flans, who were so much inferior in force to the Russians, must have endeavoured to check the progress of these latter, by clever manœuvres and marches, which would inevitably have occasioned the destruction of the country.

On the 20th of June, the following skirmish happened at Ratzebur: Major General Platen sent Captain Zettmar, with 90 hussars and 20 dragoons, from Stolpe to Neu—Stolpe and Neu—Stettin, in order to gain intelligence of the Russians. The Captain was informed, that a party of 60 Cossacks had shewn themselves in those environs. He determined to find them if possible; but General Demikow, who had discovered him, detached Brigadier Krasnotschokow and Colonel Datschein, with 500 Cossacks, to cut him off; and at the same time ordered Brigadier Stojanow, together with Colonel Szoricz, Lieutenant

nant Colonel Tockeli, and Major Foltkern, to march with a body of troops to support this detachment. Captain Zettmar was furrounded by them in a wood, and attacked on all sides. He cut his way through three different times, and was pursued to Neu-Stettin, where he received a reinforcement; and the Russians, in consequence, retired in good order. The Prussians had about 20 men killed, and a cornet and 31 men taken prisoners. The Russians had about 30 men killed and wounded. The town of Ratzebur and the adjacent villages were entirely plundered, many people killed, and others, particularly women, very ill treated by the Russians, who carried off into Poland some thousand head of cattle, and as many sheep.

General Demikow, after he had almost entirely laid waste the country in the neighbourhood of Neu-Stettin, marched

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marched his corps through the lordship of Draheim towards the New Marche, and having done the same in the districts of Dramburg and Arenswalde, he retired over the river Drage into Poland\*.

Major

\* The publick prints may perhaps have been guilty of some exaggeration, but it cannot be denied, that the Cossacks committed many cruelties and excesses in this incursion, as well as afterwards, and particularly after the battle of Zornsdorf, it would, however, be very unjust to lay this to the charge of the commanding Generals, or to accuse the rest of the Russian troops of the same bad conduct and want of discipline. The Cossacks in general, when they go out upon party, lead a horse, on which they get when the one that they are mounted upon is tired: thus they will go ten or twelve German miles in one excursion, plunder and burn one or two villages, and be in the camp again almost before they are missed. Even the Russian officers, if they ride out alone, are not safe for them. The only method of being in perfect security is, to take some hussars, dragoons, or some of the Tschoujew regiment of Cossacks, as an escort. These, as well as all the Russian regular troops, detest the Cossacks, and make them suffer if they find them plundering.

General Fermer was so far from countenancing the above mentioned excesses, that he brought General Demikow to a trial, who excused himself by alleging the impossibility

Major General Platen's corps consisted of the grenadier battalion of Neffe, the free regiment of Hordt, the dragoon regiment of Platen, and some hussars. With these troops he cotoyed General Demikow along the borders of Pomerania. He detached Colonel Hordt, with his regiment, and 40 hussars, to Driefen \*, which place was occupied by

impossibility of keeping those people in any order. I knew General Demikow very well, and will do him the justice to say, that no man can less deserve the character of harshness and cruelty than he did. He often confessed to me, that he considered it as the greatest misfortune to have Cossacks under his command. He distinguished himself very much at the battle of Zornsdorf, and was killed at that of Baltzig.—*Author.*

\* Driefen is an unfortified town on the Netze. There was an earthen work of four bastions, well palli-faded, with a good wet ditch, constructed for the defence of the bridge; it was almost surrounded by a morass, and was a very good defence against a coup de main, or an attack of light troops. It never could stand any siege, particularly as it was so small, that a few shells thrown in would greatly annoy the troops who defended it. Afterwards, when it fell into the hands of the

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by only two hundred militia, commanded by Major Schwerin. The regiment of Hordt had not been raised above four or five months; it was between eight and nine hundred men strong, and consisted chiefly of Austrian and Swedish prisoners and deserters. Count Dohna was on the march with his army towards Custrin, and the rest of General Platen's troops joined his advanced corps, which was commanded by Lieutenant General Canitz.

On the 26th of June, the Prussian army passed the Pene, and Hither Pomerania was abandoned to the mercy of the Swedes, without its being in the power of the Prussians to oppose them.

The Russian avant corps had ad-

the Russians, the works were increased by Colonel du Moulin, but they abandoned it when they retired into winter quarters.—*Author.*

vanced

vanced to Meferitz. It was impossible to discover the real plan of operations ; but as the Russians, upon their finding that Dantzic refused them admittance, did not immediately endeavour to get possession of Colberg, in order to secure a place of arms and sea port, which would have greatly facilitated their operations in Brandenburg and Pomerania, and ensured their winter quarters at the close of the campaign, it was natural to conclude, that they intended to bend towards Silesia, in order to succour the Austrian army, which was very much weakened and distressed by the unfortunate battle of Leuthen, at the close of the foregoing year, and the consequent loss of the greatest part of Silesia :—Nobody could suppose that they entertained an idea of laying siege to Custrin.

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Count Dohna, when he found that the Russian army was advancing, ordered General Canitz to retire, with his corps, from Landsberg across the Oder, and left only Major Generals Below and Ruefch, with the grenadier battalion of Nefse, and 500 hussars, on the other side of the river, in front of Custrin.

On the 28th of June General Fermer began his march with the first division, and the field artillery, and arrived on the 29th at Dlug Gossina.

General Romanzow reported, that a party, detached from his corps, had taken the Prussian Colonel Kosel and 20 men prisoners, in the castle of Draheim\*, near Tempelburg; that they had spiked 15 iron guns, broke the

\* The castle of Draheim, as it is called, is not a fortress, but merely a large redout, nearly gone to ruin: the troops that occupied it were invalids.—*Author.*

arms,

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arms, and thrown the ammunition into the water.

The 30th was a halting-day, and each regiment received 60 head of the cattle, and 150 of the sheep, that were collected in Pomerania: 125 oxen and 2050 sheep that remained were kept with the division.

On the 1st of July General Fermer encamped with the first division near Posen\*, in one line, having the river Warta in his rear, and the town of Posen in the rear of the left flank. As he had nothing to fear from the Prussians, he, in taking this camp, only studied the convenience of the troops.

Two or three hundred Cossacks scoured the country in the neighbour-

\* A town on the Warta, which is known either by the name of Posen, or Pcsnan.—*Translators.*

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hood of Driesen, and plundered all the adjacent villages. The commanding officer of the troops in the fort detached Captain Knobelsdorf with 40 hussars against them, who dispersed them, killed 20, and retook the cattle which they were carrying off: he pursued them as far as Sorge, and had 10 men killed and wounded. Some other Russian parties made incursions into Silesia, took the Prince of Hatzfeld prisoner from Trachenberg to Thorn, and levied contributions in money and cattle, threatening to burn any villages whose inhabitants should attempt to oppose them.

On the 2d of July, the second division of the Russian army, with its artillery and baggage, marched into the camp at Posen..

On

S E C T I O N I. 85

On the 3d, a proper garrison marched into Posen to protect the magazine.

General Romanzow had crossed the Warta at Wronki, and encamped there. He reported on the 4th, that the party which he had detached against Driesen was returned, after having had a skirmish, in which 15 Prussians were killed, and a trumpeter, a hussar, some Bosniacks \*, and 10 horses, taken.

On the 5th, orders were sent to Major General Iefremow and Colonel Haakt, to hasten their march to the army, with the Cossacks and Calmucks, and to keep up good discipline amongst them.

\* The regiment of Bosniacks had not long been raised. They were light cavalry, clothed and armed like the Turkish Bosniacks, and carried pikes like the Cossacks. The idea in raising them perhaps was, to accustom the hussars to these sort of arms, and to prevent the impression which the novelty of them might occasion.—*Author.*

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General Romanzow \* was ordered to defend the Vistula against any Prussian parties that might attempt to cross it. As the Russian army always carries with it, and consumes, a great quantity of provisions, owing to the number of light troops and attendants, it must necessarily have very large magazines in its rear: these must be well protected; which not only shackles the operations, but also the main army is much weakened, by the number of detachments which it is obliged to make for this purpose.

\* This must mean General Resanow, who was left on the Vistula. General Romanzow was at this time co-operating with the main army, as has been already seen, and had crossed the Warta at Wronki. It also appears, in a subsequent part, that General Resanow was left in the neighbourhood of Marienwerder. In short, if General Romanzow was co-operating with the main army on the Warta, he could not at the same time be employed in the defence of the passage of the Vistula; therefore it is most probable, that the author means General Resanow, who was certainly left on that river.—*Translators.*

The

S E C T I O N I. 87

The Russian army was now occupied in baking their biscuit.

On the 8th of July General Romanzow reported, that Captain Schoelting, who had been sent out upon party, had carried off a Prussian out-post, consisting of a Lieutenant and 30 men. On the same day 314 carriages arrived, with groats, flour, and biscuit, from Prussia; and the Austrian Major Marliani brought an account of the advantages which the Austrians had gained in Moravia, and of the raising of the siege of Ollmutz by the Prussians.

On the 9th a detachment of 450 cavalry was sent to General Braun, with orders for him to join the main army with the corps of observation as soon as possible.

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On the 10th of July, General Demikow appeared before Driesen, with his light troops and some cannon. He summoned the fort to surrender; but the commanding officer and Colonel Hordt declared, that they were resolved to defend it to the last. General Demikow dismounted his dragoons, and attacked the works, keeping up a very brisk fire from the artillery \* and small arms. He continued this till the next morning, when he retired, finding that the place was too well defended to be carried without infantry and heavy artillery. The Cossacks set fire to the suburbs, and plundered the environs. There were not a great number of killed and wounded on either side †.

On

\* They were unicorns of 3lb. calibre.—*Author.*

† Such an attack as this, in which the troops march up to the counterscarp of a wet ditch, expose themselves to the fire from the works, and return that fire without any

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On the 11th, General Fermer marched with the 1st and 2d divisions from the camp at Posen to Straschicke.

The 12th was a halting-day; and Major Karabonow reported, that he had made an irruption into Silesia with 250 Don Cossacks, but was obliged to retreat, in consequence of the approach of a strong Prussian party, consisting of 600 infantry, and 150 hussars: he had 13 men killed, and one wounded. A reinforcement was immediately sent to him.

On the 13th, the Russian army marched to Jankowitz. It encamped

any possibility of covering themselves, will certainly astonish most of my readers: but, if they examine General Mannstein's account of Russia, they will find, that this is a very common thing amongst the Russians, and that they have often taken fortified places in this manner:—the taking of Oczakow, in 1737, is a striking example.—*Author.*

in

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in two lines. Jankowitz lay in front of the left flank; and in the rear ran a long ravine, with two long narrow lakes in it.

On the 14th of July, a considerable body of troops, furnished with artillery, was detached from the Russian main army against Driesen, with directions to destroy the place, if the garrison in the fort made any further resistance. Another detachment marched by Neubruck towards Woldenberg, in order to cut off the retreat of the troops from Driesen. The fort not being able to stand a bombardment, as has been mentioned above, the Commanding Officer thought it advisable to save his troops, and retire to Custrin. He retreated, in conjunction with Colonel Hordt, by the way of Friedeberg. Driesen was taken possession of by Brigadier Jeropkin, and the whole light cavalry,

cavalry, consisting of Cossacks and hussars, was detached in pursuit of Colonel Hordt, whom they overtook near Friedeberg: they attacked him all sides: he prepared for his defence like a brave man; but 400 men of his regiment immediately deserted to the Russians; notwithstanding which, he retired so cleverly, and in such close order, with the rest of his regiment, the party of militia, and three cannon, that the light troops could not make any impression on him. They kept continually skirmishing with him, 'till Major General Ruefch came to his support with a body of Prussian hussars; upon which the Russians retreated to Driesen. These hussars belonged to the avant corps of Count Dohna's army, which had passed the Oder at Custrin, and had advanced to Landsberg, to oppose the Russians in the passage of the Warta: it was com-  
manded

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manded by General Canitz, and consisted of six battalions, and 1000 cavalry, besides the troops which General Platen had brought from Farther Pomerania.

On the 15th of July, the Russian main army advanced to Biten, where they encamped in the form of a sharp reentrant angle, in order to save the standing corn: there was a lake in the rear, and the village of Biten lay behind the left flank.

On the 18th they marched to Pnewe. The camp formed a salient angle, which enclosed the town of Pnewe, and the lake that is close to it. The latter lay behind the right wing; the former, behind the left wing and the salient point of the angle. Five *flèches* were thrown

thrown up in the front, and the artillery placed in them \*.

On the 19th of July Major Engelhard brought 740 prisoners and deserters of the Prussian army into the Russian headquarters, most of whom were Austrians by birth; some had been taken in a skirmish near the village of Noretz, but the greatest part had belonged to Colonel Hordt's regiment.

On the 20th, Lieutenant General Romanzow was directed to supply the garrison of Driesen with provisions from the magazine at Wronki, and to order brigadier Jeropkin to march with his

\* The Russian artillery is always divided into four or six brigades, each of which has its particular park. As soon as the army has marched into its camp, these brigades are formed on advantageous spots in the front, and immediately covered by a well constructed flèche or redout. This rule is constantly observed, even should there not be the smallest chance of an attack. *Author.*

detach-

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detachment across the Netze, and post himself on the river Berda, from whence he was constantly to send out parties to watch the motions of the enemy.

On the 21st the Russian army marched to Linei, about a German mile and  $\frac{1}{6}$  \*. It encamped in a sort of potence, having the village and a large pond and morafs in its rear. The right flank of the right wing, which formed the potence, was appuyed to a morafs and a wood; there was also a wood in front of the left wing. The salient point of the position, as well as the flank of the left wing, were covered by strong batteries.

Brigadier Stojanow was detached with the Hussars of Serbien to Meseritz, as a

\* All the marches that the Russian army makes are measured by wersts and toises, which I have described at large in my Field Engineer: for the convenience of my readers, I have here given them in German miles, one of which comprises 7 wersts. *Author.*

rein-

reinforcement to the party of Dragoons and Cossacks which was stationed there with the deputy Commissary General of provisions, Maslow, to cover the Magazine that was forming.

Orders were sent to General Braun, who was advancing from Prussia with the Corps of Observation, to hasten his march as much as possible. The march route from Posen to Paradise Cloister was sent him, with directions to collect a month's subsistence for his corps on the frontiers of Brandenburg.

On the same day the Prussian General Count Dohna arrived with his army on the heights of Lebus, having marched from Swedish Pomerania, through Pasewalk, Schwed, and Angermunde.

On the 23d of July the Russian army marched three long German miles to the town

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town of Ptscheff. It was encamped in two divisions, with the town and a small lake between them. General Romanzow was ordered to detach all the Hussars of his corps to Schwerin, where they were to take post and remain : he was also directed to patrolle diligently towards Meseritz, and along the frontier of Brandenburg, and to watch the Prussian movements very closely.

On the 24th of July the Prussian army, under Count Dohna, encamped in the district of Lebus, about a German mile from Franckfurt on the Oder. As the Russian light troops swarmed all over the country, there now began to be daily skirmishes between them and the Prussians, which, however, were not of sufficient consequence to be noticed. The Russian Lieutenant Colonel Tockeli, and Major Karabonow, surprised the suburb of Glogau, alarmed the gar-  
rison,

rison, and carried off 750 head of cattle, and 15 horses, which they sent under a proper escort to General Braun's corps.

On the 26th of July, the Russian army marched to Meseritz. The two lines, in which it encamped, were separated from each other by a small stream, over which several bridges were thrown. The \* head quarter was on the right flank of the first line; the town of Meseritz lay close to the right flank of the 2nd line, and the river Ober in the rear. In front of the 1st line there were four redouts thrown up, and in the front of the second, three.

\* It is customary, in the Russian army, for all the Generals, the Field Marshals not excepted, to encamp; but late in the season they sometimes lay in houses. The tents in which they sleep are made of lattice-work, which folds together, and is covered with strong felt. They are very warm, and proof against all weather.—

*Author.*

H

On

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On the 28th of July, Lieutenant General Canitz's corps arrived in the Prussian camp near Lebus.

As the Russian light troops were advancing more and more into the circle of Sternberg, the Prussian Major General Malachowsky was ordered on the 30th to cross the Oder at Franckfurt, with the free regiment of Hordt, and what Hussars remained with the army, in order to watch very narrowly the motions of the Russians. He posted the infantry in Reppen, and the main body of Hussars at Drossen, and detached an out-post of 100 Hussars to Sternberg.

On the 31st of July Count Dohna marched with the army from Lebus, and encamped at Franckfurt. On this day the Russian army was employed in baking bread and biscuit, from which  
4 they

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they had been hindred during some days by the continual rain \*.

### General

\* The Russian soldiers receive grain instead of bread, which they grind, or rather bruise in hand-mills. Every tent has one of these mills. When they have thus prepared it, they put it into a tub, or, in case of necessity, into a hole dug in the earth, with a cloth spread in it: they then make it into a dough with water, which they divide into small loaves, or rather cakes. Having done this, they dig a hole in the face of a hill, or in a ridge, in the form of a half globe, with a vent at top; in this they make a large fire, and when it is thoroughly heated, after having taken out the ashes, they put in the cakes, and let them remain until they are half baked: they cannot bake them thoroughly at once, and when they take them out, they are always quite moist in the inside, and not fit to eat. They next break or cut them into small pieces, and dry them well in the sun, or, which is more common, bake them a second time.

This biscuit, if one may call it so, looks like the burnt mortar that comes out of an oven, and it requires good teeth, and better gums to chew it, which latter indeed often bleed in the operation; they seldom, however, eat it without bruising it, and making it into a porridge, with boiling water, salt, and a spoonful of flower. If they are short of biscuit, and have not time to bake, they make this porridge with the raw flower. Our soldiers, who are used to better living, would not relish this sort of food; the Russian is not only content

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General Braun received orders to detach a party of light troops to the nearest places on the frontiers of Brandenburg and Silesia, and to collect 1500 or 2000 horses for the use of the artillery and baggage, observing at the same time the strictest discipline and regularity : these were meant to assist in drawing the baggage and artillery of the Corps of Observation, the horses of which were almost worked down, by the long and difficult marches that they had performed.

with it, but he will undergo hunger, and the greatest hardships without murmuring, if he is told that the Empress has ordered it, and that he pleases her in thus obeying her commands. Desertion is a thing hardly known amongst them. What may not be undertaken with such troops !

It is extraordinary that each tent has a carriage to convey its stores and provisions, with which a man constantly remains to conduct it: by this means the army is deprived of a great number of fighting men on the day of a battle.—*Author.*

The

S E C T I O N I. 101

The Hussars of Moldavia, and three Pulks of Cossacks, were sent to join General Braun, in order that he might make use of them on out-posts, &c.

On the 1st of August, Quarter Master General Stoffeln was sent with a considerable detachment of light troops, and 300 dragoons, to dislodge the Prussians from Lagow and Zielentzig, and to take possession of those places. The army was employed this day in making biscuit. The Prussians were driven out of Sternberg, and that town was occupied by some of the Russian light troops.

On the 2d of August, General Fermer quitted his camp at Meseritz, marched 2 and  $\frac{5}{8}$  German miles, and encamped near Konigswalde, a town of Brandenburg, close on the Polish frontier. His army consisted of 28 regiments of infantry, and had very few

light troops with it, as the whole cavalry was detached. It encamped in two lines; the 1st on the Brandenburg, the 2d on the Polish, territory: Königswalde lay in front of the center.

Quarter Master General Stoffeln had, in the mean time, made himself master of Lagow, and had caused 200 Prussian hussars to be pursued from Zielentzig to Reppen.

Lieutenant General Romanzow was directed not to move towards Sonneburg with the cavalry, but to march to the village of Dragomarg, there to encamp in a parallel line with the army, and wait for further orders.

The post at Reppen was reinforced by a detachment from the Prussian camp, consisting of 5 squadrons of the regiment of Schorlemmer, and 5 of Platten-

Plattenberg, commanded by Lieutenant General Marschall; as also of three battalions of infantry under Lieutenant General Mannteufel, which arrived at Reppen on the 3d of August. On the same day seven battalions, commanded by Major Generals Kurfel and Dierecke, arrived in the Prussian camp from Silesia. This was the corps which had been left behind for the defence of the mountains in the neighbourhood of Landshut and Glatz, when the King of Prussia marched with the army into Moravia, and which his Majesty had detached to the neighbourhood of Glogau, upon the approach of the Russians to Posen; but when these latter began to direct their march towards the frontiers of the New Marche, those battalions were ordered to join Count Dohna's army. The grenadier battalion of Burgsdorf was the only one that remained behind: this was left in Glo-

gau, in order to enable that garrison to make some defence, in case it should be attacked. On the same day two regiments of Cuirassiers, viz. that of the Prince of Prussia, and that of Marggraf Frederick, arrived in the camp at Franckfurt from Prince Henry's army in Saxony.

On the side of the Russians, General Romanzow was ordered to detach a party of light troops, under a clever Field Officer, to Cosslin, in order to discover the strength of the garrison of Colberg: if he should find it abandoned, he was to take possession of it, and report accordingly; if not, he was to get all the intelligence he could, and return to Landsberg, bringing a certificate from the magistrate at Cosslin, of his having maintained good discipline amongst the troops under his command, during his stay in that neighbourhood.

On

On the same day Prince Charles of Poland and Saxony arrived in the Russian camp from Warsaw. General Fermer and the rest of the Generals received him in front of the lines with the proper ceremony.

Information having been received in the Russian camp, that a Prussian corps was stationed on this side of the Oder, Brigadier Stojanow was detached with 1000 hussars, 100 grenadiers, and 300 Cossacks, to take as many prisoners as he could, in order, if possible, to gain some authentick intelligence. Colonel Bulatzell was also detached on a reconnoitring party towards Sonneburg and Droffen.

On the 4th of August the Russian army was employed in baking.

Major

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Major General Dietz was sent with his brigade of infantry, and 500 light cavalry, by the way of Hammer to Landsberg. All the heavy baggage followed him; and nothing remained with the army but the field artillery, and some light waggons.

Lieutenant Colonel Aschikow was ordered to have all the provisions, &c. in the magazine at Posen, transported upon hired carriages, in the quickest manner, to Landsberg.

This day the Prussian corps at Repen remained quiet in its post. But in the night of the 5th, Major General Malachowsky marched with the hussars towards Sternberg, in order to drive from thence a strong Russian detachment, commanded by Brigadier Stojanow. Major General Dierecke followed with four battalions, as a support to the hussars.

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hussars. The Russians had also marched in the night, with an intent to attack the Prussian corps at Reppen. The two advanced guards met unexpectedly in the village of Potschen. The Russian hussars were attacked by the Prussian, and driven back upon their infantry. The skirmish was sharp; there were some officers and several privates killed, but not any very considerable number.

General Malachowsky immediately retired to Reppen.

The Russian Lieutenant General Count Tschernitscheff reported to Head Quarters, that General Braun had resigned to him the command of the Corps of Observation, being prevented by sickness from proceeding any further himself, and had directed him to march it in several columns, by the way of  
Birnbaum

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Birnbaum to Schwerin, where he was to cross the Warta, and would find a sufficiency of forage and provisions.

On the 6th of August, General Dietz reported, that he had arrived with his brigade at Landsberg, having halted the night before at Hammer : also, that he had received intelligence that the Prussian General Ruesch had marched with a battalion of grenadiers, 600 hussars and dragoons, and three pieces of cannon, from Custrin towards Landsberg, to surprise and carry off the garrison of that place : that he had halted in a wood about a German mile from the town on the night of the 3d, with an intention to execute his project on the 4th ; but that on finding from a spy, that the detachment in the town was stronger than he expected, he had retired to Soldin, determining to wait there for a reinforcement from the army, and then

then to attack Landsberg on both sides at the same time.

The Russian army was still busy with baking and thrashing.

General Tschernitscheff received orders to march immediately with the Corps of Observation from Paradise Cloister, through Birnbaum and Schwerin, and encamp at Landsberg; to which place the main army would march the next day: on his arrival there, he was to oblige the country to deliver an ample quantity of provisions and forage, but on no account to allow his troops to exceed the bounds of good discipline.

Colonel Dalke, who had been left to cover the magazine at Posen, was ordered to send the sick and convalescents, and the whole remaining store of provisions,

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vifions, from Pofen by the way of Driefen to Landfberg, along the right bank of the Warta, making ufe of the horfes belonging to the inhabitants of the neighbourhood to draw the carts and waggons ; alfo to march himfelf, together with the deputy Commiffary General Tſchitkow, by the ſame route, and join the army. An expreſs was likewiſe ſent to Colonel Buddenbruck, with orders, that all convoys of ſtores, money, &c. that might come to the army from Thorn, ſhould not take the route of Pofen, but direct their march more to the right towards Landfberg, or by Labiffin, Tſchirkow and Philen, to Driefen, and from thence to Landfberg. The expreſs, in caſe he ſhould meet a convoy on the march, was directed to explain to the Commanding Officer of it, that he was to keep more to the right ; and, to prevent miſtakes, the orders

## S E C T I O N I. 111

orders were left open for the perusal of any such Commanding Officer.

Colonel Bulatzell, who had been sent out upon party towards Sonneburg, returned and reported, that he had not met with any Prussian troops in that neighbourhood, and that none had been seen there for eight or nine days; also, that he had required from the town a contribution of 1000 thalers; but, as they could not then raise more than 600, and as his detachment was too weak to risk a longer stay, he had directed, that they should send the remainder of the money to the Head Quarters of the army; and, having obtained from the magistrate a certificate of the good behaviour of his troops, he thought it advisable to return and make his report. General Fermer presented the party with the thousand thalers, in  
confe-

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consequence of their regular and soldier-like behaviour.

The division of the cavalry, under the command of Lieutenant General Romanzow, arrived in the camp at Königswalde, and took post on the left of the army.

On the side of the Prussians, Lieutenant General Marschall resigned the command of the advanced corps at Reppen to Lieutenant General Mann-teufel.

On the 7th of August the Russian army marched 2 and  $\frac{5}{7}$  German miles, and encamped near the village of Alt-Sorge. The cavalry remained in the camp of Königswalde under General Romanzow. The camp at Alt-Sorge consisted of 21 regiments of infantry; it was surrounded by wood, and, in taking

## SECTION I. 113

ing it, nothing was studied but the convenience of the troops.

Major General Dietz reported, that he had crossed the Warta at Landsberg with his brigade, the park of artillery, and the heavy baggage, and had encamped two wersts beyond that town, on the same ground where the Prussian camp had stood.

On the 8th of August the army marched 1 German mile and  $\frac{2}{7}$  to Landsberg, where it encamped on the bank of the Warta river close below the town. The baggage of the 2d division, and that of the cavalry, was immediately ordered to cross the river. The right flank of the camp was appuyed to the tête du pont; there was a morass on the left flank, and in front of the left wing, and, according to custom, redouts, or

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rather batteries, were thrown up along the front.

General Romanzow sent out three small detachments to Droffen, Sternberg, and Sonneburg, in order to get intelligence of the movements of the Prussians: these returned on the 9th with information, that the Prussian corps still remained at Reppen; but they could not learn from the inhabitants, or otherwise, that any other Prussian troops were on this side of the Oder. Colonel Dalke reported from Posen, that he expected to get 1500 horses from the inhabitants in that neighbourhood, with which he would immediately send off the provisions, &c. from the magazine, along the right bank of the Warta, through Driesen to Landsberg.

The 1st brigade of the 1st division crossed

crossed the Warta to cover the baggage, and to support General Dietz.

On the 10th of August, the accoutrements and saddlery, found in the Arsenal at Landsberg, were divided amongst the cavalry.

The division of cavalry, commanded by General Romanzow, marched from Konigswalde to Alt Sorge.

Major General Iefremow reported, that he had detached 500 Cossacks to General Refanow at Marienwerder, and had begun his march to Posen.

Major General Stoffeln reported, that he had arrived at Soldin with the Tschoujew Cossacks, and some Hussars; and after having taken possession of the town, had demanded 20,000 rations of provisions, as many of forage, and 1000

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oxen, giving positive orders that they should be delivered to the army within eight days.

Colonel Bilau was detached to Soldin, with 500 grenadiers and dragoons. Count Tschernitscheff was ordered to march with the corps of Observation from Schwerin to Landsberg, and to defend the Warta: also to demand from the Bailiffs and Magistrates in that neighbourhood provisions and forage for his troops, in order to expedite the delivery of which, he was to give them all the assistance that he could in making the collection.

Quarter-master General Stoffeln reported, that the inhabitants of Soldin had represented their incapacity to furnish what was required of them; that, in consequence, he had assembled the justices of the peace of the districts of Soldin

Soldin and Königsberg, and the magistrates of those towns, in order to come to an accommodation respecting the delivery required, and to proportion it in an equitable manner : also, that he had detached two reconnoitring parties by different routes towards Custrin, with directions to approach as near as possible to the fortress, and a third to Schwed and Stettin, with orders to advance as far as it could without danger of being cut off. Immediately after this report another arrived from General Stoffeln, enclosing a list of the arms and ammunition found in Soldin, and purporting, that the Prussian army had marched through Custrin, and had encamped in front of the town on the side of Soldin.

The 1st division of the Russian army crossed the Warta at Landsberg, and encamped two wersts beyond the town.

The

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The division of cavalry arrived at Landberg, and encamped on the bank of the Warta.

On the 11th of August the commander in chief, General Fermer, made the necessary arrangements for the contributions, and instructed Major General Karabonow how they were to be levied. He left Colonel Drewitz with a party to cover the Magazine, and directed him to maintain good order and discipline, till the Corps of Observation should arrive, when he would of course resign his command. Having done this, he marched with the second division, and joined the first in the camp, on the other side of the Warta.

General Stoffeln reported, that the parties which he had sent out to reconnoitre, were returned without having seen any thing of the enemy; but that,

accord-

according to information received from the inhabitants, there was an outpost of two squadrons of dragoons three quarters of a German mile on the Soldin side of Custrin: also, that these parties had brought in the chief magistrate, and the town clerk of Damin, as hostages, who said, that there were no Prussian troops on this side of the Oder, and that the Prussian army lay below Franckfurt. Upon being ordered to procure 500 rations of forage, and as many of provisions, they declared it was not in their power, for they were obliged to make such large deliveries to Custrin, that the greatest scarcity of every thing prevailed in their neighbourhood; but they offered to pay 500 thalers, and gave a written obligation, binding themselves to the performance of the payment,

In the night of the 12th of August,

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the Prussian Lieutenant General Mann-  
teufel attempted to surprise and carry  
off a Russian detachment at Konigs-  
walde, but it retired in good time.

The Prussian advanced corps en-  
camped at Zielentzig.

General Fermer marched with the  
1st division  $2\frac{1}{2}$  German miles, and en-  
camped at the village of Friederichsberg.  
This camp consisted of 17 regiments of  
infantry, two regiments of dragoons,  
and one of Hussars. Friederichsberg  
lay in the front of the left wing: there  
was a wood in front and on the right  
flank, a morass in the rear, and the  
village of Spiegel lay about 600 paces  
in front of the left flank. The cavalry  
was in the left wing.

Quarter-master General Stoffeln sent  
from Soldin an account of the plan of  
the

the contribution, as he had proportioned it, and reported: That deputies from Damin had paid in 500 thalers as the contribution of that town: That, in obedience to his commands, the magistrate and the town clerk of Piritz had waited upon him, and promised to deliver into the magazine at Soldin the rations of forage and provisions which were required of them: That according to the information received from these people, Stargard was in a tolerable state of defence; it was surrounded with walls, and furnished in some parts with a proper rampart: That Major Grumbkau was stationed in it with a battalion of infantry and some Hussars, and another battalion was expected there very soon: That Colberg was well fortified, particularly towards the sea; that it was amply supplied with cannon and ammunition, and was garrisoned by three battalions: That the garrison in

Stettin

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Stettin consisted of 10,000 infantry, mostly militia, and some squadrons of the new-raised hussar regiment of Natzmar. All the general officers rode to Custrin to reconnoitre its situation and the Lieutenant General Romanzow was ordered to cross the Warta with the cavalry, as soon as the Corps of Observation arrived, and to join the main army. General Stoffeln was ordered to resign the command at Soldin to Colonel Bilow, giving him at the same time directions respecting the collection of the contributions, and to proceed himself with the Tschoujew Cossacks to Damin.

On the 13th of August the 1st division marched two long German miles to Gross Camin. It encamped close to this village, having the village of Batzlow,

low, and the wood which lays between Batzlow and Camin, on its right flank.

All the general Officers rode towards Custrin to reconnoitre its situation and the environs, and at the same time the Russian light troops skirmished with the Prussian hussars, drove them back, and pursued them through the suburb, up to the causeway and bridges that lead over the morafs. The Russians lost only one man, and one horse, though there were above twenty cannon shot fired from the works. In the suburb a sick surveyor was taken prisoner, who said, that the garrison was 2000 strong, and that the King of Prussia was expected to arrive very soon with considerable succours.

Quarter Master General Stoffeln reported, that Prince Nassimskoi, captain of engineers, who had been sent upon

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a reconnoitring party towards Schwed, was returned, and said, that he had advanced as close as he could to the town, but finding that the Prussians had demolished the bridge over the Oder, he could proceed no further, and was obliged to content himself with reconnoitring the country on this side of the river: that the Prussian detachment stationed at Schwed had turned out on his approach, but had not fired at him, though he was very near to them.

Major Fermelen, who was detached towards Cöflin to gain accurate intelligence respecting the state of the fortress of Colberg, returned with information, that he had advanced as far as the village of Groß-Sistrin, about three German miles short of Colberg; that he had heard from the inhabitants of that place, that 500 militia were stationed in the fortress: that it was

amply

amply furnished with artillery, and four  
brass cannon were daily expected from  
Stettin: further, that 50 Hussars, and  
40 Bosniacks were posted near Cöflin,  
and a detachment of militia from Col-  
berg had possession of that place.

Lieutenant General Romanzow was  
ordered to march with his division  
from Landsberg, by the way of Soldin,  
and Siritz, to Stargard, and to summon  
that town to surrender if he should  
find it garrisoned by Prussian troops; to  
endeavour if possible to make the gar-  
rison prisoners; to occupy the town and  
lay it under contribution; to assemble  
the justices of the peace and bailiffs of  
the district, and demand of them a de-  
livery of provisions and forage, in order  
to establish a magazine there.

Lieutenant General Resanow's corps  
at Marienwerder was directed to march

to

to Stolpe, in order to prevent any Prussian parties from making incursions from Pomerania into Poland, and destroying the Russian Magazines.

On the side of the Prussians, Major General Malachowsky was detached, with a battalion of infantry and 500 cavalry, to reconnoitre the movement and situation of the Russians in the neighbourhood of Landsberg. He fell in with a Russian detachment of Hussars, and a skirmish took place, in which several men and horses were killed on each side. Count Dohna detached Colonel Schaack with four battalions from the Prussian camp to reinforce the garrison of Custrin, and directed him to endeavour to keep the Russians at such a distance from the works, that their artillery could not have any effect upon them.

On

On the 14th of August the 1st division of the Russian army remained in the camp at Gross Camin, and the soldiers were employed in thrashing the new-cut corn, and making biscuit. The 2d division, commanded by Prince Galitzin, joined the 1st in camp on the same day.

Major General Iefremow reported in a letter, dated the 8th, that he had detached 500 Cossacks under Colonel Orlow to Marienwerder, and was on his march to the army with the rest. General Romanzow was ordered to hasten his march to Stargard as much as possible, where he was to take post, and to send detachments towards Schwed and Stettin, in order to cut off the Prussian communication on this side. Also, as soon as he had occupied Stargard, and made the necessary dispositions, he was to send

send two batalions towards Colberg, to join General Refanow's corps.

The Prussian General Count Dohna, upon finding that the Russians had crossed the Warta at Landsberg, ordered General Mannteufel to join the army with the advanced corps, which he commanded. In consequence, the General immediately quitted his camp at Zielentzig, and retired to Reppen.

On the 15th of August, Quartermaster General Stoffeln, brigadier Uwarow, and Colonel Mulina of the artillery, marched at two o'clock in the morning towards Custrin, with 20 companies of grenadiers, the Tschoujew Cossacks, a regiment of Hussars, ten pieces of cannon, four unicorns, and two Schuwalow howitzes: the army followed in an hour. General Stoffeln halted his detachment about half a

German mile from the town, and advanced with the Cossacks only very near to the works to reconnoitre. A trumpeter whom he sent with a summons from General Fermer to the commandant, Colonel Schaack, was fired upon from the fortrefs \*.

General Fermer immediately advanced with the rest of the troops.

The Prussian detachment, commanded by Major Generals Below and Ruesch, had taken post under the cannon of the town †.

As

\* The Prussians deny this, and say, that the Russians bombarded the town without having first summoned it: however, it is very probable that they might not see the trumpeter, and indeed the advancing of the garrison in front of the works, as well as all their preparations shew, that they concluded they had only to do with light troops; the wood prevented them from discovering the Russian infantry.—*Author*.

† The fortrefs of Custrin, Pl. 2. and 4. notwithstanding the great defects in its works, is uncommonly

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As soon as General Fermer was informed of this, he ordered that some of the

strong from its situation, and has the great advantage of being able with a small garrison to check the largest army, and to harass it by a tedious, laborious, and very expensive siege. The great difficulty in attacking it consists, in the being obliged to carry on the attack by means of traverses and zigzags on the narrow causeway. In this manner the French, in the year 1747, took Hulst, Ecluse, Philippine, and Sas de Gand, which were surrounded by water from the inundations : but when you examine good plans of these sieges, particularly of the first, you are astonished at the danger and difficulty that attend such undertakings.

Custrin is situated at the conflux of the Oder and the Warta : it is completely covered on two sides by these rivers ; on a third, by a branch of the Warta, and deep morasses ; and the fourth, which is of little extent, is covered by a small part of the Warta, and defended by a hornwork, furnished with a good revêtement of brick. The morass, which entirely covers that side of the fortress towards Landsberg, can only be passed by a causeway of 600 paces long. The works are of the old Italian construction, and have the fault peculiar to it, viz. too small bastions, and too long curtains : one of those fronting the morass, over which, in case of a regular attack, the besiegers must advance upon the causeway, is 80 Rhinelandish rods, or 400 paces, long. Also the ramparts are much too high. Indeed, there are two advantages

the light troops should attack the Prussian hussars on the left of the suburb; and the rest form in the wood, and join the companies of grenadiers above mentioned. The hussars and Cossacks advanced, but were driven back by the Prussian heavy and light squadrons. The troops that were posted in the

advantages arising from their height; one, that they cover the houses; the other, that they command the heights above Tamsell, which are the only heights of consequence in the neighbourhood, but too distant to be of any prejudice to the fortress\*. A principal disadvantage of all high works is, that their fire does not sweep the ground in front of them, but all the shot are plunging shot, and the besiegers soon get quite under the cannon.

The bridge over the Oder is defended by a tête du pont of earth; this can only be approached by a long causeway, which is intersected in many parts. The works of the fortress are all faced with brick, and furnished with good casemates.—*Author.*

\* We are surprized that the Author should mention this latter as one of the advantages arising from the height of the works. The heights of Tamsell are above 7000 paces distant from Custrin; of course they are entirely out of the question, and never could have been considered at all when the fortress was building.—*Translators.*

† 32 JOURNAL of the CAMPAIGN.

suburb, as well as those regiments of infantry and cavalry that were encamped between it and the town, in all from 4 to 5000 men, advanced, and immediately occupied the *flèches* that were thrown up in the plain. The hussars and Cossacks rallied; the Russian grenadiers came out of the wood, and as soon as the cannon were unlimbered and ready to fire, the Prussians retired in the greatest haste into the town, and the Russian light troops took possession of the suburb. As this retreat was made in a great hurry, and in some confusion, owing probably to the Prussians not having suspected that any Russian infantry was at hand, General Stoffeln proposed to pursue with the grenadiers, and endeavour to enter the town with the retreating troops. If General Fermer had consented to this, and if the attempt had been carried into execution, either the Prussians  
would

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would have been obliged to sacrifice a part of their troops, and shut their gates on them, owing to the narrow causeway on which alone they could retreat; or possibly the Russians might, in the confusion, have forced their way into the town, and taken it, as Marshal Laudon took Glatz on the 26th of July, 1760.

The batteries at the wood *a.* pl. 4. were advanced to *b.* pl. 4. and the bombardment commenced, notwithstanding the heavy fire from the \* fortresses.

\* The Russians differ from all other nations in their method of carrying on sieges: instead of first opening trenches to cover themselves from the enemy's fire, and making batteries with strong parapets for the cannon and mortars, they advance as near as possible up to the town, bring up their artillery without covering it in the least, and after they have cannonaded and bombarded the town about 48 hours, they begin to break ground and make regular trenches and batteries. They think that this method inspires the assailants with courage, at the same time that it intimidates the defendants, and may possibly induce these latter to surrender. Both

trefs. The third shell set fire to the town \*.

The cannonade and bombardment continued without interruption; and about five o'clock the whole town was burnt, excepting the school, the garrison, church, and the main guard-house.

officers and soldiers are on these occasions equally exposed to the fire. In this army rash bravery is much respected; and, if an officer wishes for the esteem of the troops, he must expose himself with them in a manner that would be reckoned absurd in any other army. General Mannstein's account of Russia contains many proofs of this.—*Author.*

\* The garrison, which chiefly consisted of deserters and prisoners, instead of endeavouring to stop the progress of the fire, broke into the houses and plundered them. This conduct prevented the inhabitants from doing their parts towards extinguishing the flames: the confusion became general; and as the houses were built of wood, and the streets narrow, the fire spread so rapidly, that it was impossible to get it under. There was a magazine of 100,000 seams of grain burnt, and goods and property to an extraordinary amount, which the inhabitants of the whole Marche had deposited in Custring, as a place of security.—*Author.*

The

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The Russian loss was as follows :

4 Grenadiers.

1 Cornet and two privates of the  
Tschoujew Cossacks.

1 Quarter Master of the hussars of  
Serbien.

1 Gunner.

1 Artillery driver, and 8 horses.

Total 8 men and 8 horses.

The following is a list of the wounded.

1 Captain Orlow, of the regiment of  
Rastow, who afterwards died of his  
wounds.

1 Captain Skuratow, of the regiment  
of Smolensko.

1 Lieutenant Filatow, of the 1st gre-  
nadier regiment.

1 Lieutenant Schmidt, of the regi-  
ment of Saint Petersburg.

2 Non-commissioned Officers.

1 Drummer.

22 Grenadiers.

K 4

1 Cornet

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1 Cornet of hussars.

1 Corporal of Cossacks.

2 Hussars.

3 Gunners.

Total 36 wounded.

The Prussian artillery ceased to fire in the evening, on account perhaps of the astonishing heat occasioned by the burning of the town. The Russians also stopped firing, upon General Holmer of their artillery remarking, that the burning of the town produced no good effect; that the heat could not be greater than it was; and that at such a distance there was no possibility of destroying the works \*. About a quarter

\* The Russians were blamed extremely for burning Custrin; and it was supposed to proceed entirely from a desire of doing mischief, and to satisfy their animosity. This accusation is very unjust. Those indeed, who are acquainted with this fortress and its situation, judge very properly, when they say, that the Russians were not sufficiently provided with the necessary apparatus and

ter of an hour after nine o'clock General Fermer came up to the batteries, and having enquired of General Holmer, if he had a sufficient quantity of shells, he directed him to throw one into the town every quarter of an hour, observing, that, as there would be no other siege undertaken this campaign, the

and artillery to besiege it with any probability of success; also that they had not time to carry on a siege, as it was a place of such importance, that the King of Prussia would most certainly make an effort to relieve it. But, did the Russians know any thing of this fortress or its situation? Certainly not; for they had no plan of it till they found one in the suburb during the siege, and it was then too late to retire. On the other hand, allowing them to have known the place, have not many towns been taken merely by a bombardment, or at least has not the attempt often been made? Perhaps also General Fermer thought, that the Russian bravery might expect the same success under his direction, as had attended it under that of Marshal Munich, to whom he was first Adjutant General, and then Quarter-master General. The Marshal took Dantzic and Oczakow, though he was so deficient in the necessary apparatus for a siege, particularly at the last place, that he had no heavy artillery. It is well worth while to read the description of the attack of these two towns, given in General Mannstein's account of Russia.—*Author.*

shells

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shells were of no consequence, but that the cannon balls must be spared for the battle that would probably soon be fought.

On this day the Russian army had marched and encamped in the Drewitz wood, Pl. 4. A. This camp consisted of the Tschojujew Cossacks, one regiment of Hussars, three regiments of Cuirassiers, making 13 squadrons, two regiments of dragoons, making 6 squadrons, one regiment of horse grenadiers, making 6 squadrons, and 20 regiments of infantry, each of two battalions; besides some hundreds of the Don Cossacks. The right flank was appuyed to Drewitz, the left to Wernicke. The artillery was divided into brigades. During this night the garrison of Custrin threw up two redoubts in front of the works, Pl. 2. Y. and Pl. 4. g. and General Mannteufel retired over the Oder at Franckfurt. On

## SECTION I. 139

the 16th in the evening he joined Count Dohna, who marched with his army on that day to Reithwein, and encamped there.

On the morning of the 16th, the garrison began a very heavy fire from mortars and cannon ; and it is much to be wondered at that the Ruffians, who had not yet opened their trenches, did not lose a man before twelve o'clock, and very few during the afternoon. They were very moderate in returning the fire, not giving more than one shot for three or four.

As the Ruffians were beginning to make preparations for throwing a bridge over the Oder, they perceived, that first hussars, and then grenadiers, marched out of the fortress to oppose them in this attempt. Two new batteries, each of 1 mortar, 1 howitz, and  
1 cannon,

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1 cannon, were now completed; so that, reckoning those in b. Pl. 4. there were in all five. On the night of the 16th, they opened the trenches, c. Pl. 4.

On the 17th an officer was sent with a trumpeter to summon the town, and was answered by the commandant, "that, though the houses and magazines were burnt, yet the works were not damaged, and that he would defend them to the last man." There was very little firing on either side; the Russians worked at a Redout on this side of the Oder, f. Pl. 4, which was intended to protect them in constructing a bridge over the river.

On the same day the Prussians changed their position, and encamped near Manchenow and Ierias, on the banks of the Oder, in order to oppose the Russians, should they attempt to  
pass

S E C T I O N I. 141

pass it. As the bridge at Custrin was burnt in the general conflagration, the Prussians made a bridge of boats in its place, and the garrison was relieved every day by two battalions from the camp.

On the 18th there was very little firing. One double \*, and four single † unicorns, arrived from Landsberg, as a reinforcement to the artillery before Custrin. The redout f, intended to flank the island where a bridge of boats was to be thrown over the Oder, was completed, as also that part of the bridge from the shore to the island; but the work stopped there till further orders.

On the 19th in the evening the besieged kept up a very heavy fire, and

\* A 96 pounder.—*Author.*

† 48 pounders.—*Author.*

endea-

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endeavoured to burn the suburb, called Kutze Vorstadt, but the flames were constantly extinguished by the besiegers, who had one man killed, and one wounded.

The line c. Pl. 4. was lengthened.

On the 20th the besieged succeeded in burning the suburb, and the Russians had one man wounded.

On the 21st there was not much done during the day, but in the night the besieged kept up a heavy fire; they cannonaded and endeavoured to destroy the Russian bridge of boats near Schaumburg, but without success: they threw shells into that village and set it on fire, in order to dislodge the Russian troops that were in it, who, upon this, took post upon the island, and erected the batteries. e. Pl. 4.

On

SECTION I. 143

On the 22d, 50 Coffacks swam their horses over the Oder, and brought back many horses, and 1000 oxen.

The fire from the works slackened.

The King of Prussia arrived at Custring.

SECTION

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## SECTION II.

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THE  
B A T T L E  
OF  
Z O R N S D O R F,  
WITH  
THE SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS TILL THE  
ARMY WENT INTO WINTER QUARTERS,

---

*Au sein de la mêlé, au milieu du carnage,  
On verra des Héros le tranquille courage,  
Réparer le Deseordre, et prompt dans ses desseins,  
Disposer, ordonner, enchaîner les destins.*

L'Art de la Guerre de Main de Maître,

---

THE King of Prussia had marched, with the army which had been employed in the siege of Ollmutz, by the route of Konigsgratz, and arrived in the neighbourhood of Landshut on the 10th of August. At this time the Russians under General Fermer had

crossed the Warta at Landsberg, and were moving towards Custrin. This determined the King immediately to strengthen Count Dohna's army, in order that he might be able to check the Russians. He did so, and afterwards resolved to march in person with a considerable additional reinforcement, which consisted of the infantry regiments, of the Prince of Prussia, Affeburgh, and Forcade; the grenadier battalions of Rohr, Kremzow, and Wedel; the dragoon regiments of Czetteritz, and Normann; the hussars of Ziethen; and four Cuirassier regiments, viz. the Gardes du corps, Gens d'armes, Carabineers, and the regiment of Seydlitz.

The King began his march with this corps to Landshut at six o'clock in the evening, General Seydlitz having joined him with the 4 Cuirassier regiments

146 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

above mentioned, with which he had been cantoned in the neighbourhood of Gottesberg. The infantry cantoned in Landshut, the suburbs, and the adjacent villages; the cavalry encamped. Head quarters were in the suburbs. The Margraf Charles of Bayreuth, who was entrusted with the command of the army during the absence of the King, had his head quarters in Landshut.

On the 11th of August the King marched from Landshut, and took up his quarters that night in Runstock.

On the 12th he marched to Liegnitz.

On the 13th to Heinzendorf, where the corps halted on the 14th.

On the 15th he marched to Dalke.

On the 16th to Wartenberg.

On

S E C T I O N II. 147

On the 17th to Plothe.

On the 18th to Croffen.

On the 19th to Ziebingen, where the whole corps encamped, except the regiment of Affeburg, which remained in the village to protect the head quarters.

On the 20th of August his Majesty arrived at Franckfurt. The infantry cantoned in the town; the cavalry encamped in front of the Lebus Gate.

By referring to the map, the reader may see with what great expedition this march was performed.

On the 21st the infantry remained in Franckfurt; but the King marched with the cavalry to Manchenow, where, as is before mentioned, Count Dohna

L 2

had

148 BATTLE of ZORNSDÖRF, &c.

had encamped his army, in order to oppose the Russians, should they attempt to cross the Oder.

On his arrival, the King immediately reconnoitred the banks of the Oder, and the position of the Russian troops before Custrin.

The Fortrefs had suffered very little from the bombardment.

General Mannteufel was ordered to post himself, with the advanced corps of the army, opposite to Schaumburg, and defend the passage of the river. Pl. IV. N° 1.

General Canitz marched with the regiments of Moritz and Dohna to Writzen, in order to escort the pontoons which were bringing from thence, for the

the purpose of making a bridge across the Oder.

The King took his head quarters in Gurgast; and the infantry, which had remained behind in Franckfurt, marched on the evening of the 21st, and joined the rest of the army on the 22d, at 5 o'clock in the morning.

On this day General Mannteufel cannonaded with some effect the Russian batteries in e and f. Pl. 4. which confirmed the Russians in their opinion, that the King either intended to force a passage over the river at this place, or rather that, being too weak to risk a battle (for they were ignorant of his strength), he would dispute the passage of the Oder, and thus put a stop to their further progress \*. The present situa-

\* In the first place it appears to us, that the Russian General could not possibly have supposed, that the King  
L 3 of

## 150 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

situation of affairs did not admit of the King's making any longer stay in the Marche, for the event of the siege of

of Prussia would attempt to force a passage over such a river as the Oder, in sight of a numerous enemy, furnished with artillery and every requisite to oppose him. This is a very desperate undertaking in any situation, and may be called wholly impracticable, where the ground does not afford the most decided advantages, and where there is not a very great superiority of troops and artillery. In the next place, we are at a loss to conceive how he could conclude, that the King meant to act merely on the defensive, and to wait with his army in the Marche, to defend the passage of the Oder. He must have known, that the event of the siege of Ollmutz had enabled the Austrians to act on the offensive, and that the King would have occasion to employ the greatest part of his force in opposition to them; consequently, that things must be brought to an issue, and that the situation of affairs did not admit of his making a long stay in the Marche. We think that General Fermer must have seen, that the King of Prussia was in one of those difficulties from which nothing but the fortunate issue of a battle could extricate him. Such was his situation previous to the battle of Rostach; struggling under a load of enemies, and forced to exert himself in one vigorous effort to shake off some of them, that he might be at liberty to contend with the rest.—*Translators.*

Ollmutz

Ollmutz\* had enabled the Austrian army to change their operations from the defensive to the offensive; but if this had not been the case, he might have obliged the Russians to retire without risking a battle, merely by preventing them from crossing the Oder, and making any farther progress into the country. The following reasons will be sufficient proofs of this assertion. The Russian army, owing to its astonishing quantity of baggage and attendants, consumes far more provisions than one which is twice as strong in fighting

\* The Prussians had begun this campaign in Moravia by the siege of Ollmutz. The measure itself has been much condemned by many. On this we do not pretend to determine; but the execution of it, under Colonel Balby of the engineers, is universally allowed to have been a miserable performance. Marshal Daun had been endeavouring for some time to force the King to raise the siege, when he was at length obliged to do it, owing to the loss of a convoy of 4000 waggons, containing provisions and stores of all sorts, which the present Marshal Laudon attacked with success on its march from Troppau to Ollmutz.—*Translated* :

L 4

men:

## 152 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

men: they had no fortified town in Brandenburg and Pomerania; consequently they could not establish proper magazines in those countries, but were obliged to be supplied with stores and provisions from the magazines in Poland and Prussia: the great distance, the badness of the roads in the Polish territory, and the frequent want of horses and carriages, rendered the march of these convoys very difficult, and sometimes impossible. Moreover, those undisciplined light troops, of which they had a great quantity, ate up or destroyed every thing in front of the army, ravaged the country, and plundered the inhabitants. This is the reason why they in general detach them from the main army; and indeed they often do the same with the cavalry, in order that they may subsist more easily. From thence arises the inconvenience that they are often without them when they

they want them most. This was verified in two instances on the present occasion : first, the want of light troops was the reason that the Russians had no intelligence of the King's intention to cross the Oder till he had actually done it ; and secondly, the absence of part of their cavalry had, no doubt, a great effect on the issue of the battle \*.

In the evening, after the retreat gun had fired, the King marched with all the infantry and hussars in two columns along the Oder towards Giestebusse. General Mannteufel joined the army on

\* Two circumstances mentioned here are certainly very extraordinary ; the one, that General Fermer did not draw his cavalry and as many of his light troops, as he thought necessary, to him, upon finding that there was a probability of a battle ; the other, that he did not keep a better look-out on the Oder, and watch the King's motions more narrowly ; he had Cossacks and Hussars enough with him to have detached several outposts, and to have patrolled to a considerable distance.—  
*Translators.*

# 154 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

its march, and the whole arrived opposite to Giestebuse on the 23d. No Russians appeared, either in that village, or on the heights behind it. As General Canitz came up with the pontoons at the same time that the army arrived, they began to construct the bridge at a quarter of an hour past eight o'clock: the work lasted three hours; and during this time the advanced corps, and the hussar regiment of Ziethen, crossed the river in boats and different vessels, which the peasants had kept concealed from the enemy, and which they had got together with all possible expedition on this occasion; and they formed on the heights behind Giestebuse. At twelve o'clock the regiments Ruefch and Malachowski began to file off; next followed the infantry and train of artillery; and, lastly, the heavy cavalry and dragoons, who had marched from the camp at Manchenow at three o'clock

in the morning, and followed the army in two columns.

When the greatest part of the army had passed the river, the King marched with the advanced corps to Cloßow, where he fixed his head quarters. The army followed, and encamped, with the right flank to Zellin, and the left to Cloßow: a battalion of the regiment of Hordt remained in Giestebuse to cover the bridge; and all the baggage waggons were left on the other side of the river.

General Romanzow, who had arrived with his corps at Schwed, was entirely cut off from General Fermer by this rapid move of the King's, and the Russians saw themselves at once deprived of the greatest part of their cavalry, and of a very clever enterprising Officer.

General

## 156 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

General Malachowky, who went forward with the Hussars, fell in with a party of Cossacks, and took between twenty and thirty prisoners. It was from this skirmish that General Fermer first learned that the Prussians had crossed the Oder \*. He raised the siege of Custrin the same night, and sent off the heavy baggage, and park of artillery, under an escort of 4000 grenadiers, with 4 cannon, to Klein Camin, where they formed a barricade of waggon, Pl. 4. B. This was just deducting from the effective strength of fighting men 4000 of the best troops. The army, together with the baggage of the General and Field Officers, which

\* There seems to have been an unaccountable negligence on the part of General Fermer; not to have been acquainted sooner with so great a movement of the enemy was strange indeed. He does not appear to have been aware of that boldness in decision, and that promptitude in execution, which so strongly marked his antagonist throughout all this war.—*Transylvans.*

was not inconsiderable, advanced on the 24th of August into the plain between Quartfchen and Zornsdorf \*, Pl. 4. C. there to wait the enemy's approach. The corps of Observation, commanded by General Braun, arrived at two o'clock in the afternoon, and formed in D. Pl. 4. making a fort of potence to the right flank of General Fermer's army.

General Braun's corps was composed of the following troops.

- 3 Pulks of Cossacks.
- 1 Regiment of hussars.
- 9 Squadrons of horse grenadiers.
- 6 Squadrons of Cuirassiers.
- 8 Regiments of infantry.
- 1 Legion of grenadiers.
- 4 Ditto of musketeers.

\* There are some risings on this ground ; but they rather deserve the appellation of wavings in the surface, than that of heights, which is the case in most sandy soils.—*Author.*

The

## 158 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

The King of Prussia remained in the camp at Cloßow till three o'clock in the afternoon, in order to rest his army: at that hour the regiments began their march, and advanced towards Darmitzel in two columns. The Russian light troops, who were dispersed along the bank of the Mutzel stream, and the Prussian dragoons and hussars, who flanked to the right of the march, fired at each other out of carabines and pistols, but without any effect. They could not close, as the Mutzel which separated them was impassable, owing to its rotten marshy banks, and all the bridges over it were destroyed. Whilst this firing was going on, a body of Prussians, furnished with cannon, advanced towards the villages of Kutzdorf and Quartſchen, which confirmed General Fermer in his opinion, that the King intended to attack on this side, notwithstanding the nature of the situation

ation made it so very improbable. He was informed by a Quarter Master of Ziethen's hussars, who was taken prisoner, that this was not the advanced corps, but the covering party of the right wing of the Prussian army, which had got in motion at two o'clock in the morning, and was marching towards Batzlow: that the advance of a body of troops towards Kutzdorf was a feint, to make the Russians believe that the King meant to direct his attack on this side; but that his Majesty's intention was, to cross the Mutzel at the Dam Mill, to march by Batzlow, Gross Camin, and Wilckersdorf; to draw heavy artillery from Custrin, and to attack on the side of Zornsdorf.

If General Fermer had given credit to the report of this man, which the event proved to be true, he might have taken a very advantageous position with  
the

160 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

the left flank behind Zicher, and the right on the heights between Gros and Klein Camin. The front is much intersected with wood and ponds, and the debouchéing and forming might have been rendered very difficult to the Prussians, particularly if an abbatis had been made along the wood, which could soon have been done by so large an army: moreover, the King would have been cut off from Custrin; and the Prussian cavalry, which was greatly superior to the Russian, could not have acted with advantage against this position, as the nature of the ground would have greatly impeded its movements. The extent of this front is about 10,000 paces; consequently, if you deduct the necessary intervals, it was not too long for the army to be formed in two lines. But, if they thought that they had not time to march and occupy the position of Zicher, they might have formed,

formed, with the right flank extending to the rivulet and marsh, in front of the Quartſchen ſheepfold\*, having Zornsdorf and the little copſe in front of the right wing, and the left flank appuyed to the marſhes at the Darmitzel Mill. In that caſe Zornsdorf muſt have been occupied in force, and the little copſe cut down; redouts muſt have been thrown up on the plain along the front; or, if they had not time to do that, they might have dug ditches; theſe would have been of great uſe in impeding the action of the Pruſſian cavalry, which was ſo much more numerous than the Ruſſian. It is particularly owing to this ſuperiority on the ſide of the Pruſſians that I propoſe theſe two poſitions, which are both of

\* Many of the ſheepfolds in Germany are large brick buildings, adjoining to the farm houſes, which is the caſe in this inſtance:—the whole premiſes are called the ſheepfold.—*Translators.*

162 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

such a nature, as not to leave the enemy's cavalry a great deal of room to manœuvre upon. If the Russians had taken this last position, they should have posted some thousand infantry and the greatest part of the Cossacks in the Drewitz wood, extending from the right of the position to Tamsell. This would have entirely cut off the Prussians from Custrin, prevented their being supplied from thence with heavy artillery, and secured the rear of the Russians against a sally from that fortress, which of course would have left them no sort of reason to form a square. It would have been almost impossible for the Prussians to have forced these troops in the wood, till the main army was defeated; and an attack, particularly on the Russian right wing, would have been very difficult and dangerous, because the Prussians, in advancing, must have given their left flank to the wood, and

## SECTION II. 163

and exposed themselves to an attack in the rear. The village of Tamsell, and the gentleman's house, which is in the middle of it, and encircled with a wall, should have been occupied by a strong body of grenadiers \*, in order to facilitate the fallies of the troops from the wood, and to cover their retreat in case of a repulse †.

All

\* I hope that this idea will not be rejected on account of the height that commands Tamsell. It is certain, that no house or court-yard can withstand batteries, whether erected on a height, or in a plain ; but it would not have been an easy matter to erect them here whilst the enemy had possession of the Drewitzwood.—  
*Author.*

† We certainly agree with the Author, that the occupying Tamsell was necessary, but not for the same reason that he assigns. This village is situated quite in the low ground, consequently the troops posted in it could not in the least discover what was passing on the plain, and of course could not be of use in covering the fallies from the wood. But the making a strong post of Tamsell would prevent the Prussians from marching a body of troops along the bottom by that village, under cover of the hills, in order to form a junction with the garrison of Custrin, to attack the Russians posted in the

164 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

All the baggage should have been sent off to Landsberg; the 4000 grenadiers kept with the army; and several bridges and passages made over the Mutzel and the morasses near Quartfchen; so that, in case of a defeat, the army might retreat towards Schwed, and form a junction with General Romanzow's corps.

As the Prussian army was directing its march towards Batzlow, General Fermer changed his position: he made his corps face about, and advance to E.;

wood on the right flank, and draw the heavy artillery from the fortrefs. This was not an unlikely attempt for the Prussians to make, as the success of it would have procured them such evident advantages; but the taking possession of Tamsell would of course put it out of the question, and place this flank of the position in perfect security. We are not only guided by the plan, when considering the situation of Tamsell and its environs, for we remained at Custrin two days on purpose to examine the ground ourselves, which we did very minutely.—*Translators.*

and

and General Braun's moved to its right towards Wilckersdorf, F. Pl. 4. About six o'clock in the evening the Prussian advanced corps arrived at the Dam Mill: the bridge over the Mutzel had been nearly demolished, but they immediately repaired it, and the troops passed, and formed on the other side in a half circle, with both flanks appuyed to the water, N° 2. Pl. 4. The army remained under arms all night between Darmitzel and the Mill, N° 3. The King took his quarters in the Miller's house. Some bridges were thrown over just above and below the principal bridge, and the artillery crossed during the night.

On the 25th of August, as soon as the Russian General perceived that the Prussian army was moving behind Zicher and Wilckersdorf towards the Drewitz wood, he ordered the best regiments of the first line to advance into

M 3 the

the second, which indeed was now become the first : the heavy artillery was posted with all expedition along the new front, and the army formed a sort of oblong square, with broken faces, perhaps the only one of the kind that ever was seen. Pl. 4. G. It is evident that most of the lines could be enfiladed, and, consequently, that the enemy's artillery had the best opportunity possible of displaying the utmost extent of its force : besides, reckoning the reserve, there were three distinct lines at small distances behind each other, and the baggage and the greatest part of the cavalry enclosed in the square, so that hardly any ball could fail of doing execution somewhere. After considering these circumstances, one is not surprised that the Russian loss was so uncommonly great. Another principal disadvantage of this position was, that though the whole army was equally

2

exposed

exposed to the enemy's artillery, yet not above one third could be brought into action, and consequently the Russians derived no benefit from their superiority in infantry, in which they were twice as strong as the Prussians\*. If their idea in adopting this formation was to defend themselves against the superior Prussian cavalry †, the event has proved how little it answered the proposed end. The ground, as has been before observed, afforded much better defences against cavalry than such a miserable formation was capable of. I am far from measuring General Fer-

\* The Russian infantry consisted of 28 regiments of 2 battalions each, and 5 legions of 4 battalions each: in all 76 battalions. The Prussians had only 38 battalions.—*Author.*

† This consisted of 83 squadrons; and the Russians, even counting the hussars and Tschoujew Cossacks, who never form in the line, had only 51; and these were not above half as strong as the Prussian squadrons. The Don Cossacks cannot be reckoned.—*Author.*

## 168 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

mer's abilities as a General by this position; perhaps he could not divest himself of a prejudice\* in favour of the square, to which he had been so much accustomed †. This formation may have

\* This cannot pass under the simple appellation of *prejudice*; it was certainly an instance of ignorance in the military art: you might just as well make the cavalry attack in a walk, alleging in excuse, that you was *prejudiced* in favour of that pace. Captain Tielke's candour carries him rather too far on this occasion: he, as an officer of extensive knowledge, should not be too backward in pointing out defects, as it is an excellent method of conveying instruction. Now, it is evident that General Fermer's was as bad a position as troops could be placed in. It was just an army formed, as it were, on purpose to be destroyed by the enemy's artillery; and huddled together in such a manner, that confusion must inevitably ensue, without a possibility of bringing half the troops properly into action.—*Translaters.*

† In the year 1737, when the Austrians were on the point of opening the campaign against the Turks, General Schmettau, who was aware of the bad condition of the infantry, and of the little dependance that is to be placed on raw troops in the field, proposed that each battalion should have two field pieces, in order to give the soldiers confidence, and to intimidate the enemy, who particularly dreaded this species of artillery. But he

## SECTION II. 169

have its advantages, and indeed be necessary against the Turks ; but against German

he received for answer, That, as the Austrians had hitherto always beat the Turks without cannon, they must adhere to the old system. See a book entitled, *Geheime nachrichten von dem Kriege in Ungarn, in den Feldzügen, 1737, 38, and 39.* The Turkish cavalry are much to be dreaded, owing to their great numbers, the activity of their horses, and the boldness of their riders, which, indeed, makes the formation in square, when opposed to them, a necessary evil, both on marches and in battles ; but in course it is understood, that this general rule will meet with some exceptions.

Major General Warnery says, in his *Remarks on the Turkish Military, and on the Method to be adopted in acting against them*, p. 36, of the German edition, " I cannot approve of the method which the Russian Generals adopted in their marches on the open heaths. They always formed their troops in order of battle in oblong squares. The infantry was destroyed by it, for they could not take a step in the high wet heath and grafs without great difficulty ; consequently they were much fatigued ; as wet as if they had been wading through water ; and of course soon barefoot and ill. It is, however, well known, that the Russians were at that time very little used to great movements ; and if they had marched in any other order, perhaps they might have found it extremely difficult to form upon the appearance of the enemy." He repeats, in pages

## 170 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

German troops, furnished with artillery, it is most extremely dangerous.

The

45 and 76, that the Russians were not sufficiently practised in great manœuvres; and proposes a formation for the march, and an order of battle, by the adoption of which the square might be avoided.

In the last war with the Turks, the Russians shewed that they were improved in manœuvring: but I have been told by some officers of high rank in their army, that they were still not perfect, and that this was the reason why they always either formed in a square, or chose a position, where the nature of the ground completely secured their flanks and rear; which indeed would most probably deprive them of a possibility of a retreat\*. I have seen them exercise in detail; but, as I never saw them manœuvre in large bodies, I cannot be a judge how far the reason above assigned is the true one. Possibly those officers who were my authors did not do the army justice. In the battle of Groß Lägerndorf the Russians had neither time nor opportunity to form a square, and yet they did extremely well.

It is very certain, that if these people, who are brave in the extreme, had better regulations respecting their

\* From positions so confined in the rear, the retreat is always extremely difficult and dangerous: it seems, therefore, that circumstances will *seldom* justify a deviation from the established rule of *not occupying a position from which there is not a safe retreat.*—*Translators.*

baggage,

## SECTION II. 171

The Prussian army followed the advanced corps at break of day: the infantry, N° 4, crossed the Mutzel at the Dam Mill; and the cavalry, N° 5, crossed by the bridge at Kersten. The infantry formed in the Maffin wood in two lines in order of battle, N° 6; the advanced corps taking post on the left of the first line, N° 7; and they then marched off from the left in two columns by lines, N° 8 and 9. The wood concealed this movement from the Russians \*, and prevented their discovering

baggage, provisions, &c. and were equal to the Prussians in manœuvring, which may possibly be the case some time or other, it would be very difficult for any army to withstand them. General Mannstein says, that he much doubts whether there are any troops in the world who would or could undergo such hardships as the Russians; and that they are equal to undertake and execute any thing if they are well commanded.—*Author.*

\* It appears to me to be one of the most disadvantageous circumstances in the Russian army, that they have no light infantry. This deficiency renders their  
light

172 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

vering the march of the army, till the columns debouched into the plain on their advance towards Batzlow. Near this village, the cavalry rejoined the infantry, and formed the two left columns of the march, N° 10 and 11. The advanced corps, consisting of 8 battalions, and the hussar regiments of Ziethen and Malachowsky, had separated from the first line, and formed a distinct column on the right, N° 7, in order to cover the march of the army. The columns cottoyed each other at

light cavalry nearly useless in skirmishes and small affairs with the German troops ; and indeed in reconnoitring, which is almost the only use that can be made of such troops as the Russian light cavalry are, they are always obliged to stop for want of light infantry, when they meet with very intersected, woody, and marshy situations, into which cavalry cannot venture. Also, the enemy may with safety send out light parties against the Russians, far inferior in number to theirs, if they are composed partly of light infantry. Even their hussars, who are brave and well mounted, cannot do any thing against infantry, because they are not accustomed to attack regularly and in close order, as the Prussians do.—*Author.*

small

small distances \*, which the openness of the ground allowed, and directed their march towards Zornsdorf, keeping Batzlow and Wilckerdorf between them †. As the Prussians were advancing, the Russians set fire to Zornsdorf, with an intent to impede their formation; but in fact it proved more disadvantageous to themselves, than to the enemy, for, as their position was entirely turned, they were of course obliged to make their front, what was before their rear, and thus they not only lost all advantage of ground, but they likewise received a high wind in their faces, which, though apparently

\* That is, keeping as nearly as possible the distance that should be between the lines when formed. The common rule on a flank march.—*Translators.*

† This part of the account does not agree with the plan.—In plan 4. it appears, that the 1st line went directly through the villages of Batzlow and Wilckerdorf.

*Translators.*

trivial

#### 174 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

trivial in itself, became a circumstance of consequence, as it made them suffer great inconvenience from the burning village, and the excessive dust. In short, the smoke of Zornsdorf and that arising from the artillery and small arms, mixed with clouds of dust, concealed the Prussian movements from the Russians, and they could not distinguish friend from foe, which was the principal cause of the subsequent confusion.

The Prussian columns kept pointing towards the Drewitz wood, leaving Zornsdorf on their right.

The Russian light troops, 34 and 43, approached from Zicher, to harraßs the Prussians on their march, but the Prussian hussars kept them off the columns.

The King of Prussia proceeded with the two hussar regiments of the advanced

## SECTION II. 175

vanced corps to the edge of the Dewitz wood, from whence he could discover the whole Russian position, in order to reconnoitre the ground on which what was now their right wing stood. His majesty determined to attack the right of the Russians with his left, and to refuse his right wing \*. He ordered the  
army

\* Every person who has a knowledge of military operations must admire the greatness of this design. It is one of those bold strokes which moderate Generals never risk, and which none but great men are capable of executing. The attack upon the Russian left, from Zicher and Wilckersdorf, would certainly have been attended with less difficulty; but then if the attack had succeeded on this wing, the Russians would still have remained master of the highest ground †, with their flanks and rear covered by the morasses; and in case of an entire defeat, they might have retired across the rivulet ‡ and marsh, to the Quarttschen sheepfold, where

† The difference in the height of this ground seems too inconsiderable to have had any influence on determining the point of attack.

*Translators.*

‡ The brook or rivulet that appears to run in a marshy bottom in the direction from the Dewitz wood to Quarttschen, must have been passable in some places, as part of the cavalry is described in the sequel to have moved across it.—*Translators.*

they

## 176 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

army to halt and form in order of battle, pl. 4. The infantry of the advanced corps formed behind Zornsdorf, in front of the left wing, N° 12. The rest of the infantry formed in two lines, the left towards a pond, the right extending

they would have found an advantageous position, and have been protected against the Prussian cavalry by the ponds, marshes, and the Drewitz wood. On the other hand also, supposing that the King had been repulsed in this attack, his retreat might have been made very dangerous by offensive movements of General Romanzow's corps, which was in the neighbourhood of Schwed, and of the light troops near Landberg. His Majesty, therefore, duly weighing every circumstance, determined to **make** his attack on the Russian right wing, although it **was** the most hazardous in the execution, and indeed fraught with many difficulties. The principal advantages which he foresaw in it were these: 1st. That, in case every thing was executed according to his intention, the Russians would be cut off from Custrin, and a communication with that fortress opened to the Prussians. 2dly. If the Russian right wing was beaten, they lost at once every advantage of ground, and must be entirely defeated, as the ground in front of their center and on their left was a perfect plain, and consequently afforded them no protection against the Prussian cavalry. 3d. Should the Prussian army be defeated, it could retreat through the Drewitz wood, under the cannon of Custrin.—*Author.*

## SECTION II. 177

to within 800 paces of Wilckersdorf. N° 13. The dragoons of Normann and the hussars of Ruesch occupied the space between the right of the infantry and Wilckersdorf, N° 14. The hussars of Ziethen and Malachowsky formed on the left flank along the edge of the wood, N° 16. And the rest of the cavalry drew up in two lines in the rear of the left wing, the Cuirassiers composing the first line, the dragoons the second, N° 15. The two wings of cavalry were almost immediately changed. General Seydlitz moved with the two brigades under his command from the right of the line of cavalry, and formed in 17. pl. 5. and General Schorlemmer moved with those under his command from the left, and formed in 18. pl. 5. Whilst this was executing, General Mannteufel had put the advanced corps in motion, and had formed four battalions and 20 heavy cannon, N° 19,

178 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

on a small height to the left of Zornsdorf, opposite to the Russian right wing. This battery opened upon the salient point of the right of the Russian position, a quarter of an hour before nine o'clock : it enfiladed their whole flank, and consequently did great execution. The other four battalions of the advanced corps, from want of ground to advance strait to the front, and not being able to pass through Zornsdorf on account of the flames, were obliged to move round that village to the right. They formed on the other side of it; and under their protection, another battery of 40 heavy cannon was formed, N° 20. This was pointed in the same direction as the first; so that these two batteries made a cross fire on the Russian right wing, which lasted without interruption, from a quarter of an hour before nine o'clock, till more than half an hour after ten. There was a third battery

battery of 20 heavy cannon formed in front of the right wing of the first line, which played upon the rest of the Russian front, N° 21, Pl. 5. This obliged the Cossacks, who were stationed near Zicher, to retire into the wood behind that village.

The Russians were equally active in the cannonade, and, in order to increase their fire on the right, they had brought most of the heavy artillery from their left to their right wing; but as their infantry was unfortunately formed in a square, which enclosed six cavalry regiments, the reserve, and the baggage of the staff, &c. and as the direction of their batteries was such, as to scatter their fire equally along the whole extensive front of the Prussians, it had much less effect than that of these latter, who collected theirs on one point, and

N 2                      who,

180 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

who, by firing principally en ricochet, swept every line of the Russian position.

The extraordinary steadiness and intrepidity of the Russians on this occasion, is not to be described; it surpassed every thing that one has heard of the bravest troops. Although the Prussian balls mowed down whole ranks \*, yet not a man discovered any symptoms of unsteadiness, or inclination to give way, and the openings in the first line were instantly filled up from the second, or the reserve; in short, every one seemed determined to conquer or die. Before the fire from the small arms commenced, a report, "that the Prussians gave no quarter," the origin of which I do not know, ran through all the Russian ranks; "nor we either," was the spirited reply of every Russian soldier; and

\* One ball killed 42 men of one of the regiments of grenadiers.—*Author.*

indeed

indeed they kept too well to this resolution during the rest of the day.

The baggage \* in the square was the occasion of the principal disorder, for, when the cannon balls, and the shells which were thrown from the Prussian howitzes in great quantities, struck into it, many of the horses ran away with the waggons, and broke through the ranks. Finding this, they moved it out of the square to I. and the cavalry moved to K. Pl. 5. The Prussians advanced their batteries to 22; and their infantry marched up to the bayonets of the Russians, without being able to force them a foot from their ground. At last the eight battalions of the Prussian gre-

\* When acting against the Turks, the Russians have on many occasions enclosed their baggage in the square; amongst other instances, the battle of Stawutſchane, in 1739, was one. The numerous Turkish cavalry; and the want of strong towns in that country, make this necessary; but then experience has proved, that the Turkish artillery is not very formidable.—*Author.*

182 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

nadiers, N° 23. gave way about eleven o'clock, and retired in great confusion, 25. Pl. 6. which was not to be wondered at, after so obstinate an engagement, and after having been at least two hours in constant fire. The left wing of the first line of the Prussian infantry, Pl. 5. 24. which was to have advanced with its left flank close to the brook, in order to support the grenadiers, had inclined too much to the right in advancing, particularly when passing the village of Zornsdorf, by which means it became on the same alignment with the grenadiers, instead of remaining directly in their rear, and consequently could not support them when they were repulsed\*.

If the Russian infantry had now remained firm and motionless, and allowed

\* This was the reason of the failure of the King's first plan, which he immediately changed.—*Author.*

their

their cavalry only to pursue, the Prussian cavalry, though it might have defeated the latter, yet would not have been able to make any impression on the former; and, though the Prussian infantry might have returned to the charge two or three times, it would have been impossible at last to have brought it any more into fire. But, instead of preserving this order and steadiness, the square broke, and advanced in pursuit of the Prussians, the troops shouting out "*Ara!*" which signifies "*Victory.*" Pl. 6. L. They had not advanced above two or three hundred paces before they got into the greatest confusion, by pressing in some parts of the line, opening in others, and being unsteady throughout. What added much to the disorder was, that the second line fired upon the first, being prevented by the smoke and dust

184 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

from distinguishing that they were their own people.

The Russian cavalry had advanced in the mean time, broke into the Prussian infantry, and charged their cavalry with the greatest bravery, M. Pl. 6. But the Prussian regiments of Ziethen, Malachowky, and Seydlitz, N° 26, took them in flank and rear, and drove them back on their own infantry, which they also attacked and broke, N° 27. It has already been observed, that the Russian infantry, as they advanced, had made openings in some parts of their line, and pressed very much in others; they were not, therefore, now in a situation to resist the attack of the enemy's cavalry, which made a great havock amongst them: they, however, defended themselves in the most desperate manner, and many of them sold their lives dear,

## SECTION II. 185

dear, though wounded and laying upon the ground.

The confusion in the Russian army was much increased by the soldiers getting possession of several casks of brandy, of which the Russians always carry a great quantity with their baggage. It was to no purpose that the officers broke the casks in pieces, for the men threw themselves on the ground, and drank the liquor out of the dust: this made them quite raving and ungovernable; and the threats and entreaties of the officers were of so little effect, that the men even treated them ill, particularly such of them as were Germans by birth, and indeed they went so far as to kill many of them \*.

Thus was the whole right wing of

\* This is mentioned in General Mannstein's account of Russia.—*Author.*

the

## 186 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

the Russians dispersed, Pl. 6. N.; part of them were driven into the morasses; part retired upon the left wing, which had formed a new flank, and remained firm in O. P. Q. Pl. 6.

The Prussian hussar regiment of Zieten, N° 38. particularly distinguished itself; it had penetrated so far, that it was quite surrounded by the Russians, and cut its way through again.

The King of Prussia now ordered his right wing to advance, and made the left fall back to Zornsdorf, N° 29. The two wings of cavalry, 30. and 31. advanced on their respective flanks; and the batteries, 32. and 33. moved on in front of the infantry, protected as usual by some battalions advanced for that purpose; the infantry kept marching on, and the fire from the small arms commenced. The Russian cavalry, in

## SECTION II. 187

P. and Q. came forward again in R. and S. and attacked the batteries 32. and 33. with uncommon intrepidity. Those in S. were driven back again by two regiments of the Prussian right wing of cavalry, viz. the Prince of Prussia's regiment, and that of Normann, who pursued them as far as Zicher: but those in R. met with very different success; for, upon their advance, the battalions that were destined to protect the battery, 32. as well as those in the rear, viz. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 41. 42. all gave way, N° 34. Pl. 6. and retired without halting, in great disorder, to Wilckersdorf, 35. notwithstanding the strenuous efforts of their officers to rally them. General Seydlitz, who saw this in good time, and before the Russians could take advantage of it, immediately advanced with the left wing of cavalry on to the ground that this infantry had quitted,

Pl. 7.

188 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

Pl. 7. N° 36. He drove back the Russian cavalry in R. and after receiving a heavy discharge of grape-shot and small arms, he attacked and broke all that part of the Russian infantry which had, till now, remained in good order, T. Pl. 7. he forced them to retire in utter confusion into the wood between Zicher and Quartschen, and pressed forward to 37. The Prussian infantry regiments of the Prince of Prussia, Affeburg, Kalkstein, Forcade, and the grenadier battalion of Wedel, N° 38. supported this manœuvre excellently, and performed wonders of bravery. They had not only continued advancing with the utmost steadiness, after the left wing gave way, but they also charged the Russian infantry with their bayonets, N° 39. at the same time that the cavalry attacked. The confusion now became general, and friends and foes were intermixed; but the Prussian regiments had

## S E C T I O N II. 189

had a great advantage in being able to form again much quicker and more readily, in doing which their cavalry protected them as well as possible. The King always did the cavalry the justice to say, that they had distinguished themselves most in this slaughter, which indeed it may justly be called.

The firing ceased almost entirely; friend and foe, horse and foot, were all jumbled together; and they killed each other with bayonets, swords, and the butts of their muskets. On each side, but particularly on that of the Russians, the troops were broken into small parties, many of which fought without officers, and many officers put themselves at the head of parties composed of men of six or seven different regiments. The marshy banks of the Mutzel seemed, as it were, paved with the dead bodies of the men and horses; and it appeared as if

190 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

if this dreadful battle could only end by the entire destruction of both armies. The Russians had not the choice of flight left, for all the bridges were either burnt or otherwise destroyed; therefore with them it was either death or victory. This unparalleled butchery lasted till towards the evening.

At last, Major General Demikow of the cavalry, Major General Holmer of the artillery, Brigadier Gaugrave, and Colonel Effen, collected about 2000 Russian infantry, 1000 cavalry, and some cannon that they found on the field of battle; with these troops they again repulsed the Prussians, and formed in U. V. Pl. 7.

The King of Prussia ordered Lieutenant General Forcade to make a wheel, N° 40. with the regiments of Kurfel, Bulow, and Seers; and such of the routed grenadiers

## S E C T I O N II. 191

grenadiers as had been collected again, and attack the Russians in U. V. The Prussian cavalry was directed to advance against Zornsdorf and Wilckersdorf, to check the Cossacks, who were plundering on the field of battle in the rear of the Prussian troops, and endeavouring to carry off the cannon.

The battalions under the command of General Forcade made the greatest exertions to break the body of the Russians in U. and V.; but they found it impossible, particularly as they began to fall short of ammunition, both for the cannon and small arms, the greatest part of it having gone off to Wilckersdorf with the routed left wing. This contest lasted till night with equal advantage on both sides. These Prussian battalions were at last obliged to throw away their own arms, and take the muskets and ammunition of the dead  
Ruf-

## 192 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

Russians \*. The King ordered, that the battalions which had retreated to Wilckerfdorf, 35. should advance again, and take this Russian corps in the right flank: they obeyed the order; but when they had approached near enough to receive a sharp fire from the Russian cannon, they gave way, and fled to the wood behind Zicher, where they remained the whole night. The General who commanded these battalions received his dismissal the next day.

During the night the dispersed Russians collected, and formed on that body which had made the last stand against the Prussians: General Fermer also joined it; (he, with most of the General Officers, had been on the right when the right wing was routed, and thus

\* The Russians had been formed on this spot in the beginning of the action, consequently there had been a great many killed there.—*Author.*

became

## SECTION II. 193

became cut off from the left wing); he now formed the army again in a square, Pl. 8. W. the rear face of which consisted of waggons, till they could collect troops enough to fill it up. The baggage was then placed behind Zornsdorf, and covered by the cavalry, X.

The King of Prussia remained the whole night near Quartschen in N° 40. and the cavalry kept its position between Zornsdorf and Wilckersdorf, 41. in order to cover the field of battle. The hussar regiments of Malachowsky and Ruesch, which a little while before had been detached into the woods, with the infantry regiment of Kalkstein, and had taken a great share of the Russian money-chest, now formed in the rear of the right wing of infantry, and the battalions, which are mentioned above to have retired into the wood behind Zicher, remained there the whole night.

During the night His Majesty ordered that the tents and equipage should be brought to the army from Neu Dam.

Since the invention of gun-powder, no battle has been fought which could equal this for duration, obstinacy, and the uncommon proofs of valour displayed on each side; since that period, likewise, few instances are to be met with of the infantry's having closed in this manner. The behaviour of the two armies gave them an equal respect for each other. Even the Prussian Officers have said, that no troops could exceed the Russian infantry in bravery, and that their Generals had acted up to their characters in every respect, having exerted themselves as much as possible, during the whole affair, to collect and form the broken troops, and renew the combat.

The

The Prussian cavalry most certainly distinguished themselves in a particular manner; but we must also do the Russian the justice to say, that they fought like brave men, and did more than could have been expected from them, considering that they were so inferior in numbers, and that their horses were so small, and almost worn out with fatigue.

It has been already mentioned, that the Russian army formed in a square near Zornsdorf. The Prussians were busy during the night in collecting their broken troops; and on the 26th of August, at day break, the King, after having reconnoitred the Russians, formed his army in order of battle on the ground where the Russian left wing had stood in the beginning of the action. The right wing of the Prussians extended to within a thousand paces of Quartfchen, 42. Pl. 8. having the Hof

196 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

Marsh in its rear: it was composed of infantry, except the regiment of Ruesch, which formed in the flank, fronting towards the morafs, and making the right face of an oblong square. The cavalry was in the left wing, which extended towards Wilckerfdorf, 43.

The Russian Generals, particularly General Demikow, wanted to renew the action, and attack the Prussians, but General Fermer did not think it advisable, as there was a scarcity of ammunition: however, a severe cannonade commenced, which lasted more than four hours.

A part of the Russian cavalry of the left wing advanced against the Prussian right wing from the Quartfchen side, and drove the regiment of Ruesch back into the wood; but the fire from the Prussian artillery and small arms obliged the

the Russians to retreat in the greatest hurry: the Prussian hussars pursued, and took many prisoners, as the passage across the Marsh, by which the Russians retired, was too narrow for a retreat of cavalry. The rest of the day passed without any action taking place, either between infantry or cavalry, partly owing to a scarcity of ammunition in both armies, particularly in the Russian, and partly because the troops were so much fatigued. The Russian army remained under arms till night; the Prussians encamped a little after twelve o'clock in the same order that they were formed in, with the exception only, that the left wing was thrown a little more back towards Zicher.

General Fermer proposed to Count Dohna a cessation of hostilities for two or three days to bury the dead, which was refused by the latter, who said,

198 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

That though customary in sieges, yet no cessation of hostilities ever took place after a battle. But he sent the pass which was required for General Braun, who was wounded, without hesitation.

As the Russian army was destitute of every thing in its present position, it marched early in the night, which the Prussians did not perceive till two o'clock on the morning of the 27th, when the Cossacks, who flanked to the left of the columns, approached too near to the enemy's out-posts. This gave the alarm, and the Prussian artillery kept up a terrible fire without knowing why. The whole army got under arms, and at day break, when His Majesty rode forward to reconnoitre, he found that the Russians were marching towards Camin. He ordered his cavalry to move on their flank, and to endeavour to fall on their rear guard. A thick fog made it impos-

possible to distinguish friend from foe at the distance of twenty paces; and the Russian army reached their barricade of waggons at Gros Camin without suffering any loss. They covered the march of their rear guard by some cannon planted on the height behind Wilckerdorf. They encamped round the barricade of waggons in Z. Pl. 8. and immediately began to intrench themselves.

Y. An intrenched advanced post.

- a. Redouts.
- b. Infantry.
- c. Cavalry.
- d. Park of artillery.
- e. Coffacks.

The Prussian army also moved from its position, and arrived in the neighbourhood of Tamsell at nine o'clock.

## 200 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

The avant corps, 44. commanded by Prince Moritz, advanced to within a cannon-shot of the enemy's batteries, and the King reconnoitred very closely the Russian position, which he found to be advantageous. About eleven o'clock both the avant corps and the army, N° 45, pitched their tents, and the King made Tamsell head-quarters.

General Bredow was detached with two regiments towards Batzlow, to keep the Cossacks, who were hovering about the Maffin wood, off the field of battle, in order that such of the wounded as still remained there, and the rest of the artillery, might be collected and brought to the army, and that the dead might be buried.

The different Russian and Prussian accounts of this battle are too well known already, to make the insertion  
2 of

of them in this volume necessary; and they do not convey any further information respecting the affair than has already been given\*.

\* The author here inserts an account of this battle, contained in a letter from the Russian General Panin to Count Ivan, of Schuwalow, at Petersburg; but we have omitted it, as it is only a repetition of what Captain Tielke himself has said, and consequently just serves to swell the book, without conveying any additional information. The only thing worth notice that General Panin remarks, in addition to what Captain Tielke has observed, is, that the Prussians had 18 and 24 pounders, out of which they fired grape shot when they came pretty close. It is to the great effect of these heavy guns that he in part attributes the disorder which took place amongst the Russians. General Panin's account goes no further than the night of the 25th of August.—*Translators.*

## 202 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

The whole of the loss sustained by the  
Russians in the Battle of Zornsdorf,  
was as follows :

Lieutenant Generals taken prisoners	—	—	2	}	5
Major Generals	—	—	1		
Brigadiers	—	—	2		
Colonels killed or taken	—	—	5	}	16
badly wounded	—	—	8		
flightly wounded	—	—	3		
Lieutenant Colonels killed	—	—	5	}	28
badly wounded	—	—	16		
flightly wounded	—	—	7		
First Majors killed	—	—	4	}	20
taken	—	—	2		
badly wounded	—	—	9		
flightly wounded	—	—	5		
Second Majors killed	—	—	4	}	13
badly wounded	—	—	7		
flightly wounded	—	—	2		
Captains killed	—	—	33	}	169
taken	—	—	11		
badly wounded	—	—	88		
flightly wounded	—	—	37		
First Lieutenants killed	—	—	44	}	224
taken	—	—	33		
badly wounded	—	—	90		
flightly wounded	—	—	57		
					Second

## SECTION II. 203

Second Lieutenants killed	—	85	
taken	—	14	
badly wounded	—	146	}
slightly wounded	—	102	
			347

Cornets and Ensigns killed	—	31	
taken	—	10	
badly wounded	—	51	}
slightly wounded	—	25	
			117

Total of Officers	—	—	939
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Non Commissioned Officers, and			
rank and file, killed and taken	—	9931	
badly wounded	—	8289	
slightly wounded	—	2370	
		20590	
Officers	—	—	939
		21529 *	
Total	—	—	21529 *

Besides the above, General Braun was badly wounded in the following manner. He had surrendered himself prisoner to

\* The number of prisoners amounted to about 3000 : therefore, there were about 18,500 killed and wounded, which sufficiently proves the obstinacy of the battle.—

Author.

## 204 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c,

a lieutenant of the Prussian cavalry, and, as in this action fortune alternately favoured each side, the Russians, who had been retiring, faced about again, and were advancing on the Prussians. His horse being wounded, the General could not get on so fast as the Lieutenant wished, who therefore gave him thirteen wounds with his sword, and left him for dead. He was taken up by some of his own people, and it was not till a year afterwards that he was entirely recovered.

I have no other way of coming at the loss which the Prussians sustained in this battle, than by the list which they published afterwards. It is as follows :

INFANTRY

CAVALRY

## CAVALRY.

Names of Regiments.	Killed.				Wounded.				Missing.				
	Officers.	Non Commissioned Officers.	Drummers, &c.	Farmers.	Privates.	Officers.	Non Commissioned Officers.	Drummers, &c.	Privates.	Officers.	Non Commissioned Officers.	Drummers, &c.	Privates.
Gardes du Corps					11	3	1	1	21				9
Gens d'Armes	1	2	2		55	4	3	1	38				
Prince of Prussia.		1			16	6	1	1	26		1		2
Margraf Frederick					18	2	6		12	1	1	1	8
Seydlitz	3	1			53	5	5	1	86	1			
Carabineers	1	1	1		7		1	1	16				
Schorlemmer	3	8			121	11	9	2	85				
Normann.	1				18	2	4		34				
Zetteritz	1	3			35	5	3	1	42				
Plattenberg		2			27	3	3		21				
Platen	2	6			45	7	5		60				29
Ziethen	4	2	1		25	8	11	3	90		2		32
Ruefch		1			15	3	1		26				
Malachowsky		4	1		50	1	3		27				
Total	16	30	4	2	496	60	36	11	584	2	4	1	80

## INFANTRY.

# 206 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

## INFANTRY.

Names of the Regiments and Battalions.	Killed.					Wounded.					Missing.				
	Officers.	Non-Com. Off.	Musick.	Pioneers.	Privates.	Officers.	Non-Com. Off.	Musick.	Pioneers.	Privates.	Officers.	Non-Com. Off.	Musick.	Pioneers.	Privates.
1 Gren. Wedel	1	1			23	5	5	2		96					
1 Gren. Bohr					21	4	7	1		91	2	1	1	1	62
1 Gr. Krenzow	3	4	1		54	5	8	1		162					5
1 Gr. Kleist	1	1	1		23	4	10	2	1	171	1	5	5		166
1 Gr. Petersdorf	2	3			71	6	7	3		153				1	26
1 Gr. Billerbeck					25	5	9			110					
1 Gr. Loffow		1	1		111	6	10	3		91					27
1 Gr. Bargdorf	2	3			61	2	6	4		142		5	3		79
1 Gr. Nefse	3	6	4		165	1	6	1		104					10
2 Kalkstein		2			36	10	14	3	1	138	1		1		8
2 Lehwald	1	3			138	5	14	5		264		1			40
2 Prince Moritz	2	11	4	2	333	10	5	1		237					
2 Dohna	4	8	2		344	16	19	4		287	1				46
2 Canitz	5	8	1		244	15	18	4		432		1	1		85
2 Bevern	2	8	1		250	11	19	3	2	367					63
2 Prin. of Prussia	2	3			24	7	6	1		131					7
2 Forcade	1	2			49	8	10	2		274	1	1			14
2 Kreytzen	2	2	1		92	7	8	1	3	180					
2 Seers	2	10	6		259	10	10	3		157	6	9	5		142
2 Affeburg	1	2			72	9	18	1		367					
2 Below	2	8	3		261	13	17	2	2	273	2	6	2	2	131
2 Kurfel	2	4	1		101	13	14	3		422		1	3		111
2 Bulow	4	2			87	9	16		4	224		2	2		61
2 Rauther	3	6	2		115	5	6	1		142	1	6	2		220
Total	45	98	28		2295	186	262	47	17	5015	15	38	25	4	1303

HORSES

# SECTION II. 207

## HORSES.

Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
71 —	12 —	
132 —	62 —	
60 —	31 —	
67 —	10 —	
109 —	98 —	
47 —	23 —	
351 —	72 —	
53 —	30 —	
84 —	74 —	
82 —	33 —	
76 —	79 —	74
109 —	76 —	20
29 —	30 —	
119 —	26 —	
<hr/> Total 1389	<hr/> 656	<hr/> 94

## RECAPITULATION.

	Men.	Horses.
Killed	3680	Killed, wounded, and missing } 2139
Wounded	6238	
Taken and Missing } 1472		
<hr/> Total	<hr/> 11390 men, including officers.	<hr/> 2139 horses.

The

## 208 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

The Prussian list undoubtedly appears too small, considering the fury with which this battle lasted, from three quarters after eight in the morning, till night, and that the Russian soldiers neither gave nor took quarter the first day \*. I cannot, however, decide any thing on this head; nor do I conceive it at all necessary for me to enter into the dispute, that afterwards arose, in consequence of both parties laying claim to the victory, which was in some measure doubtful. Connoisseurs in the military art, and indeed every other attentive reader, may easily determine that question, after having read the account of the battle, and that of the ensuing part of the campaign, which latter can be considered in no other point of view, than as the immediate consequence of the former.

\* The few prisoners were almost all taken the day after the battle, in the wood and marshes in the rear of the army.—*Author.*

An Account of the OPERATIONS after the BATTLE, till the Armies went into Winter Quarters.

The Prussian Major General Gablentz was detached with four battalions of infantry and a party of huffars, on the 27th of August, to Damm, in order, if any opportunity should offer, to strike a blow in the rear of the Russians. Towards evening, the regiment of Wiedt, which had been left behind in Custrin, escorted a supply of bread and ammunition to the Prussian army. The huffars of Ziethen were detached, by the way of Custrin and Franckfurt, to Lower Lusatia, in order to check the light troops of General Laudon's corps, who had already made incursions upon the frontiers of the Marche. To the same end the Prince of Brunswick followed on the 28th of August, with the regi-

210 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

ments Wiedt, Kurfel, and Hordt, which latter, after the pontoon bridge at Gies-tebuse was broke up, had returned to Custrin with the Pontoons. This regiment defended itself with bravery in a pretty severe skirmish with a Russian detachment of General Romanzow's corps, which had endeavoured, during the battle, to destroy the bridge, by means of howitz-shells.

The Prussian corps, which had been detached towards Landberg, returned to the army without having effected any thing.

On the 1st of September, the Russian army marched in two columns to Landberg. The one went straight to Landberg, the other took the route by Maffin. The Prussian army likewise got into motion, and the cavalry endeavoured to fall upon the Russian rear guard,

20215 1 9 which

which it came up with in the wood behind Blumenberg; but the latter posted itself behind some ponds, and kept the Prussians at a distance by a smart cannon fire. However, upon the arrival of Prussian infantry and artillery, the Russians continued their march, after they had made abbatis across all the roads and passes in their rear. The Prussian army encamped near Blumenberg, which became the head quarter. The left wing was appuyed to the village, and the advanced corps encamped to the left of it. The regiments of Cuirassiers had remained in the camp of Tamsell.

The Russian camp was taken in the following manner upon the heights in front of Landsberg. The left wing was appuyed to the Wartha, and had a wood in its front. Three regiments of Cuirassiers, one of horse grenadiers, two of

212 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

dragoons, and three of infantry, composed the first line of it; and one regiment of horse grenadiers, and three of infantry, the second line. These four regiments of the second line were enpotence to eight regiments of infantry that were formed next to them. Behind these eight regiments stood eleven regiments of infantry, fronting to the rear, that is, facing towards the river, with their right to the horse grenadiers of the second line of the left wing, and their left to the gallows. This formed, therefore, an oblong square, the right flank of which, however, was not closed; but there were five Legions upon this flank, in two lines, three in the first, and two in the second, forming a re-entrant angle, and having the village of Heinrichsdorf at some distance in their rear. Just between the right flanks of the two first lines, a little off to the right, there was a large redout, and the dif-

different fronts of the army were covered by *flèches* and batteries \*. The 2d of September General Mannteufel was detached from the Prussian camp with ten battalions, and the hussar regiments of Ruesch and Malachowsky, to follow the Russian army: he directed his march through Maffin and Tornow, and posted his corps in the woods near Hohenwalda, with this village in the front of his left wing, which was appuyed to a morass in the wood; his right extended towards Tornow. The Russian outposts were in and near Marwitz, not quite a German mile distant from the Prussian corps. On this day the King quitted the camp with the troops that he had brought out of Silesia, and marched to the assistance of Prince Henry, who was in Saxony, and

\* This description of the camp is translated *literally* from the original; but Captain Tielke has not annexed any plan to it, and without one, it is unintelligible.

*Translator s.*

## 214 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

threatened with an attack from the Imperial army, and that of the Empire.

The troops which were left in the New Marche, under the command of Lieutenant General Count Dohna, remained in the position described above; namely, the army at Blumenberg, and the advanced corps at Hohenwalda.

On the 4th of September, the Prussians detached one battalion of infantry and a hundred dragoons to Soldin, to seize upon the forage that the Russians had collected there, and to protect that neighbourhood against the incursions of the Cossacks.

Lieutenant General Mannteufel was attacked at day-break by a detachment of Cossacks, and some hundreds of hussars, which he repulsed.

On

On the 6th of September, such men of the Russian army as were badly wounded, were sent off to Marienwerder.

A detachment of light cavalry attacked the Prussian advanced corps with great intrepidity, but they were driven back by the fire of the artillery, on which occasion some houses in Hohenwalda were burnt. General Mannteufel changed his position this afternoon, and took a new one, on a height between Liebenau and Ratzdorf, his former being in so low and confined a spot, that he could scarce discover what was passing at 600 paces from his camp. Between this and the 10th nothing worth notice happened in either army.

On the 10th some thousand Cossacks attacked General Mannteufel's out-posts, and under favour of the fog they

P 4

pushed

## 216 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

pushed forward as far as the chain of camp guards. The Prussian hussars skirmished with them till about nine o'clock, when they retired, having first set fire to the villages Ratzdorf and Schinowitz.

About nine o'clock in the evening, General Mannteufel received intelligence, that he was to be attacked the next morning by a Russian corps, to be detached for that purpose from the camp of Landsberg; in consequence of which, he made his infantry remain all night under arms, and prepare themselves to receive the attack. But every thing remained quiet.

On the 11th, General Romanzow's corps joined the Russian army, and encamped on the left bank of the Warta, with its right flank appuyed to the suburbs of Landsberg. It consisted of,  
Half

# SECTION II. 217

Half the Cuirassier regiment of Kasan.

Half ditto ditto of Kiow.

Half ditto ditto of Nowotroitskoi.

Half the dragoon regiment of Tobol.

Half ditto ditto of Kargapol.

The whole ditto ditto of Archangel-  
gorod

ditto ditto of Niesegrod,

The Serbien	} regiments of Hussars.
Schorwad	
New-Serbien	
and Hungary	

The strength of the Russian army, after receiving this reinforcement, and having called in several small detachments, amounted to about 38,000 men.

In the afternoon, General Mannteufel received positive intelligence, that he was to be attacked, and that a strong corps of Russians was ordered for this enterprise, which would be carried into  
execu-

## 218 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

execution the next morning. In consequence of this intelligence, he thought it advisable to retire, as neither the strength of his corps, nor the position which it occupied, were such as could warrant his waiting a serious attack. As to the former, it did not amount to above 4000 infantry, and 1200 hussars; and the latter had no other advantage than that the camp stood upon a height of moderate elevation, and was covered in the rear by a thick wood, in which he had made an abbatis, with the view to secure himself on that side. The only manner in which he could appuyer his flanks was, by throwing them back to the wood, and, of course, forming a convex line. These reasons, added to that of his being above two German miles distant from Count Dohna's army, which made it impossible for him to receive any immediate support, induced him to begin his march about nine o'clock

o'clock in the evening, and to retreat through Maffin to Blumenberg.

On the 12th of September, a Russian corps did in fact advance to Ratzdorf; but finding that General Mannteufel had retired, the light troops only pursued him, and the corps returned to Landsberg.

On the 13th, two Prussian battalions were detached to Soldin, in order to meet a convoy of provisions, and the heavy baggage of the army, which were coming from Stettin, and to escort them to the camp, where they arrived on the 14th.

The Russian army changed its position near Landsberg, and encamped in such a manner, that the town lay behind its left flank, and the suburbs and river in its rear. It encamped in two lines,  
the

220 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

the first of which formed a reentrant angle. Four regiments of infantry were placed in each flank. The front was covered by batteries and fleches as usual.

On the 15th Count Dohna put his whole army in motion, and retreated from the camp of Blumenberg to Custrin, where he passed the Oder, and encamped near Manchenow.

The approach of the Swedes, who seemed to threaten Berlin, induced him to make this movement, in order to be at hand to oppose them.

As soon as General Fermer's patrols, which advanced as far as Maffin and Vietz, brought him intelligence of this march of the Prussian army, he sent colonel Buccow with a detachment of Cossacks and grenadiers to Soldin, to collect

collect forage and provisions in that neighbourhood.

This evening a courier arrived in Count Dohna's camp from the King of Prussia, with information, that he had sent General Wedel against the Swedes, with a corps detached from the army that was acting in Saxony. His Majesty therefore ordered, that Count Dohna would pay his whole attention to the Russians, and send the dragoon regiment of Plattenberg to Berlin, where it was to join General Wedel.

On the 16th of September, in obedience to these orders, the regiment of Plattenberg was detached to Berlin, and Count Dohna occupied his former position near Blumenberg, making his out-posts take possession of the passes in the Massin wood, and those towards Vietz.

On

## 222 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

On the 18th of September, General Fermier held a numerous council of war, in which it was determined, that, on account of the want of subsistence, the army must make some movement.

Count Dohna detached General Mann-teufel with three battalions of infantry, and the hussars of Malachowsky, to dislodge Colonel Buccow from Soldin. He marched in the night through Neu-Dam to the above mentioned place; however, as he found that Colonel Buccow appeared determined to defend himself, and as he did not think he was strong enough to attack him, imagining perhaps the Russians to be in greater force than they really were, he abandoned the enterprize, and returned to the camp at Blumenberg, leaving General Malachowsky, with his regiment of Hussars, and two battalions, at Neu-Dam.

On the 19th the Russian advanced corps

corps marched to Marwitz; and on the 20th, their army marched two German miles to Kartzig. The camp formed an exact right angle; the village of Kartzig, and the small lake that joins it, were in front of the right wing, in the first line of which were five regiments of Cuirassiers, and three legions of the corps of Observation; in the second, three regiments of horse grenadiers, two of dragoons, and two legions. The left wing was on a gentle rising ground, and in its front and left flank were marshy meadows; its first line consisted of 16 regiments of infantry, its second of 12. The hussars and Cossacks were in the rear of the camp. There was a wood in front of the right wing. The artillery was placed in three large batteries, which were thrown up in the front.

On the 21st of September the army marched a German mile to Dicko. In chusing

## 224 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

choosing this camp nothing was attended to but the convenience of the troops, particularly that of the cavalry.

On the 22d they marched two German miles to Piritz. This town is situated between two rivulets which run in marshy bottoms; that on the side of Stargard forms a long lake. Four regiments of infantry were placed with their left flank to this lake; between these and the town, a little further forward, stood four regiments of Cuirassiers: a little to the rear of these, were, one regiment of Cuirassiers, three of horse grenadiers, three of dragoons, and four of hussars, with their right flank extending to the road that leads to Stargard, their left to the Stettin road, and having the town of Piritz, and a small lake, the borders of which were marshy, in their rear. On the other side of Piritz were the five legions of the Corps

of Observation, and the Cossacks : they were formed likewise between the two rivulets above mentioned, and had the town in their rear. Upon the right flank of these, on the other side of the water, the rest of the infantry was formed in two lines, in a reentrant curve which the rivulet makes. The first line consisted of 14; the second of 10, regiments; both flanks were appuyed to the water, and three batteries were erected in the front \*.

On the 24th of September Major General Dietz's brigade marched to Pafskrug.

On the 25th, Major General Palmback was detached, with his brigade, from the Russian camp to Pafskrug, where there is a very advantageous position, Pl. 9. and general Dietz's bri-

\* Captain Tielke has not annexed any plan to this description. We have translated it *literally*; but without some sketch, it is unintelligible. *Translators.*

## 226 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

gade took possession of Stargard, and seized there 20,000 rations of provisions, and 3,000 rations of forage. It was not till the 25th that the Prussians received intelligence of the march of the Russians from Landsberg, and that they had left in that town only a detachment of 1000 grenadiers, and 400 Cossacks. The masking the marches of the army is the chief use of the Cossacks: this was an instance of it; and, indeed, they in general do it so effectually, that it is almost impossible for the enemy to discover when a movement is made.

Count Dohna having determined to try to cut off the detachment stationed in Landsberg, he intrusted Major General Woberfnow, who was one of the King's chief Aides de Camp\*, with the execution

\* The King of Prussia has always in his suite many clever officers, who are perfectly informed in every

execution of the enterprize. The Major General marched from the camp of Blumenberg at four o'clock in the afternoon, with the regiment of Lehwald, a battalion of Rauther, 10 squadrons of Schorlemmer, and 200 huffars. He went considerably about, through woods

branch of the military art; some of them are his regular Aides de Camp; others have no particular appointment. He often intrusts them with the execution of important undertakings, particularly such as require great secrecy; but takes care to be first certain, that they possess the necessary qualifications for the business on which he intends to employ them: having ascertained this point, and having given them all the necessary directions and orders with his own mouth, he sends them off to the army or corps which they are to conduct. This excellent custom makes the Prussians equal to the most difficult operations; for in fact one may say, that by these means the genius of the King pervades all the different corps, however distant they may be from each other. Also, there is no danger of the plan of operations being discovered by the enemy's intercepting letters or couriers. Another advantage of no small importance is, that, by this method, a General may often be greatly assisted in the execution of an enterprize; and the necessity, which perhaps there would otherwise be, of superseding him, is avoided.—*Author.*

## 228 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

and unfrequented roads, in order to avoid the Russian patrols, and, after a march of three long German miles, arrived about two o'clock in the morning at the village of Schonefeld, a German mile distant from Landsberg. His plan was, to attack the town with his own corps at the two gates on this side of the Warta at the same time, and thus cut off the Russian detachment from their army. Also to make use of Colonel Hordt's free regiment \*, to invest the town on the other side of the Warta, and to prevent the Russians from retreating over the river, which could easily be done, as they would in such a retreat be obliged to file over the bridge, and pass a long causeway, intersected

\* Colonel Hordt had marched with the King's corps as far as Lubben in Lusatia, from whence he had returned with his regiment, crossed the Oder at Franckfurt, and had constantly remained, since his return, stationed in the country on the left bank of the Warta.—*Auber.*

with

with several ditches. To execute this plan he made the following disposition : on the afternoon of the 25th, he sent orders to Colonel Hordt to march with his regiment, so as to be on the river side opposite to Landsberg at day break on the morning of the 26th. On his arrival at Schonefeld, he divided his own corps into two divisions. One of which, consisting of the battalion of Rauther, 7 squadrons, and a party of 12 hussars, he ordered to direct its march in such a manner through Cladow, as to arrive at day break before the gate of Landsberg, called the Zantoch-gate ; and as this division had about half a German mile further to march than the other, the General halted an hour with the latter, in order that they might both arrive at the same time at their places of destination. At the expiration of the hour he began his march with this other division, which consisted of the remainder

## 230 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

of his corps, following the straight road through Beyerndorf, with an intention to attack that gate of Landberg, called the Cuftrin-gate. The Russians had no intelligence of this expedition till General Woberfnow appeared with his division before the Cuftrin-gate, at day-break on the morning of the 26th. On his arrival there he found that the other division was not yet at its place of destination; he therefore, without loss of time, made the three squadrons of dragoons, which he had with him, cross a little mill-stream that separated the two gates of the town, and form in front of the Zantoch-gate; with his infantry he advanced into the suburb, and found the Cuftrin-gate open, and two cannon planted in it. The enemy immediately fired two or three shot out of these guns, retired them into the town, shut and barred the gate, and endeavoured to make their retreat through

through the Zantoch-gate, but were prevented by the three squadrons of dragoons above-mentioned. Finding themselves cut off on this side, they determined to cross the Warta, and retire towards Poland, which was the very thing that General Woberfnow wished them to attempt. He immediately pressed forward with his infantry into the town, and followed the enemy, expecting to get them between two fires: but, luckily for the Russians, Colonel Hordt had not yet arrived at his post. According to the time that the orders were sent to him, he might easily have received them at seven o'clock in the evening of the 25th: but by one of those unfortunate accidents, which have often occasioned the failure of the best planned expeditions, the messenger did not reach him till three o'clock on the morning of the 26th, and, as he was then more than

## 232 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

two German miles distant from Landsberg, he could not perform the march in time. The Russian detachment, therefore, got clear off; and, having set fire to the bridge over the Warta as they passed it, they gained so much time before it could be sufficiently repaired for the Prussian cavalry to cross the river, that these latter could not come up with them. Major Hirsch, who commanded the other division of General Wobernow's corps, arrived in front of the Zantoch-gate just after the affair was over: he had allowed himself to be stopped a considerable time, by 40 or 50 Cossacks, at the defile which he was obliged to pass at Cladow. Colonel Hordt arrived with his regiment about an hour after Major Hirsch. The Prussians took only two officers and five privates, who had not got quick enough through the town; and their loss amounted to no more than

than two horses, killed by the cannon shot. General Wobernow disposed of his troops as follows: The battalion of Rauter was stationed in Landberg; the regiment of Hordt in the suburb on the other side of the Warta; the regiment of Lehwald, and the dragoons, encamped on the height in front of the Zantoch-gate. About midnight the whole corps began its march to rejoin Count Dohna's army.

On the 26th the Russian army marched a German mile and an half to Prilow, where it encamped in two lines. The front was covered by the river Pläne; the right flank was appuyed to the Madajer Lake, the left flank extended to Prilow. In front of this village were the Cossacks; in the rear, five regiments of hussars, and to the left of it, three regiments of dragoons, and two of horse grenadiers. The first line

con-

### 234 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

consisted of 17 regiments of infantry, and three legions; the second of 5 regiments of Cuirassiers, which were formed on the right, 11 regiments of infantry, and two legions. The village of Groß Schonfeld lay in the rear of the center.

On the 27th the Prussian army marched, and took a new camp near Neu Dam, where General Wobersnow arrived with his corps in the afternoon. On the same day, Count Dohna made his avant corps, commanded by General Mannteufel, advance to Wustewitz. The Russian detachment, which had been driven from Landsberg, joined their army this evening.

On the 28th, Major General Palmbach's brigade began its march to Colberg, to undertake the siege of that fortress.

fortress. I treat at large of this siege, in the third section of this volume.

On the 29th, the Prussian army advanced to Soldin.

On the 30th the Russian army marched to Stargard; but General Romanzow's corps was left stationed at Pafskrug.

The Russians encamped close before the town of Stargard, on the Stettin side, in the following manner: The right wing was formed in a perpendicular direction to the line of the suburb, and appuyed to that part of it which is opposite the church-yard, where the Stettin road comes out of the town.

The town of course lay on its right flank; its first line consisted of eight, its second of three regiments of infantry: its left extended across the road

to

to Schellin, till it joined the center corps of the army. This corps was formed between the Schellin and Piritz roads; its first line consisted of eight, and its second of three regiments of infantry. The left wing extended from the Piritz to the Wetgo road, and was also a little retired towards the suburb. A strong intrenchment was carried from the left flank of this wing, quite down to that part of the river Trago where the suburb terminates. To the left of this intrenchment stood two regiments of horse grenadiers, and five regiments of hussars. On the right of Stargard, below the road to Para, stood the Cossacks, and behind the town was the baggage, forming a baricade of waggons. There were three strong batteries constructed in the front of the camp.

On the 2d of October the Prussian army marched to Lippena, and General Mannteu-

Mannteufel advanced in the night towards Piritz, where the Russians had left a weak garrison. He arrived there on the 3d in the morning, and surprised the Russian detachment, which was employed in levying contributions. His hussars took 46 of them prisoners, and the rest retired to Paszkrug. This important pass, Pl. 9. lays between Piritz and Stargard, a German mile and a quarter from the former, and a German mile and a half from the latter. Between Piritz and Paszkrug there is an extensive marshy bottom, which is intersected in almost every direction by rivulets and swamps, and is only passable by the causeway, on which the high road from Piritz to Stargard runs. This road crosses a rivulet named the Plæne, which falls into the Madajer Lake, and can only be passed at the wooden bridge near a mill, and a few houses, which are called Paszkrug. On the Stargard side,

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side, there is a steep height which extends from the Madajer Lake for some German miles in a parallel direction with the Plæne, and is the commanding ground of the whole environs. The road from Pafskrug to Stargard ascends this height through a gorge, or a sort of very sharp reentrant angle, which the height forms just opposite to the village. In this position a few battalions could stop a whole army, for there is no other road from Piritz to Stargard, without going six or eight German miles about.

The Prussian avant corps followed the Russians through Piritz, and advanced towards Pafskrug, Pl. 9. when a smart cannonade took place between it and the Russian corps that was stationed there. The loss on either side was very trifling, and after the cannonade had lasted about two hours, the Prus-

fians fell back to Piritz. Count Dohna arrived there with the army on the same day, and encamped in the front of the town; General Mannteufel took a camp, with the avant corps, on the height near Gros Risch.

Colonel Hordt was detached with his free regiment to Kolbatz, to keep open the communication with Stettin.

On the 4th of October, General Romanzow's corps cantoned; but it was ordered to keep all its baggage packed, and to be ready to march at the shortest notice.

There were now daily skirmishes happening between the Russians and the light troops of Count Dohna's army and the patrols which the Duke of Bevern sent out of Stettin, but they were too insignificant to deserve notice.

The

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The pass of Pafskrug put a stop to all movements of consequence.

On the 5th of October a Prussian cornet and 20 hussars were surprised in Berlinchen, and brought prisoners into the Russian camp.

Major General Prince Lubomirsky was detached with four thousand infantry, and a part of the light troops, to Pafskrug, in order that a corps might be stationed there, of fully sufficient strength to defend that pass, in case the enemy should attempt to force it.

On the 8th, Colonel Jakoblew was sent to Colberg with two regiments and two Howitzes, as a reinforcement to General Palmbach's corps, which was forming the siege of that place.

A part of the heavy baggage of the  
army

army was sent off to Calies, as the Russians were still in expectation of being attacked again.

On the 12th, six Prussian hussars, and sixty men of the regiment of Hordt, were brought prisoners into the Russian camp.

On the 15th two regiments of General Resanow's corps joined General Fermer's army.

The baggage and prisoners were sent forward under an escort of two regiments; and the Russian army marched on the 16th two German miles to Zechan, where it arrived in the night, having begun its march late in the afternoon. As the Russians had quitted the pass of Pafskrug the day before, the Prussian light troops advanced, and at-

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tacked their rear guard on this march, but they were repulsed.

The Russian army encamped at Zechan in two straight lines: this village lay in front of the right, and Schwanebeck in front of the left wing; the front of the camp was covered by a rivulet, that ran in a marshy bottom from Zechan through Schwanebeck; on the other side of this rivulet was a wood. The first line consisted of fifteen regiments of infantry, and two legions: the second of eight regiments of infantry, and three legions. The cavalry cantoned

On the 18th, the Russians marched two German miles to Reetz, which is a small town, surrounded by marshes, and enclosed with an old wall. The camp was in two lines on small heights. Temporary works were thrown up round

round Reetz; three batteries were erected in front of the camp; and a flèche was constructed on the right flank. In the front of this flank lay the village of Falkenwohl, behind which stood four regiments of hussars: the rest of the cavalry cantoned. The first line of this camp consisted of sixteen regiments of infantry, and the grenadier legion; the second line, of ten regiments of infantry, and four musketeer legions.

On the 21st, the Russian army marched to Springfield, and encamped in two straight lines. Springfield was in front of the center, and the front of the camp was covered by a rivulet, which runs in a marshy bottom close past the village. In the rear of the right wing there was a wood, and in the rear of the left wing a morass, which

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terminated in a large pond on the left flank.

On the 22d, the Russian army marched to Dramburg, where it encamped close in front of a wood, in three straight lines, formed exactly behind each other. In the first line, were eleven regiments of infantry; in the second, ten regiments; and in the third, five legions. On the right flank was the river Rega, between which and the right of the camp three regiments of infantry were formed, fronting to the river. The town of Dramburg lay at some little distance in front of the right wing. There was a large lake in front of the left flank: the front of the camp was, as usual, strengthened with batteries and *flèches*. This position was naturally very strong.

On the same day, the Prussian General

neral Mannteufel marched with the advanced corps to Stargard; the infantry cantoned in the town, and the cavalry encamped in front of the Stettin gate.

On the 23d Count Dohna followed with the army, and encamped on the river Ihne. General Kleist marched, with the regiment of Kréytzen and two hundred hussars, back from Piritz towards Landsberg, to check the Cossacks, who were making incursions on that side. Colonel Hordt was detached, with his free regiment, and three hundred hussars, to Dolitz, which lays on the route that the Russian army had taken. He was attacked there on the 24th by five hundred Cossacks, which were repulsed, but they made prisoner and carried off an officer of the hussars. On the same day the Prussian General Platten took possession of the small town Maffau, with his regiment of dragoons,

## 246 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

and the Russian regiments of Siberia and Narva marched from their camp to Colberg with ammunition.

The Prussians began now to be alarmed for this fortress, which was very weakly garrisoned; nor did they see how it was possible to relieve it, as the whole army in this part of the country did not amount to more than sixteen thousand men, and as from the situation of the Russians, any corps which might be detached to Colberg, would run the greatest risk of being intercepted. The erroneous idea that they had of the strength of the corps which formed the siege served greatly to increase their fears: they conceived it to be twice as strong as it in fact was\*. However, notwithstanding the many

\* The great quantity of baggage, which a Russian army or corps carries with it, often deceives you as to its strength.—*Author.*

apparent

apparent unfavourable circumstances, they determined to make every possible effort, and to endeavour, by alarming General Palmbach, to induce him to raise the siege. Major General Wobersnow took upon him the execution of this project; and a corps was put under his orders, consisting of the two battalions of the regiment of Moritz, the two battalions of Canitz, the grenadier battalion of Nefse, the dragoon regiment of Platen, and four hundred hussars. With these troops he marched on the 25th in the morning from Stargard to Maffau.

On the 26th he marched to Nau-  
garten, where he received intelligence,  
that Greiffenberg was occupied by a  
party of three hundred Russians, con-  
sisting of Cossacks and horse grenadiers.  
He immediately determined to surprise  
them; and to this end he detached, on  
the same evening, Colonel Schlabern-  
dorf,

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dorf, with a battalion of Canitz, three squadrons of dragoons, and three hundred hussars, to Plathe, a small town on the river Rega. He gave him the following directions: viz. to cross the river with his cavalry before day-break the next morning, and occupy the defile that lay between Greiffenberg and Kadam, on the road to Colberg, in order to cut off the retreat of the Russian detachment, and to leave his infantry stationed in Plathe, where they were to defend the passage of the river.

On the 27th, as the Russians had no intelligence of this expedition, they remained quiet in their camp, and fired a feu de joye, in consequence of the victory obtained by the Austrians at Hochkirchen.

At two o'clock in the morning of this day, General Platen marched with

the remaining two squadrons of his regiment, and the hundred hussars; the grenadier battalion of Neffe followed him immediately as a support; and General Wobersnow marched with the rest of his corps at three o'clock. All these troops took the straight road to Greiffenberg, and the cavalry fell in with some Russian out-posts, about half a German mile from that town, which they at first attacked but very feintly, in order to give Colonel Schlaberndorf time to arrive at his place of destination. However, upon their forming behind a defilé, apparently with the intention of opposing General Platen in his march, he fired two or three cannon shot at them, which not only drove them back, but also gave such an alarm to the detachment in Greiffenberg, that it retreated in the greatest haste towards Colberg. As Colonel Schlaberndorf had not yet advanced so far

## 250 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

far as to be able to gain the defilé of Kadam before the Russians, he could do nothing more than pursue them. His hussars came up with their rear at that defilé, and killed an officer and eight privates, and took one hundred and thirty-four prisoners. The Prussian loss on this occasion was only a few men. Although General Platen hastened his march as much as possible, he did not arrive with the rest of the cavalry till the skirmish was over. The infantry of General Wobersnow's corps, except the 2d battalion of Canitz, which had remained at Plathe, was quartered in Greiffenberg, and the cavalry cantoned in the villages on this side of the river Rega.

Every pains were taken to spread a report, that this corps was ten thousand men strong, and that several thousand  
5 more

more were to arrive at Greiffenberg the next night.

On the 28th in the morning, the 2d battalion of Canitz joined in Greiffenberg. General Woberfnow moved with all his troops towards Gulzloffshagen, and filed over the heights two deep, in order to make his corps appear stronger. It was impossible for him with so few troops to attack General Palmbach, who could take a very advantageous position on the heights in front of Colberg, which are surrounded by morasses. He advanced, however, with his infantry to Gulzloffshagen, and made his cavalry push forward to the heights above the village of Spie. This village was occupied by Russian infantry and Cossacks, who skirmished with the Prussian out-posts till night. These latter were ordered to maintain their ground on the heights, but not to allow

## 252 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

low themselves to be drawn into any serious affair with the Russians. The intention of this was to prevent the Russians from reconnoitring the Prussian corps, and discovering the retreat of the infantry towards Treptan, which was performed in the evening, and entirely concealed from the enemy by the woods and heights. The cavalry, after having lighted a great many fires, likewise quitted their post in the night, and followed the infantry: these latter cantoned on the 29th in Treptan, and the former in the villages behind the Rega river.

General Palmbach, allowing himself to be deceived and alarmed by this feint, raised the siege in the night of the 29th, and retreated towards the Russian main army.

On

On the 29th, the justice of peace of the district of Schiefelbein, and the magistrate of that town, were brought prisoners into the Russian camp, in consequence of their keeping up a correspondence with Count Dohna.

At this period of the campaign, the Cossacks committed the most daring outrages in all parts of the country, and ill treated every person who fell into their hands, without regard to condition, sex, or age. No measures that could be taken to put a stop to these excesses, no punishments \* that could be

\* The Empress had forbid the punishment of death, and had substituted the knout in its place, which, indeed, sometimes occasions death. With the Cossacks particularly the punishment of cutting off the ears and nose was adopted. In the Russian army they also make use of the punishment, called the Patoki, which they inflict in a greater or less degree, according to the magnitude of the crime for which the offender suffers: this serves instead of running the gantlet (which the Russians

## 254 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

be inflicted on the offenders, had the desired effect. One of the principal causes of this publick calamity (which indeed the inhabitants of that country might justly term it), was, that many of the Pulks had been separated and entirely dispersed in the battle of Zornsdorf; and they took care to make use of this favourable opportunity, by com-

ans think very disgraceful and below them), and it is also substituted in the place of caning. It is as follows: the offenders shirt is taken off, and he is laid down on his belly; one Non-commissioned Officer kneels upon his shoulders, taking his head between his legs; another kneels upon his hocks; they have both thin sticks, with which they beat him black and blue from his shoulders to the calves of his legs. An Officer stands by with a watch in his hand, as the time for the duration of the punishment is always limited. If the crime is of magnitude, the man is turned, and beat in the same way on the belly, when they have finished on his back. The punishments for Officers are, suspension of pay, arrest, and reduction of rank. Not only Officers of the inferior ranks, but even Generals are reduced to privates, and must sometimes serve as such a long time, before they are again promoted to the rank of Officers. See General Mannstein's account of the Russians.—

But when any Officers came, he received them

mitting

mitting the most flagrant acts of barbarism. Even the Russian Officers were in constant danger of being plundered by them, and from the day of the battle, when any of them were obliged to ride through a wood, they always took with them a party of the Tschoujew regiment, or some dragoons, or hussars, and gave no quarter to any Cossack whom they met without an Officer. A gentleman of the name of Græven, who had been a captain of cavalry, and who had a house and estate about a German mile from Dramburg, upon witnessing the miserable fate of some of his neighbours, bravely resolved to die, rather than see his wife and daughter ill treated by these brutes. He, therefore, armed his people, closed all the approaches to his house with chevaux de frise, and pallisades, and suffered no Cossack to come near him. But when any Officers came, he received

them

256 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

them with the greatest politeness, assured them of his subjection to the Empress's will, and how little it was his intention to make any opposition to her Majesty's troops. This conduct was so far from displeasing General Fermer, that, when he heard of it, he immediately sent Mr. Græven a guard to protect his house.

As no intelligence was yet received in the Russian main army of what had happened at Colberg, General Fermer sent thither General Martuinow, with a reinforcement of five regiments of infantry. It was now too late for this; but had it been thought of sooner, and had a proper quantity of artillery been sent at the same time, affairs would probably at this juncture have worn a different aspect.

On the 30th of October, Colonel  
Irrman

## SECTION II. 237

Irrman of the Russian engineers was ordered to reconnoitre the country in the neighbourhood of Labes. On the same day a messenger arrived in the Russian camp, with intelligence of the raising of the siege of Colberg; in consequence of which, orders were sent on the 31st to General Martuinow, to return to the army with the troops under his command.

On the 1st of November, General Fermer sent off the prisoners which he had with the army.

On the 2d, a courier arrived in the Russian camp from Petersburg, with orders from the Empress, for her army to go into winter quarters.

On the 3d, the Russians marched to Tempelburg, and encamped there in a bend which the Dratzig lake makes at

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that place. On the right lay Tempelburg; on the left a small lake and a wood. The Dratzig-lake was in the rear; and along the front ran a ravine, in which were two lakes, called the Replin, and lower, lakes: thus the army was surrounded by water. Five regiments of hussars formed in front of Tempelburg. The Cossacks were between the small lake and wood on the left flank. The first line was composed of eight regiments of infantry and two legions: the second, of eight regiments of infantry and three legions. In this camp General Palmbach's corps rejoined the army.

On the 8th of November the Russian army began its march to its winter quarters. It moved in three columns: the first, which General Fermer commanded in person, marched on this day

to Hochstadt; on the 9th to Crone;  
and on the 10th to Schneidemühl.

On the 13th the army separated, and  
marched by brigades into the different  
quarters, which were already fixed and  
regulated.

On the 22d of November the Russian  
garrison retired out of Driesen into Po-  
land, so that now there was not a  
man of the Russian troops left in Po-  
merania, or the New Marche. Major  
General Ohlitz, who had commanded at  
Driesen, got great credit for the strict  
discipline which he had kept up  
amongst the troops during their stay  
there.

The Russian General wished to keep  
his army as much together as possible,  
in order that he might open the ensu-  
ing campaign so much the earlier; but

## 260 BATTLE of ZORNSDORF, &c.

he found that Polish Prussia could not furnish winter quarters for the whole army, and he was, in consequence, obliged to send some brigades further back into the kingdom of Prussia.

The following was the arrangement of the winter quarters of the Russian army.

Arrangement

## SECTION II. 261

### Arrangement of the Winter Quarters of the Russian army at the End of the Campaign of 1758.

First Division, commanded by Lieutenant General  
Froloff Bagreef, whose Quarters are in Elbing.

Names of Generals, and their Quarters.	Names of the Regiments.	Places of Quarters.	From whence provisions and forage are to be received.
Major General Palmbach, quartered in Elbing. Brigadier Berg, also quartered in the district of Elbing.	1st brigade of infantry. Regiments. 2d Moscow, Wier and Niefen.	The town and district of Elbing.	Provisions and corn from the magazines in Elbing. Hay from the country, for which apply to Mr. Koppen, one of the counsellors of the war department.
Major General Prince Wolkonskoi, quartered in Dirschau. Brigadier Nummer, quartered in Mewe.	2d brigade of infantry. Regiments. Permia, Niefegrod, Asoph, and Archangelgorod.	On the other side of the Vistula, in the towns Dirschau and Mewe, and the adjacent villages.	Provisions and corn from the magazines at Dantzig and Marienwerder. Hay must be bought from the inhabitants of the country.
Major General Leontiew, quartered in Marienburg. Brigadier Essen, quartered in Neuteich.	3d brigade of infantry. Regiments. Narva, Siberia, Kiow, and Troitzkoi.	Marienburg, and the suburbs, on both sides of the river Nogath.	Provisions and corn from the magazines at Elbing and Marienwerder. Hay must be bought from the inhabitants of the country.
Major General Demikow, quartered in Heiligenbeil.	Cuirassier regiments, Kiow, Nowotroitzkoi, and Kafan.	Heiligenbeil and Brandenburg.	Provisions and corn from Pillau. Hay from the country.
Colonel Soritch commands both regiments.	Hussar regiments. Hungary and Serbien.	Muhlhausen, and Prussian Holland.	Provisions and corn from Elbing. Hay from the country.

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2d Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Refanow, whose Quarters are in Graudentz.

Names of Generals, and their Quarters.	Names of the Regiments.	Places of Quarters.	From whence provisions and forage are to be received.
Major General Martuinow, quartered in Graudentz. Brigadier Kokofin, quartered in Engelfburg.	1st brigade of infantry. Regiments. 2d grenadiers. Kafan, Schluffelburg, Obfcheron.	Graudentz, and the adjacent villages.	Provisions and corn from the magazine in Graudentz. Hay must be bought from the inhabitants.
Major General Panin, quartered in Wehlau. Brigadier Leontiew, quartered in Tappiau.	2d brigade of infantry. Regiments. 1st grenadiers, St. Petersburg, Woron, Novogorod.	Extending from Konigsberg, on both sides of the river Pregel, to Wehlau, and from thence extending along the Dyme.	Provisions and corn from Konigsberg. Hay from the country.
Major General Plemenikow, quartered in Zinten, Brigadier Treyden, quartered in Konigsberg.	3d brigade of infantry. Regiments. 4th grenadiers, Murom, Smolensko, Refan.	{ First two, in Konigsberg. Creutzburg. Zinten.	Provisions and corn from the magazine in Konigsberg. Hay from the country.
	Cuirassier Regiments. The Imperial regiment. The third Regiment.	{ Riefenburg and Saalfeld. Rosenburg and Prussian Markt.	{ Provisions and corn from Marienwerder. Hay from the country.
	Horse Grenadiers. Narva Kargapol	Neidenburg. Soldau.	{ Provisions and forage out of the country, till the magazine is established at Soldau.
	Dragoons. Archangelgorod Tobol	Hohenstein. Gilgenburg.	
	Hussars.		{ Provisions and corn from Elbing. Hay from the country.
	New Serbien	Morung.	
	Gurfini Tschoujew Cofacks.	Garnsee Freystadt	{ Provisions and corn from Marienwerder. Hay from the Country.

3d Di-

# SECTION II. 263

3d Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Romanzow, whose Quarters are in Culm.

Names of Generals, and their Quarters.	Names of the Regiments.	Places of Quarters	From whence provisions and forage are to be received.
Major General Prince Lubomirsky, quartered in Culm. Colonel Dierfeld acts as Brigadier.	1st brigade of infantry. Regiments. 3d grenadiers, Rastow, Czernikow, Prul.	Culm, and the adjacent villages, as far as Graudentz.	Provisions and corn from the magazine in Culm. Hay must be bought from the inhabitants.
Major General Dietz, quartered in Marienwerder. Brigadier Prince Dolgorucky, quartered in Deutsch Eylau.	2d brigade of infantry. Regiments. Ladoga, Wologda, Neus, Suldal.	Bischoffswer, Deutsch Eylau. Liebenauhl. Osterode.	Provisions and corn from Marienwerder. Hay from the country.
Brigadier Hartwisch: but, till his arrival, Prince Dolgorucky officiates in his place.	3d brigade of infantry. Regiments, Belosero, Piskoff, Kexholm.	Allenburg and Gerdauen. Friedland. Schippenbeil.	Provisions and corn from Konigsberg. Hay from the country.
Brigadier Ieropkin, quartered in Ortelburg.	Horse Grenadiers. Saint Petersburg, Riga, Refan.	Paffenheim. Senfburg. Rastenburg.	{ Provisions and forage from the country, till a magazine is formed in Ortelburg.
	Dagoon Regiments. Tweer, Niefegrod.	Rhein. Nicolaiken.	
	Hussars. Moldavia. Slavano Serbien. }	Liebstadt.	Provisions and corn from Elbing. Hay from the country.

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A part of the artillery horses go to Fischhausen, with proper attendants; provisions and corn will be received from Pillau, and hay from the districts of Rufs and Kukernese. — 11

The New Corps, or Corps of Observation, under the command of General Braun, will extend from Thorn on the Vistula to Culm on the Drabenitz.

General Iefremow and Brigadier Krasnotschokow have five thousand Don Cossacks under their command. The former is stationed at Oletzko; the latter forms the advanced posts on the other side of the Vistula.

In order to convey a more complete idea of the operations of this campaign, it is necessary to say something of the Russian fleet.

It

It consisted of

1 ship of 88 guns.

1 — of 84

1 — of 80

11 — of 66

3 — of 54

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17 ships of the line.

4 frigates of 32 guns.

1 fire-ship.

3 bomb-ketches.

As in the beginning of the year 1758 it was apprehended that a British fleet would cruise in the Baltick, with the double view of intercepting the Russian and Swedish trade, and of affording protection to the Prussian coast, a treaty was concluded and signed at Stockholm on the 26th of April of this year; in which it was stipulated, that the above-mentioned Russian fleet should join and co-operate with a

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Swedish Squadron of the following strength, viz.

1 ship of 74 guns.

2 — of 64

1 — of 60

1 — of 54

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5 ships of the line.

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2 frigates of 32 guns.

1 frigate of 24

This combined fleet was to cruise between Zeeland and the Swedish coast. It sailed in the month of July, and was commanded by the Russian Admiral Mischowkow, Vice-admiral Polænski, and Rear-admirals Lapuchin and Martuinow. As no English ships appeared, this naval armament was of little use. It met with several accidents in its cruise. One Russian ship of 66 guns blew up, and another of equal force foundered off the coast of Jutland.

There were likewise 22 Russian transports lost, which were taking provisions, ammunition, and stores, to the corps that besieged Colberg.

In November the combined fleet returned to the harbours of Cronstadt and Carlscrona.

## SECTION III.

## JOURNAL

OF THE

## SIEGE of COLBERG.

---

la morale

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*Condamne l'intérêt et la ferocité,**Dans le sein des horreurs prêche l'humanité.**L'Art la Guerre de Main de Maître.*

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**T**HE fortress of Colberg is situated on the coast of Pomerania. It has a good harbour formed by the river Persante, which flows through the town, and discharges itself here into the Baltic. The works are of considerable strength; for, though the ramparts are

or

### SECTION III. 269

only constructed of earth, they are of a strong profile. The parapets are 10 feet thick on the curtains, and from 12 to 15 feet in the bastions, and faced with brick.

Some objections might be made to the plan of the works, that is, to the manner in which they flank and defend each other, particularly on the side of the fally port gate: however, the place is strong, both on account of its broad and deep wet ditches, in which the water can be raised by means of the batadeaux, as also on account of the marshy ground, intersected with canals, which entirely surrounds it, and which from the gate called the Muhlen gate, to that called the Lauenburg gate, can be inundated by means of sluices. The siege therefore of this fortress, particularly in the spring and autumn, must

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must be attended with considerable difficulty.

At a distance of about a cannon shot from the town on both sides of the Persante is a ridge of small heights, the front and flanks of which are covered by a morass; they seem as if nature had intended them as a position for a small corps to occupy in order to defend the town against a large army \*.

From what has been said, it is evident, that Colberg must be a place of importance. It was particularly so to the Russians, who would have derived infinite advantages from the possession of such a fortress and harbour in the enemy's country. Without having previously made themselves masters of some fortified town in Brandenburg or

\* These are the heights which in the third siege were occupied by the Prussian corps under the Prince of Wurtemberg.—*Author.*

Pomerania, they never can take their winter quarters in these countries, and however far they may have advanced in the course of the campaign, they must always return to winter in the kingdom of Prussia and Poland, as was the case both in 1758 and 1759. The want of such a place as Colberg was very severely felt by them in the campaign of 1758, for it was extremely embarrassing to be under the necessity of transporting all the ammunition, provisions, and stores, to the army by land carriage out of Poland and Prussia, and the most important undertakings were retarded or entirely frustrated by these means : sometimes there was a want of ammunition and military stores, sometimes a dearth of provisions, and the army was consequently often obliged to retire without having seen an enemy.

In consideration of all these circumstances,

stances, every body, even the Russian officers themselves, imagined, that the campaign of 1758 would be opened with the siege of Colberg; and they were strengthened in this supposition, by General Fermer's sending out several parties to get intelligence of the situation of that fortress. There is no doubt but that would have been the most proper time for undertaking the siege, for the following reasons:

1. The marshes are dried up in the summer, or at least there is not water enough in them to impede the carrying on the approaches.

2d. There was at that time no danger of the town's being relieved by the King of Prussia, who was then employed in the siege of Ollmutz. A universal astonishment was therefore excited when the Russian army suddenly turned towards Custrin.

I am

### SECTION III. 273

I am ignorant of General Fermer's reasons for taking this step, but possibly the general plan of operations, agreed upon by all the powers which were combined against the King of Prussia, made it necessary. Although it appears from what has been already said, that it would have been very advantageous to have *opened* the campaign by besieging Colberg, yet the siege of it, which was *afterwards* undertaken in the month of October, must be reckoned among the many unaccountable events of the last war. If you consider the season which was chosen for this siege, and compare the small number of troops who were sent to execute it (even those few having by no means a sufficient stock of ammunition) with the importance of the place, you can scarcely persuade yourself that General Fermer, who was an able general, and an engineer, could have seriously pro-

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## 274 SIEGE of COLBERG.

posed to himself success in the undertaking. A fortress, that is provided with 130 pieces of cannon, is not to be taken with six 12 pounders, and a few howitzes. Perhaps his only idea was, to divert the Prussian force from another quarter, and by that means to be assistant to one of the armies of the allies in the execution of some project. I conclude also, that he must have had very particular reasons \* for employing so weak a corps on this occasion, for if he had marched to Colberg with his whole army, the Prussian corps under Count Dohna, which was not above

\* A major, who was a sort of partisan and sent out to reconnoitre, had assured General Fermer, that he would engage to take Colberg with a battalion of infantry, 500 Cossacks, and a few cannon and howitzes. Such reports from those whose business it was to get intelligence of the fortress, might possibly be one reason why an attack upon Colberg was not considered in a more serious light. This major, however, was a partisan, not an engineer, and consequently his reports should have had no influence on the arrangements for the siege. — *A. bor.*

ten thousand strong, could never have relieved the town; nor was there at that time any reason to apprehend a considerable reinforcement from Saxony. This being the case, and the garrison very weak, the place could not have held out long against the whole army with its train of heavy artillery, however difficult the wet season might have rendered the carrying on the approaches through the marshy ground.

Unacquainted with the motives which influenced General Fermer's conduct, and not having been privy to the general plan of operations, it would be inconsiderate in me to form a judgment on them. As an eye-witness of the siege, however, I must do justice to the brave troops who carried it on, by asserting, that they exerted themselves to the utmost, and spared neither labour

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nor blood in their endeavours to effect an impossibility.

Towards the latter end of 1757, the King of Prussia drew his troops out of the kingdom of Prussia, and it was then expected that the Russians would soon undertake the siege of Colberg. Orders had therefore been given, to make all the necessary preparations to resist an attack; and Major Hyde, who had been formerly commandant in Friederichsburg near Königsberg, was appointed temporary commandant\*, of the fortress. Under his careful inspection every thing that was necessary in order to put the place into a good state of defence was executed without loss of time. A sufficient quantity of wood having been collected in the course of

\* The real commandant was Colonel Grollman, but he was then with the army in Saxony, commanding the garrison battalion which properly belonged to Colberg.

*Author.*

the

the winter, the pallifading of the extensive covert way was begun in the month of March, and completed in August. Platforms were laid in the batteries, embrasures were cut, and bonnets were constructed on the salient angles of all the bastions. The guns were brought up into the batteries; sally ports made; and temporary bridges thrown over the ditches \*. As the Russian army, instead of marching to Colberg early in the spring of 1758 (when it would have found the place in a bad state of defence), moved against Custrin, there was time enough

\* These details, as also the relation of what passed within the town, are taken out of an octavo work published at Franckfurt in 1763, entitled, "The remarkable occurrences during the three sieges of Colberg," in which, though the author was not a military man, there is much important and valuable intelligence. In praising this work, however, I only refer to the account of the *first siege*. The author of the account of the two last was a different person, who displays, it is true, a great deal of religion, but neither military knowledge, nor even common sense.—*Author*.

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to make most of the necessary preparations. But the curtain and ravelins of the New Town could not be quite completed, and the batteries of the latter were scarcely raised to a sufficient height; notwithstanding this, however, they were afterwards of great service. The New Town being surrounded by the river, the force of the current had in the course of time occasioned the works sinking very much, so that a great deal of time and labour were required, to raise and repair them thoroughly, by driving in very large piles to support them. The following quantity of materials were made use of for the repairs of the fortress, viz. 15,803 nine-foot pallisades; 729 stems of oak, each 30 feet in length, and from 2 to  $3\frac{1}{2}$  feet in diameter; 382 pines of 40 feet in length; and 956 two-inch oaken planks.

On

On the ramparts were 130 cannon of different calibers, from four to twenty-four pounders.

There were 14 mortars fit for service ; and there had long been an ample store of powder, shot, and shells. In short, had the garrison been sufficient, nothing would have been wanting for the defence of the place ; but, instead of 3 or 4000 men, which it required, there were only two battalions of militia in it, commanded by Colonel Schmeling and Major Kleist, and even these were so bad, that they had scarcely begun to have the appearance of soldiers. They ought, if complete, to have consisted of a thousand men ; but as the best men had been taken out of them, and put into field regiments, the whole garrison, including the few invalids that were come from Draheim, was hardly seven hundred strong. This

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number being very insufficient, a reinforcement of two battalions was to have been sent from Stettin; but how this was prevented will appear hereafter. As, notwithstanding the movement of the Russians towards Custrin, a siege was still expected, a considerable magazine of flour and corn was transported with all possible expedition from Colberg to Stepnitz and Camin, and from thence carried across the Oder to Stettin, where it was in safety.

On the 28th of September the Russian corps that was to besiege Colberg marched out of the camp near Stargard.

It consisted of

1 Major General, Palmbach.

1 Brigadier, Berg.

1 Colonel of Engineers, Oetingen.

Some hundred hussars and Cossacks.

2 Squadrons of Horse Grenadiers.

4 Regi-

4 Regiments of infantry, viz.	{	Niesen.
		Wiet.
		Wiburg.
		2d Moscow.

The four regiments did not amount to above 3000 men, as they had suffered a good deal in the battle of Zornsdorf.

The artillery of this corps consisted of,

Cannon	{	8 three-pounders.
		6 twelve-pounders.

6 Unicorns. The whole under the command of Colonel Volkerfaamen, of the artillery.

As intelligence of the march of this corps was received in Stettin, the two battalions, which had been promised as a reinforcement to the garrison of Colberg, were detached for that place; they

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they took their quarters, on the night of the 2d of October, in and near Greiffenberg, which is four German miles distant from Colberg; and on the 3d in the morning they sent forward their camp colour-men with an escort, which was attacked at Beelkow, three German miles from Colberg, by the light troops of General Palmbach's corps; a lieutenant and 47 men were taken, and three men killed; upon which the two battalions returned to Camin. The prisoners were allowed to send intelligence of this event to Major Heyde in an open letter.

About eleven o'clock in the forenoon of this day (viz. 3d of October) General Palmbach's corps arrived by the road of Schiefelbein on the heights of Sellnow, a quarter of a German mile from Colberg.

### SECTION III. 283

A trumpeter was immediately sent to the fortress with a written summons, and he received from the Commandant, who was come out beyond the barrier before the Muhlengate, a polite but short answer. Some shells were immediately thrown against the New town, but, on account of the great distance, they fell short of it: they were answered by a few shots from the works. The Russians took a camp between Sellnow and Werder,

As the besiegers had not any plan of the fortress, and as it was impossible to discover the nature and disposition of the works merely by reconnoitring, it was judged advisable to take possession of the harbour, and to conduct the approaches on the side of the Munde\* suburb. Fourteen days after this, when

\* The German word, Munde, means the mouth of a river.—*Translators.*

it

## 284 SIEGE of COLBERG.

it was too late to change the attack, an Officer found a good plan of the fortress, by which it plainly appeared, that the attack was directed against the strongest side of it.

The Commandant, Major Heyde, continued making the necessary arrangements in the town: the striking of clocks and ringing of bells was put a stop to. The nine iron cannon that were in the battery near the harbour, N° 32. Pl. X. were brought into the town\*. The fire engines were tried, and an order was given out, that tubs of water should be placed before all the houses, as well as in the attick stories.

A quantity of oxen and sheep were brought in from the neighbouring vil-

\* One of them was left upon the Glacis, the carriage being broken.—*Author.*

lages, and the sluices were shut, in order to raise the water in the ditches.

On the 4th of October, the besiegers placed three unicorns in the Maykuhle wood\*, opposite the houses called Licens hæuffer, Pl. X. a. without any battery having been prepared for them, and shells were thrown from 10 o'clock in the morning till noon, which fire was answered from the town.

In the afternoon a Trumpeter was sent to summon the town a second time, with directions to say, That the fire of the besiegers had hitherto only been intended to shew what they could do; but that, if the garrison did not immediately surrender, the town should be laid in ashes.

\* The Maykuhle is a pleasant wood which shelters the harbour on that side.—*Aulbor.*

The

## 286 SIEGE of COLBERG.

The Commandant having again refused to surrender, the town was in the evening bombarded for about an hour, by which several houses were damaged.

The precautions that were taken in the fortress to prevent fire were very good. Guards of the Burghers, under the command of the Magistrates, were day and night in readiness in each quarter of the town, to turn out in case of fire. The fire-engines were placed in different parts of the streets; and all the horses stood constantly harnessed in the stables.

This evening the covert-way was for the first time occupied by about 400 men of the militia: the Burghers lined the ramparts under their own Officers; the Commandant gave them instructions concerning the manner in which they were to act; and the Commanders of  
the

the battalions of militia placed their men themselves on their respective posts. No drum was beat at guard-mounting; but the taptoo and reveille were still continued.

The Russians had ordered peasants to attend to work at making fascines, and bringing them to the depot. The inhabitants of the suburbs, who took intelligence into the town of every thing they could observe or discover, had reported this also; in consequence of which there had been no fire from the garrison during the two last nights, from a motive of sparing these people, who, it was at first imagined, were employed in throwing up the trenches.

On the 5th of October, Brigadier Berg marched to the harbour with four companies of grenadiers, six 12-pounders, and six unicorns, and found that the re-

## 288 SIEGE of COLBERG.

dout, N° 32, was abandoned. A bridge was immediately made across the river Persante, by means of three Prussian merchant vessels, six of which were laying in the harbour, together with one Swedish ship that had been detained there.

Brigadier Berg crossed at this bridge, and occupied Munde and Pfannschmiede, two suburbs so called, the first of which is near the harbour, and the latter just in front of the gate called the Munde-gate.

These suburbs were of great service to the Russians, because, under cover of them, they were enabled to open the trenches very near the town, which saved them a great deal of work. So prudent a man as the Commandant was, would certainly not have neglected  
burning

burning the suburbs, had not weighty reasons determined him against it\*.

On the same day Colonel Oettigen of the engineers opened the trenches under cover of Pfannschmiede, and of a little grove called the Orchard, and began a battery, into which they could go, with-

\* This is accounted for by the Author, whom I have mentioned before as treating of this siege, in the following manner. He says, "It is more than probable that our Commandant would not have neglected to burn the suburbs, and clear the ground in front of the works, if he had had certain intelligence of the Russians intending to besiege the place, and had also a sufficient garrison to make a defence against a serious attack. But both these circumstances were doubtful, and he was too much a friend to mankind, to ruin and render miserable two or three hundred families upon an uncertainty, and thus to distress the town as much as it was in the power of the enemy to do. Moreover, he might have thought it advisable to spare the Burghers as much as possible, as he stood in such absolute need of their assistance, owing to his garrison being so weak."

It is most likely that the latter reason was the true one, and indeed it is substantial enough.—*Author.*

290 SIEGE of COLBERG.

out being much exposed to the fire of the enemy.

About eight o'clock in the morning, some shells were thrown into the town from the Maykuhle wood: these were answered by a very brisk fire from the works, by which the Russians lost a Captain of engineers and a few men.

The fire of the besiegers ceased towards the middle of the day, but it was renewed in the afternoon about four o'clock. A shell went through the window of the Lieutenant of Artillery's room, in which were the Commandant, Lieutenant Colonel Schmeling, and a Captain, who were just come down from the ramparts; it struck against a wall, flew out of the room, and, bursting in the house, the pieces of it broke the leg of a Non-commissioned Officer, and hurt two or three other people very much.

This

### SECTION III. 291

This night the garrison had occupied that part of the covert-way in particular from the suburb called Stubenhagen, round by Pfannschmiede as far as the Perfante. Some Russian grenadiers, under cover of the houses and gardens, stole up to the counterscarp, and threw some grenades into the covert-way, most of which however rolled into the ditch. This occasioned a very heavy fire from all the troops in the covert-way.

On the 6th the trenches were carried away to the right from the battery in the orchard, b. along by the avenue, c. and the battery was completed. Three unicorns were still left in the Maykuble wood, out of which, at break of day, shells and carcases were thrown into the town.

As well on this day as during the whole of the siege, the Prussian fire

## 292 SIEGE of COLBERG.

was six times as heavy as that of the Russians; and they threw some very large shells towards the Maykuhle wood, by the bursting of which, and the splinters that they occasioned from the trees, several soldiers were wounded.

The following night the remainder of the artillery was brought from the Maykuhle wood to Pfannschmiede.

On the 7th, a zig zag, d. was carried back from the orchard, because the party that covered the approaches was too much exposed to the Prussian fire.

Two unicorns and three 12 pounders\* were placed in the first battery, b. and began to fire upon the town. This fire (which continued without interruption till eleven o'clock in the forenoon) especially the shells and carcases which were

\* These cannon were taken from the Prussians at the battle of Zornsdorf.—*Author.*

### SECTION III. 293

thrown out of the unicorns, considerably damaged the buildings in the town, particularly in the streets called the Dome Street, Pfannschmiede Street, Brodscharren Street, and Linden Street, and the houses in the market-place suffered a good deal; but the precautions taken were so good, as entirely to prevent fire, and the inhabitants escaped unhurt, by taking shelter in the extensive corporation cellars, which were supposed to be bomb-proof, owing to their roofs being arched, and plentifully covered with dung. The besieged kept up a brisk fire with their heavy artillery, particularly from the cavaliers, 10 and 11. The besiegers had one man killed and seven wounded on this occasion. In the afternoon of this day the besieged threw 200 lb. shells, one of which fell and burst in the battery, b. damaged it very much, and killed and wounded several men. The Russian fire also be-

## 294 SIEGE of COLBERG.

gan in the afternoon, and continued without interruption till midnight.

On the 8th the trenches were carried backwards from the end of the zig zag to the avenue, e. e.; but this being Sunday, the firing was stopped till three o'clock in the afternoon, in order that the service in church might be performed without interruption; however, as the garrison was not aware of the good intention of the Russians in this respect, the congregations did not assemble as usual. From three o'clock till five the besiegers threw as many shells into the town as possible.

On this day General Palmbach, contrary to all expectation, received orders to raise the siege, and return to the army\*.

\* Such an order being sent is a most unaccountable circumstance. It certainly was sent and received; but why, or by whom it was given, I never could find out.  
—*Author.*

He

### SECTION III. 295

He immediately determined to try if he could not persuade the Commandant to surrender the place, and sent a Major to him with a Trumpeter, with offers of a most honourable and advantageous capitulation; but threatening, in case of refusal, to give the garrison no quarter. The Major was admitted at the Munde-gate, was blindfolded, and taken by a Captain, in a carriage, to the Commandant's house, who was confined by illness. Major Heyde's answer to all the threats and representations was, " That he had not  
 " the smallest reason to surrender : that  
 " the works were in a perfect state of  
 " defence ; and that the burning of the  
 " town would not have more effect  
 " upon him, than it had on the garrison of Custrin \*." The Russian Major  
 was

\* As the Commandant was well informed of the small force of the besiegers, both from their method of  
 U 4 conducting

## 296 SIEGE of COLBERG.

was sent back without a handkerchief being tied round his eyes, in order that he might see what a good state the works of the fortress were in. Upon this the firing recommenced, and lasted with more vigour than the preceding day, till five in the morning. A great quantity of carcases and fire-balls\* were thrown, but most of these latter fell short of the town into the ditches†.

On the 9th, in the morning, General Palmbach raised the siege. He marched

conducting the attack, as also from the reports of the inhabitants of the suburbs, no other answer was to be expected from him. The corps was too weak to prevent intelligence being carried into the town.—*Author.*

\* In German, *Pechkrantze*; in French, *Cercles goudronnés*: a species of fire-balls made of old untwisted matches, boiled in a composition of pitch, tallow, powder, and oil.—*Translators.*

† The intention of this was not to burn the town, but to frighten the burghers, and to persuade the Commandant to surrender.—*Author.*

a German mile and an half to Gros Gestein, where Colonel Jakoblew met him with the reinforcement which he had applied for, consisting of two regiments of infantry, together 1200 men, and two howitzes: the colonel also brought orders from the Commander in Chief, purporting, that the siege was to be carried on with the greatest vigour\*.

As the garrison was so weak, and as the Commandant was apprehensive of a surprize, he did not, as is customary on these occasions, send out a detachment to destroy the trenches, but kept all the gates shut, and remained the whole night in readiness to resist an attack.

\* It seems that the order to raise the siege, and that to continue it, must have been sent nearly at the same time.—*Author.*

## 298 SIEGE of COLBERG.

On the 10th General Palmbach returned, and found every thing as he left it. He detached Colonel Jakoblew, with the reinforcement which he had brought, to the Lauenburg side of the town, in order to carry on an attack from that side, and to invest the place more closely. A bridge of communication was made over the Persante, at Rosentin, about half a German mile up the river from Colberg.

Brigadier Berg returned to his former situation; found every thing in the harbour and trenches in the same state as when the siege was raised; summoned the town to surrender; and, upon a refusal being received, began the bombardment again from the battery in the orchard, b.

When Colonel Jakoblew arrived upon the height above the old town, he  
fired

SECTION III. 299

fired a few shots and shells into the works of the fortrefs out of two howitzes, and some field pieces, which was all the artillery that he had with him. P. Pl. 10.

During this night the trenches on the Munde fide were advanced towards Saint Nicolas church, c.; and being completed on the 11th, a battery was begun in front of the church, f.

All day on the 11th the town was cannonaded from the battery, b. on the Munde fide; and on the other fide from the artillery placed near the old town church in P.; and shells were thrown into it out of the unicorns.

The Muhlen fuburb was furrounded by Major Vermeulen, with a party of Coffacks and horfe grenadiers.

The

### 300 SIEGE of COLBERG.

The fire of the besieged was particularly heavy, and it dismounted one gun, and killed and wounded nine men of the battery, P.

Part of the town was set on fire, but it was immediately extinguished.

Almost all the garrison was posted in the covert-way, as an attack upon it was expected, and the ramparts were strongly lined by the burghers. There was in the town a body of burghers who had been trained to exercise, and fire at marks, for the purpose of defending the ramparts; these were excused from night duty; but a certain number of them were always obliged to be on the ramparts in the day time, armed with rifles, and were directed to fire upon every Russian that came within shot. They killed or wounded during the siege many Russian Officers who

### S E C T I O N III. 301

who approached too near to the works to reconnoitre. General Palmbach was at first much exasperated against the burghers for thus joining in the defence of the place; but, upon being informed by the inhabitants of the suburbs, that when any person was admitted a burgher of the town he was sworn to defend it, and obliged to produce his arms, his anger subsided, and he could not help expressing his approbation of so excellent an institution.

On the 12th the battery at Saint Nicolas church, f. was completed, and one unicorn, three twelve pounders, and one three pounder \*, mounted in it; also the traverses, g. g. were constructed, to prevent an enfilade.

On the foregoing evening Colonel

\* This was perhaps the first three-pounder that ever was mounted in a dismounting battery.—*Author.*

Jakoblew

## 302 SIEGE of COLBERG.

Jakoblew had taken a camp near Neckniehn, and in the night had constructed a battery at q. from which he began to throw shells on the morning of the 12th.

On the 12th Quarter Master General Stoffeln arrived from the main army, reconnoitred as far forward as he could through Pfannschmiede, and undertook to conduct the approaches on this side himself. He found fault with the method in which they had hitherto been carried on, and said, that the trenches might have been opened nearer to the town, under cover of the suburb. Colonel Oettingen of the engineers was sent to the other side of the town, to assist Colonel Jakoblew in that attack.

The besiegers held a council of war, and it was determined, as there was such a scarcity of artillery and ammunition,

to storm the covert-way. All the necessary arrangements were made.

The fire of the besiegers was very slack, owing to their want of ammunition; but they worked the harder at the trenches, in order to approach near to the place, which the heavy fire from the works rendered very difficult and dangerous.

To return to the besieged. Lieutenant Ebel of the artillery was rendered unfit for duty, by an illness which attacked him in consequence of the great fatigue he was obliged to undergo, and, luckily for the besieged, Lieutenant Scheel, who had the care of the arsenal, was able to take his place\*. There

\* The only engineer in the town was Lieutenant Kaschitzk. The only artillery officers were Lieutenants Ebel and Scheel. These officers deserve to be made known on account of the abilities and indefatigable zeal which they displayed in this siege. They were all promoted after the siege was raised.—*Author*.

were

### 304 SIEGE of COLBERG.

were only one Non-commissioned Officer and 14 privates of the artillery in the garrison. This number was not sufficient to allow one artillery-man to each battery. The Commandant had, therefore, long been applying for a reinforcement, and thirty experienced artillery men were promised him: these were on their march to Colberg, with the two battalions which are already mentioned to have been intercepted by General Palmbach's corps, and they returned with them to Stettin. To get the better in some measure of the embarrassment which this occasioned, 120 men were taken from the militia, and exercised in the management of the guns, and employed in the batteries. As these people were obliged to remain day and night in the batteries, victuals were dressed regularly for them in the town, and carried to them on the ramparts; they were very well fed; and  
every

every care taken of them that could be under such circumstances. Indeed the necessary arrangements had been made, so as to insure to the whole garrison a regular daily supply of bread, fresh meat, bacon, and vegetables; to this end the inhabitants of the adjacent villages had been obliged to bring in as much of every thing as could be wanted, before the town was invested. This assisted greatly to keep the garrison in health and spirits.

Among the Burghers there were found some few, who had formerly been in the artillery; but a circumstance of much more consequence than this was, that, amongst those of the militia who were appointed to the guns, there were a great number, as well non-commissioned officers as privates, who discovered very good natural abilities, and great inclination for the artillery

### 306 SIEGE of COLBERG.

service. Particular pains were of course taken to instruct these people, and in a short time they became so expert, that they could safely be intrusted with the direction of batteries. The great difficulty of all was, the service of the mortars. The few regular artillery men that were in the garrison understood but little of this. However, Lieutenant Scheel was indefatigable in his exertions, and displayed much science and ability in that part of the service.

About midnight a great alarm was occasioned by a heavy fire accompanied by loud shouts, beginning on the rampart on the Munde side, and extending round the whole town. The guards at the gates and those in the town beat to arms, and it was generally thought that the Covert-way was attacked. The few soldiers and Burghers who were not on duty assembled on their alarm posts, ready

ready to move to whatever quarter there might appear to be most danger. The besiegers likewise got under arms, and concluded that the garrison had made a folly. In about an hour every thing was quiet again, and both sides saw that it was only a false alarm. It was supposed that the commandant had ordered this, partly to interrupt the besiegers in their work, but principally to exercise the garrison and Burghers in turning out and repairing to their alarm posts, and to make such an event familiar to them.

On the morning of the 13th, the battery at Saint Nicolas church, f, began to play for the first time. In the foregoing night the third battery was begun in the garden: the trenches were carried forward to the glacis, h, and gabions were placed on the ridge of the Glacis. The besieged endeavoured to

X z prevent

308 SIEGE of COLBERG.

prevent this by a very heavy grape fire, but they could only annoy the workmen from the bastion, N° 11, and from a part of the adjacent curtain, for these latter were covered to the left by the houses, and on the right they were only a little exposed to the fire of the cavalier of the bastion, N° 12. Moreover, the battery of the bastion, 11, was much too high, so that in fact the besieged were now under its guns: the defence of this bastion, therefore, principally rested on the small arms.

The besiegers continued to work the whole day; they repaired what damages the different parts of the approaches had sustained; roofed the trenches in those parts which were most exposed to the enemy's fire; and carried a sap through the Glacis up to the pallisades.

As it was now certain that the besiegers

### SECTION III. 309

siegers intended to storm the Covert-way, the commandant did not think it advisable, with so weak a garrison, to risk the event. With so few troops, however brave they might be, it was impossible to defend it; the loss also which he might sustain on the occasion was in his situation a very weighty consideration; and added to this, it was possible that the assailants might force into the town with the garrison, as they retreated from the Covert-way. He therefore drew all his troops into the body of the place; had the bridge across the ditch of the hornwork, 16. destroyed as far as the drawbridge, and all the temporary bridges across the ditches removed; the gate of the hornwork was barred, and a great quantity of dung thrown up against it. The garrison and Burghers could now do duty jointly on the ramparts, and one half being fully sufficient to occupy

X 3                      them,

them, there never were more on duty at a time, which indeed the cold weather and constant rain made very necessary.—There was no longer any danger of a storm, 'till the besiegers should have completed their passage over the ditch. This, viz. the making a passage over the broad and deep wet ditch was, considering the force of the besiegers, next thing to an impossibility; not because the ditch was particularly well defended, but because the Russians had not a sufficient number of men to work, and particularly because they had not heavy artillery and ammunition enough to dismount the guns which flanked the ditch, and to silence the fire of the besieged.

On the 14th the besiegers threw up a traverse in the middle of the street on a line with the third battery, i, and were busy in preparing scaling ladders, gabions,

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gabions, a  
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way. As  
Kleist, w  
had, with  
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the curta  
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with so  
could be  
the sap,  
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they wer  
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courage t  
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Tottleber

\* At that  
service, but

# SECTION III. 311

bans, and fascines. The same evening they made a lodgment in the covert-  
y. As the besieged expected it, major  
eist, who commanded on that side,  
d, with the approbation of the com-  
ndant, cut two embrasures, one in  
e curtain facing the head of the sap,  
d one in the flank of the hornwork,  
h so great a slope, that the guns  
uld be sufficiently depressed to rake  
e sap, and he had mounted cannon  
them loaded with grape. The be-  
gers were not aware of this. At first  
y were not at all disturbed in making  
s lodgment. All the volunteers and  
cers carried fascines in order to en-  
rage the soldiers; but they were so n-  
covered from the ramparts. Perhaps  
s was owing to the taking possession  
the outward barrier, which Colonel  
tleben \* did too precipitately with

20

At that time he had not entered into the Russian  
ce, but was a volunteer. He was present during

X 4

the

### 312 SIEGE of COLBERG.

20 grenadiers, whose bright brass caps shone by moonlight, and were easily seen through the portcullis. The besieged immediately began an astonishing heavy fire, particularly of grape shot, from all the batteries on this side, and especially from the guns in the two embrasures above-mentioned. They also kept up a brisk fire from the small arms, and rifles. The first shot killed major Lauterbach, an officer who was much respected; besides this, two grenadiers were killed; and two lieutenants, one serjeant, eight grenadiers, and six musketeers, wounded.

This unexpected fire occasioned a panick amongst the soldiers of the besiegers: they deserted their officers, and

the whole of the siege, and had requested to be charged with the execution of this duty. In the Russian army it is easy for a volunteer to get a small command, and, indeed, those receive great encouragement who are remarkable for bravery and abilities.—*Author.*

retiring

retiring in great disorder, sought shelter behind the houses in the suburb; however, they were soon rallied, and brought forward again. They laid down till the grape fire began to slacken, and then covered themselves by a parapet of Gabions.

In order to facilitate the getting possession of the covert-way, Colonel Labadie (a volunteer) was sent at the head of 200 grenadiers, and Major Vermeulen with the horse grenadiers dismounted, to surprise the bastions of the new town, 12 and 13. But they found the captain and 50 men who were posted in these bastions, in perfect readiness to receive them; and as these works have a broad, deep wet ditch, they judged it advisable to desist from the attempt to carry them; they returned without having sustained any loss.

The

### 314 SIEGE of COLBERG.

The constant rain, which lasted almost during the whole siege, made the carrying on of the approaches very difficult. It of course rendered the ground much more swampy than it was naturally, and in the firmest parts the besiegers came to water by sinking a spade deep. The trenches were therefore constantly full of water, and the troops suffered much in consequence.

On this day the governor's stables were set on fire, but it was soon extinguished \*.

The bridge of boats near Munde was in great danger of being carried away, as a storm at sea occasioned the river to swell very much.

\* Particular orders were given; that the shot and shells should be directed against the ramparts, and not fired into the town! but it is not possible to fire with a howitz, as true as with a rifle.—*Author.*

On

### SECTION III. 315

On the 15th the besiegers fired very little, owing to their scarcity of Ammunition, and they received from the town ten shot for one the whole day through. I had remained during the preceding night, with Colonel Tottleben, in the lodgment in the covert way. At the break of day we saw, that part of the parapet had fallen down from the rampart of the body of the place; it had the appearance of a breach, which indeed it was very improbable that the few twelve-pound shot which we had fired should have effected: however, Colonel Tottleben thought that this certainly was the case; and, as he knew that Colonel Volkerfaamen, who commanded the artillery, had a particular partiality for me, he desired me to beg of him to allow a few shots to be fired at this part of the rampart. I found the Colonel in the third battery, h, I shewed him the rampart, and asked

### 316 SIEGE of COLBERG.

asked him what he thought of it? He laughed at the idea of a breach, but could not account for the circumstance. I requested him to let the battery fire, saying, that perhaps the enemy's guns were dismounted. Certainly not, says he, by our fire; however, we will try, and you shall have the satisfaction of pointing the guns yourself. I aimed at the cannon on the broken part of the rampart which were almost entirely exposed, and the Colonel gave the word for firing. We had not fired three shot, when we received a most severe round from all the batteries on this side of the ramparts, and had three artillery men killed at our feet. We immediately desisted, as did also the besieged. It now appeared to us very plain, that the parapet had been thrown down on purpose, in order that the guns might be depressed more, as we had got almost under them. Of the besieged

one

### S E C T I O N III. 317

one musketeer was killed on the rampart, and one of the best artillery men, and a burgher, badly wounded.

The besiegers strengthened and raised their batteries, in order to cover themselves from the enemy's fire.

The besieged endeavoured to destroy the battery at St. Nicolas church, but they employed their heaviest artillery and mortars in vain, as it was constructed in a very substantial manner. The church was knocked to pieces on this occasion.

On the 16th the traverse across the street, i, was converted into a battery, and the unicorns mounted in it \*.

\* As new batteries were constructed, the artillery was brought into them out of the old ones; for the whole artillery on this side consisted only of six twelve-pounders, and six unicorns, besides field pieces. In the attack on the other side of the town, there were only two howitzes, besides field pieces.—*Author.*

On

### 318 SIEGE of COLBERG.

On this day General Stoffeln rode round the whole town to reconnoitre, accompanied by Colonel Oettingen and some other officers. Amongst the rest I attended him. As we were approaching the Lauenburg suburb by the causeway that is carried across the morass, two or three cannon shot were fired at us; perhaps the general's red cloak and the number of his suite might have attracted the notice of the besieged in this instance, but it was no uncommon thing even for single officers to be fired at from the works.

As in the beginning of the siege the Russians had no plan of the fortress, all of us who were engineers made an agreement to reconnoitre the place as accurately as possible. We used to approach within grape shot of the works; two generally went together, one of whom kept his eyes fixed on the enemy's batteries,

### SECTION III. 319

batteries, and when they prepared to fire, both threw themselves flat on the ground, and let the balls go over their heads. On moon-light nights we used to steal up to the pallisades of the covert way, and endeavour to form some idea of the works by the shade. It was very astonishing that with so few experienced artillery men, they fired so well and so quick from the fortrefs, as to make it dangerous to reconnoitre on horseback. At first the tower of Saint Nicolas church was of use to us to reconnoitre from, but as it lay close behind one of our batteries, it was soon demolished.

The besiegers on this day collected two or three and twenty boats from Munde, and the fishing villages, Deep, and Henkenhagen, for the execution of a project which I shall take notice of in the sequel. Information of it was carried

ried into the town on the same evening by the inhabitants of the suburbs. The commandant concluded from this circumstance, that the Russians intended to assault the town on the side next to the river. He saw, however, that he had little to fear from such an undertaking, for in the first place the whole number of boats could not contain above one hundred men besides the rowers; and secondly, they would be obliged to force the boom that was across the river under the fire of two works. Allowing also, that they surmounted this first difficulty, and that those who escaped attempted to take the hornwork, 16, in the rear, they would find in it a post of 100 men ready to receive them. However, that no precaution might be neglected, two cannon were placed on the edge of the river near the guard, and pointed so, that they enfiladed the river; and the guard was strengthened. As

the Russians had no intention of such an undertaking, the boats were brought into the trenches and quietly deposited there.

Every thing remained still during this night; the besiegers did not fire owing to a want of ammunition.

On the 17th Lieutenant Ingelstrom\* and I discovered the sally port gate, N° 20, by which the besieged could constantly receive supplies and intelligence. We reported this to General Stoffeln, who immediately ordered a party of Cossacks to be stationed on that side of the town.

As some deserters informed the besiegers of the situation of the powder magazines N° 8. they pointed their

\* He had been in the Saxon Service, but attended at this siege as a volunteer.—*Author.*

322 SIEGE of COLBERG.

artillery principally towards those spots, and kept up as brisk a fire the whole morning, as the small quantity of ammunition would admit of. The tower of the Muhlengate was set on fire by a carcass, but it was soon extinguished.

A heavy storm of wind and rain rendered the working in the trenches very difficult. In this storm 22 Russian transports were lost off the point of land between Stolpe and Rugenwalde. They were laden with grain, flour, beer, and all sorts of provisions, as well as ammunition, and were on their way from Riga, Memel, and Konigsberg, to Colberg.

On the 18th, the fifth battery, k, was completed, and the besiegers began to work at a gallery to descend into the ditch b. The difficulty of passing a broad, deep wet ditch is too well known

to

to require demonstration, and the Russians were in want of every requisite to effect it. As they had only six twelve-pounders, and not a sufficiency of balls for even that small number, they could neither dismount the enemy's guns, nor attempt to make a breach. Generals Stoffeln and Palmbach, as well as brigadier Berg, and colonel Volkerfaamen, were men of abilities and approved courage, and to such people the idea of spending so much time before this place to no purpose was insupportable. They left, therefore, nothing untried to accomplish their point, however difficult the execution might be; and, as, owing to their small number of troops, and great dearth of every necessary for carrying on a siege, they had little to hope from real science or force, they resolved to try some other means. It was determined to carry on the gallery or covered sap to the counterscarp of

the body of the place, and to make an appareille into the ditch. Rafts of strong beams, furnished with strong timber blinds, were prepared ready for putting together; these were to be carried piece by piece into the covert-way, there joined, and the raft, thus constructed, was to be let down the above mentioned slope or appareille upon rollers. Upon these rafts 30 volunteers were to pass the ditch, and endeavour to make a lodgment under the bastion. They thought to frighten the commandant and the garrison by this bold undertaking, and to prevail upon them to capitulate upon advantageous terms being offered. Should it, however, not have the desired effect, they resolved, as the garrison was so weak, to endeavour to storm the fortress on all sides by means of these rafts, and the boats which had been collected, making use of scaling ladders to mount the ramparts.

To

To this end the troops were very busily employed in preparing the rafts and ladders. It was at the same time determined to carry on regular approaches on the Lauenburg side; for as yet Colonel Jakoblew had not advanced nearer than the battery, q. from which he had thrown shells into the town. The following substantial reasons argued strongly in favour of this last mentioned attack.

1.) The besiegers had now discovered that their attack was directed against the strongest side of the fortrefs \*, and that it ought to have been carried on against the right face of the bastion, 14, on the Lauenburg side. This face was only flanked by the work

\* They can hardly be blamed for this, as they had at first no plan of the works, and as the fortrefs was difficult to reconnoitre, owing to its low situation.—

*Author.*

### 326 SIEGE of COLBERG.

on the small ~~land~~ <sup>island</sup>, N° 17. The Ravelin, 18. was in the same situation as the works of the new town are above described to have been in, and was not sufficiently raised and repaired to defend the bastion, 14 \*.

If the Russians had been provided with a sufficient quantity of heavy artillery and ammunition, they must have succeeded in an attack on this side of Colberg: for, after dismounting the guns on the right face and flank of the bastion, 14, and destroying the defences of this part of the works, they could cross the canal, which is not very broad, and take possession of the work, N° 17. They would then be exposed to no fire except from the houses in the town; consequently they could ef-

\* The following summer this side of the fortress was greatly strengthened and improved, so that it is now in as good a state of defence as the other side.—*Author.*

fect a passage over the second canal, which separates this work from the town. However, in this siege, the question was, not what *ought* to be done according to the rules, but what *could* be done under such circumstances.

2.) As the besiegers were almost entirely destitute of the necessary stores and materials for carrying on a siege in the usual manner, the plan of crossing the ditch by rafts, and assaulting the place as above described, afforded at least a greater probability of success than any other scheme. Now it was very natural to conclude, that the assault was more likely to succeed, if attempted on different parts of the works at the same time. It was, therefore, determined to carry a sap through the covert-way into the ditch on the Lauenburg side.

# 328 SIEGE of C O D B E R G.

The gate which formed the entrance into the Lauenburg suburb from the cause-way was shut, and the besiegers did not know whether or not it was guarded, and the suburb occupied by the enemy. A few hussars were therefore sent thither in the forenoon, who knocked at the gate, and gave themselves out for deserters; but as the inhabitants refused them admittance till they should send into the town and receive orders for that purpose, they returned to the camp as fast as possible. In the evening a strong detachment marched up to this gate, forced it open, took possession of the suburb, and pushed on posts towards the town, which covered themselves by means of the houses and barns.

An Officer was sent again with a trumpeter to summon the place. He announced himself at the Munde-gate, but

but as the bridge on this side was taken away, and the gate blocked up with dung, he was desired to go round to the Lauenburg gate. He rode round on the Glacis, and the Commandant met him at the chevaux de frises, and received the letter from him with his own hand. This was couched in the most persuasive and, at the same time, threatening terms; and was to the following purport: "That the Com-  
 "mandant would have reason to lament  
 "the misery of the inhabitants if the  
 "town was taken by storm. That,  
 "however inclined the Russian Officers  
 "might be to humanity, still it was  
 "impossible for them to restrain the  
 "soldiers on these occasions, and con-  
 "sequently the inhabitants would be  
 "exposed to the most shocking treat-  
 "ment. That he (namely, the Com-  
 "mandant) by his long and brave de-  
 "fence with so weak a garrison, and  
 "without

### 330 SIEGE of COLBERG.

"without hopes of being relieved, had  
 "done every thing that could be ex-  
 "pected from him by his King and  
 "Country, and that it would be an  
 "ill-timed obstinacy to persevere till  
 "he brought destruction upon the  
 "town, and all those who were in it."  
 The Commandant went into the guard-  
 house, and wrote an answer to this  
 effect, viz. "That he was very sensible  
 "of the Russian General's consideration  
 "for the garrison and burghers, and  
 "agreed with him perfectly in that  
 "respect. That nobody could be more  
 "desirous than he was of sparing an  
 "effusion of blood. But that the *posi-*  
 "*tive orders* which he had received to  
 "maintain his post, would quiet his  
 "own conscience, and justify him in  
 "the eyes of his King and Country, if  
 "he persisted in defending Colberg to  
 "the last extremity, which he certainly  
 "would do." He gave the Officer this  
 letter,

letter, and informed him, that he must not return by the Glacis; but that, if he wished to pass in safety, he must take the common road across the Munde field, and so round by Munde.

From seven o'clock in the morning till nine some shells were thrown, and a grape fire kept up against the ramparts. The besieged had no men killed; but a much greater misfortune happened to them: a howitz shell broke the leg of Lieutenant Scheel of the artillery, whom I have mentioned before, and he was obliged to be carried off the rampart into his quarters. Considering their great deficiency in artillery men, this was a severe loss indeed. During Lieutenant Ebel's illness, Lieutenant Scheel had commanded the whole artillery with great ability, and had annoyed the besiegers extremely. Lieutenant Ebel was luckily so far recovered, that he had been in the

### 332 SIEGE of COLBERG.

the arsenal for some days past, superintending the filling of the shells, and the other works in the laboratory: therefore, on this accident happening, he immediately returned to his duty on the ramparts, and continued it during the remainder of the siege.

This night every thing was quiet on the Munde side; but as the besiegers were working on the Lauenburg side, the garrison kept up a heavy fire on them from the ramparts, both of shot and shells. The trenches on this side were opened within 300 paces of the counterscarp, under cover of the houses.

On the 19th the besieged made every possible preparation to resist this attack, but they could only bring three guns of the ravelin, 18. to bear upon it; to these the besiegers were entirely exposed, and indeed they were in some

measures

measures

measure enfiladed by them; however, as the ravelin had sunk considerably, and was not yet sufficiently repaired, it could at most be reckoned but a very moderate defence.

About twenty years before this period, a Major General Sack, who was Commandant of Colberg, had at the request of an engineer ordered a high cavalier, which was on the bastion, N<sup>o</sup> 14, to be removed. The engineer was of opinion, that they gave the enemy a great advantage in mining, and consequently that they were more hurtful than useful \*. The besieged now la-

\* I conclude that the engineer premised, that the suburbs were thrown down and the ground cleared in front of the Glacis: for the fire from a cavalier is too plunging, and of no effect, except whilst the enemy is at a distance, as he soon gets under the guns: besides, they leave no room for making a retrenchment in the bastion, and they give the enemy too much earth to cover himself with, when he has made a lodgment in it.—*Author.*

mented

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lamented the loss of the cavalier; for they thought, that, if it had still remained, they might have come at the attack, at least with plunging shot.

Colonel Schmeling commanded on this side of the works, and was very vigilant.

The Commandant wished very much to take a few Russians prisoners; and as he had observed that some of them often went with waggons to get grain and forage from the barns in front of the Muhlen-gate, he sent out a volunteer Non-commissioned Officer and five men to watch, and endeavour to surprise them. The party returned in the evening with three futtlers waggons, and five horses, but no prisoners.

As the country on this side of the fortress was commanded by the works

of

of the new town, and as the grain in the town began to grow dear, the Commandant allowed such of the burghers as had barns in front of the Muhlen-gate, to send out people to thrash and bring in the grain.\*

On the Munde side the besieged cut another embrasure in the curtain with such a slope as to admit of a great depression of the gun; in this they placed a cannon, and pointed it directly against the head of the sap, l. As soon as the gallery was opened into the ditch, they kept up such a heavy grape-fire from this embrasure, that it was impossible to let the rafts down into the ditch and man them.

On this day the besiegers received a supply of ammunition; and their fire,

\* The besiegers were not in force enough to invest the place sufficiently to prevent this.—*Author.*

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which had been very slack for some days, began again with vigour.

In the night, a battery, s. was begun between the houses on the side of Lauenburg, but it never was completed.

On the 20th, as the besiegers could not dismount the Prussian batteries, owing to their want of heavy artillery, they carried the gallery of the first attack away to the right round the covert-way towards the Persante, m. in order to avoid the Prussian fire, and with a view to break through into the ditch at o. where they could not be enfiladed from the works. On the side of the second attack the water was drawn off from the canal, r. The wood of alder-trees, called the Matze, furnished fascines for the approaches on this side. The besiegers worked hard at the battery, s. but were very much impeded by  
the

S E C T I O N III. 337

the Prussian shells; however, as they had now a good stock of ammunition, they were not behind hand in returning the fire.

On the 21st the besieged kept up an uncommon heavy fire, particularly of shells, against the second attack, which greatly retarded the working, more especially as the houses and garden walls and paling were now knocked down, and the workmen of course exposed; this made it necessary for the besiegers to intrench themselves behind the walls, and take measures to cover themselves against the stones that were flying about in great numbers.

The besiegers made a pretty brisk fire from the first attack, and the straw magazine, 23. was set on fire by a shell which fell into it: this was quite accidental, for the shot and shells were

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directed

### 338 SIEGE of COLBERG.

directed against the attacked bastion, 11., and the powder magazines, 8. as also against the batardeau, with a view to let the water out of the ditch into the river, and thus facilitate the passage of the ditch. Nothing could be further from the intention of the Russians than the burning of the town. A few days before this, there was a very high westerly wind, and I was present, when an officer proposed to General Stoffeln to set fire to the hay and straw magazine\*, as the wind would carry the flames into the town. "What good would that do?" said the general; "do you think that a brave Commandant will surrender the place be-

\* This might easily have been done by means of carcasses or burning arrows. This latter method is as follows; viz. lighted spunk mixed with sulphur is bound on the point of an arrow, and shot from a bow. This is a very good way to set fire to hay and straw, or dry wood, such as planks or shingles, and it may be done without the enemy's perceiving it.—*Author.*

"cause

"cause the houses are burnt?— By  
 "such an act we shall draw upon our-  
 "selves the epithets of barbarous and  
 "inhuman : let us then shew that we  
 "are not so ; and that we do not take  
 "pleasure in the sufferings of our fel-  
 "low-creatures."

The accidental burning of the straw  
 magazine on this day, viz. the 21st,  
 might have been very detrimental to  
 the town, as the wind blew very hard  
 all the morning from the south west,  
 and, owing to the stacks being high,  
 the flames could easily have been com-  
 municated to the adjacent houses. But  
 luckily the wind fell just as the fire  
 began, and a gentle rain came on ; this  
 occasioned the magazine, which was  
 roofed with deal planks, to burn like a  
 candle ; and, owing to a gentle rain  
 falling at the time, it was twenty-four  
 hours before the whole was consumed.

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It was curious enough that the hay magazine, which was within sixty paces of the other, received no damage. Every preparation was made in the town to obviate, as much as possible, the evil consequences that might have ensued from this accident.

The fire of the besieged against the second attack continued to be very heavy, and the besiegers answered it as well as they could.

During the night the approaches on the Lauenburg side were advanced 100 paces towards the salient angle of the covert-way of the bastion, 14. where a battery, t. was begun, as they were obliged to desist from the attempt to construct the battery amongst the houses, s.

On the 22d little progress was made  
in

in the sap of the first attack, as well as in the construction of the battery of the second, owing to the very heavy fire from the works. The besiegers were obliged to cover themselves particularly well over head; for their weak fire could neither dismount any of the enemy's guns, nor even drive their riflemen from the ramparts of the attacked bastions. The besieged paid particular attention to the Lauenburg side, knowing it to be the weakest part of the fortrefs. They took great pains to put every part of the works which flanked, or could in any degree contribute to the defence of the attacked bastion, N<sup>o</sup> 14, into as good order as possible.

Many years previous to this period a small battery of two cannon had been made on the town wall just by the large manufactory; it was concealed by a tree, and had been hitherto little

### 342 SIEGE of COLBERG.

known or thought of; but the tree was now cleared away, guns were mounted in the embrasures, and the battery was made use of with considerable advantage against the besiegers\*. It lay high, and consequently commanded the approaches. The first shots from it surprised the besiegers a good deal, particularly as they could not discover from whence they came.

The Ravelin, 18. was put into such a state as to contribute to the defence: its fire flanked the approaches, so that the working on this side became difficult and dangerous.

On this day the besiegers did not fire till 4 o'clock in the afternoon, partly because it was Sunday, and partly be-

\* This battery would have been of little service if the besiegers had had sufficient heavy artillery to have made proper dismounting and breach batteries.-- *Author.*

cause

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cause they were obliged to be sparing of their ammunition. In this interval the town was threatened with a serious calamity. About 11 o'clock in the forenoon a smoke was perceived to issue from the tower of the large church, N° 1. \* A workman immediately ran to the church, and got up into the tower with the sexton. They perceived a smoke, but could find no fire. They then went into the belfry, where they found a beam burning. As this beam lay rather high, the one got up a ladder in order to reach it, and the other handed him pails of water. This water was constantly kept in large coppers on the loft, and in the tower of the church, by way of precaution, particularly in case of accidents by lightning. These

\* This is an uncommon high building, of which not only the spire, but the roof also, can be seen at a great distance.—*Author.*

### 344 SIEGE of COLBERG.

two people extinguished the fire in this manner without any further assistance.

About four o'clock in the afternoon the besiegers threw some shells, which, though directed only against the ramparts, did great damage to the adjacent houses.

In the night there was a general alarm in the garrison, which was occasioned by the relief of the post of Cossacks, that was stationed in front of the sally port gate, marching too near to the Glacis.

As the decrease of the moon made it natural to expect dark nights, and as the besieged were apprehensive of an assault, they prepared light balls. However, the star-light nights which succeeded rendered the use of them unnecessary.

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On the 23d the besiegers worked with the greatest diligence, but hardly fired at all, as it was judged proper to save the ammunition for the intended storm.

The battery, t, of the second attack was completed, and the two howitzes were brought into it from q. As the besieged could not come at this battery, and the sap of this attack, any way so well as with shells, they threw a great many of 200lb. weight, one of which broke through the covering of the sap, killed some men, and did great damage.

The besieged had still an ample stock of provisions, but as the wood began to run short, and as there was a considerable quantity in the Muhlen suburb, the inhabitants ventured, with the consent of the commandant, to endeavour

to

### 346 SIEGE of COLBERG.

to fetch it into the town \*. Directions were given for the batteries of the new town to protect them on this occasion, by their fire,

On the 24th the besiegers took the greatest pains on the Munde side to destroy the batardeau, and open the sluices. In the night some cannon were sent from this to the second attack, to the end that every effort might be made to dismount the guns of the bastion, 14; part of the trench was, therefore, taken into the battery t, in order to add three more platforms to it.

As the besiegers were particularly short of shells, they loaded their howitzes with the pieces of the shells that

\* The Cossacks stationed on this side of the town were a quarter of a German mile from the suburb, consequently too distant to prevent this.—*Author.*

were

were thrown from the works, and also with stones.

During this night the Russians did not fire at all; but the Prussian fire was not the less on that account.

On the 25th, the besiegers worked hard at the sap of the second attack, owing to a scarcity of ammunition; the Russian fire ceased entirely till the evening of,

The 26th, when a few shot were fired, and some carcases \* thrown into the town, which the besieged were not behind hand in answering.

\* I must here mention a precaution which was taken in the town against carcases. As they do not discover themselves by bursting like shells, all the doors and windows of the uninhabited rooms and lofts were thrown open, in order that they might be discovered by the smell of the sulphur, and immediately extinguished, or thrown by means of hooks into places where they could do no harm.—*Author.*

On

### 348 SIEGE of COLBERG.

On the 27th the Russians fired a feu de joye in consequence of the victory obtained by the Austrians over the Prussians at Hochkirchen. The troops that were in the camp, as well as those on all the different posts, turned out on this occasion : the batteries and the troops in the trenches fired the volley with ball against the town. The besieged returned the compliment, and their fire had the greatest effect, as they could partly see the Russians, and partly discover their exact situation by the smoke.

On this day the besiegers received a considerable supply of ammunition, and particularly of shells and balls, of which there had been a great dearth, from Marienwerder.

On the 28th, therefore, they began a heavy fire from all their batteries, which

which lasted without interruption till seven o'clock in the evening of,

The 29th. The town was a good deal damaged, and several fires broke out, but the precautions taken were so excellent, that they were soon extinguished. The besieged owned afterwards, that if they had been attacked by such a heavy fire at first, or if this had been continued for some days longer, they must have surrendered.

In the second attack the besiegers had at last, after much labour, and a considerable loss of men, carried a sap through the Covert-way, and opened into the ditch, in order to make a slope or appareille into the ditch the same as that on the Munde side, which they had completed on the 22d at a point where it could not be enfiladed, o.

By

### 350 SIEGE of COLBERG.

By this time the Prussian General Platen had advanced to Spie, as is mentioned in the foregoing Section \*. The Russian advanced post, which he attacked there, as is before described, retired to Sellnow, and greatly magnified the strength of the Prussian corps. The officer stationed at this place, reported to General Palmbach, that General Platen was advancing with a strong corps to relieve the place. As General Palmbach's troops were very much divided, and consequently could not wait an attack in that situation, it was determined to raise the siege the same night, and orders to that effect were sent to every post. The shot were saved in case an action should take place, but all the remaining shells and carcasses were thrown, to the end that the corps might

\* This was the advanced guard of General Wobernow's corps.—*Translators.*

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not be encumbered with them on the march.

In the afternoon a Russian vessel arrived with provisions and military stores from Königsberg, but as its cargo was no longer wanted, it was sent back again.

In the night the troops quitted their posts, and assembled on the heights near Colberg: those on the Munde side moved round by the Munde Field, through the Lauenburg suburb, and across the causeway; the outposts at Sellnow and Werder crossed the Persante by the bridge of communication at Rosentin, which they destroyed as soon as they were over it; and the corps thus united marched a German mile and a half to Stecknow.

Notwithstanding the silence with which these movements were made, the besieged discovered them, and kept up a heavy fire from the ramparts, which had little effect, owing to the darkness of the night.

On the 30th in the morning the inhabitants of the suburbs carried intelligence into the town of this retreat. As the bridge in front of the Munde gate had been taken away, and the gate blocked up, it was impossible to get out on that side, but the Lauenburg gate was opened at eight o'clock in the morning, after a previous accurate examination of the environs. Strong parties of the garrison and Burghers went out with spades and pickaxes to fill up the trenches, and destroy the approaches; (they all took their arms with them) and the gabions, fascines, and apparatus for storming

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forming the place, were taken into the town in waggons. A number of people went out to examine the Russian works; and some of them ventured so far as where the Russian camp had stood behind the Nuns wood. Those who remained there too long, were surprized and plundered by the Cossacks, and part of them were carried prisoners into General Palmbach's camp at Stecknow. The fort major was of the number, but after having plundered him they let him go again. The engineer officer escaped by the swiftness of his horse. The prisoners were only a non-commissioned officer who gave himself up as a deserter, and a few burghers. General Palmbach was very much surprized to learn from the people, that no succours had yet arrived: he kept them in the camp that night; treated them very well, and sent them back again the next morning.

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The clocks in the town were permitted to strike again, and numbers of people were employed, both burghers and countrymen, in destroying the enemy's batteries and approaches.

The bridge of boats at Munde was broke up in order to keep off the Cossacks, who were still hovering about the place. The gates were shut at sunset, and the ramparts lined as usual.

General Palmbach now perceived that he had been deceived by this feint of General Wobernow's. To return and begin the siege a third time after all the approaches were destroyed, was not advisable, particularly as the season was so far advanced; and indeed, the undertaking a siege in which the troops, owing to the want of the necessary previous preparations, must sacrifice their lives without a probability of success, could

could not be otherwise than very repugnant to their inclination. However, the General resolved to try if he could not take the town by surprise. As he had learned from the prisoners that some hundred men of the garrison, together with a great number of burghers, went out every morning to fill up the trenches, it was determined to surprise them by means of an ambuscade on the Lauenburg side, and to force into the town either before or with them. To this end a detachment marched out of the camp in the night, consisting of all the companies of grenadiers, and some hundred hussars and horse grenadiers.

The grenadier companies were directed to march by an unfrequented road, and take post in the Lauenburg suburb, there to remain perfectly silent and still till the gates were opened, and

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the garrison and burghers came out to proceed with their work; they were then to fall upon them, and endeavour to force into the town. The cavalry were to halt in the Matze wood; and as soon as the infantry had made themselves masters of the gate, they were to hasten to their support, and gallop through the streets to prevent the assembling of the garrison. But the grenadiers were discovered too soon on

The 31st, and the garrison got time to assemble and form. Some burghers had heard the Russians talking in a barn, and called to them, "Russians, turn out!" They did so, and the alarm spread immediately. Major Kleist, who was present, hastened to Lieutenant Colonel Schmeling, whose party, consisting of about 150 men, was under arms on the counterscarp close to the gate. They now saw 300 Russian grenadiers

nadiers advancing from the suburb. They decided in an instant. Major Kleist, at the head of 50 men, went directly against them; and the Lieutenant Colonel, with the remaining 100, moved off to the right, in order to get round the Russians by means of a cross street, and fall on them in the rear: preparations were instantly made on the ramparts to support these troops with the cannon. At the distance of fifty paces Major Kleist gave them a fire with such effect, that the Commanding Officer and fifteen men fell: this checked the Russians; they stopped to fire\*; and gave way, owing, probably, to their Commander's death. The Major

\* This was the great error. The Officer ought to have just let one or two shots be fired to hasten the advance of the rest of the troops, particularly the cavalry, and attacked the Prussians with the bayonet. On these occasions there ought to be several well informed Officers appointed to the detachment, in order that, if one is killed, the undertaking may not fail on that account.

—Author.

### 358 SIEGE of COLBERG.

charged them, and pursued them to Saint George's church yard, N° 28. Here the Prussians received a discharge of grape out of a dragoon unicorn, which killed three men, mortally wounded a Non-commissioned Officer, and hurt the Major in the left hand. Upon this the hussars and horse grenadiers shewed themselves; but, on Lieutenant Colonel Schmeling's advancing against them, they gave way \*. The two Prussian parties now fell back in the best order under the cannon of the fortress on to the Glacis† and the Russian detachment began its march to rejoin general Palmbach, the cavalry

\* This was a great fault in the Commanding Officer. On such occasions as these, the most determined resolution, nay, even rashness, is necessary. If they had instantly charged these 100 men, without giving them time to recollect themselves, or to recover from the surprise which the appearance of this cavalry must have occasioned, and if the retreating grenadiers had advanced again, success might still have crowned the undertaking.—*Author.*

covering

### SECTION III. 359

covering the infantry. Thus a well planned enterprise failed, partly owing to the foresight and good arrangements of the Commandant of Colberg, and the bravery of his Officers; partly to the timidity of the Russian Officers, and their neglecting to support each other properly; but above all, to the ambuscade of the grenadiers not observing the most profound silence.

During this attack the Russians had thrown some shells into the town out of two unicorns from the Matze wood, by which some damage was done to the Cloister church.

On the 1st of November, General Palmbach's corps began its march to the main army, which it joined on the 6th.

I cannot exactly ascertain the loss of the Russians at this siege, but I think

A a 4

they

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they had between 4 and 500 men killed and wounded. According to the Prussian account, the garrison lost only six foldiers and two burghers.

The Prussians spoke much in praise of the good discipline of General Palmbach's corps, and the generous humanity of the Russian Officers. General Palmbach gave, during the siege, safe guards to the adjacent villages without any recompence in return; and no injury whatever was offered to the inhabitants of the suburbs\*. The deliveries which

\* The generosity of the Russian Officers extended so far, that they not only did not injure the inhabitants of the suburbs, though they knew that they carried intelligence into the town; but Brigadier Berg supported those whose houses were knocked down, and who had nothing to live upon. He gave them money and escorts, in order that they might fetch bread from the adjacent villages. Plenty and tranquillity reigned every where, as if no enemy had been in the country. Never was there such an abundance of provisions in any Russian camp as in this; for the country people not only delivered

which were required from the country of grain, forage, and cattle, were moderate; and there was such a stock of provisions in the neighbourhood when the siege was raised, that the prices fell one third. Even in the retreat there was no plundering, or irregularity, which might have been expected.

Thus ended a siege, which may justly be called too serious for a joke, and too trifling for earnest.

vered what was demanded of them, but they also brought in a quantity of every thing to sell, knowing that they could return home in safety with their money.

—*Author.*

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## SECTION IV.

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### P L A N

FOR SURPRISING AND STORMING

### C O L B E R G

IN THE WINTER, AFTER THE CLOSE  
OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1758.

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*Etudiez le foible, et le fort de la place,*

*Et contre elle tournez vos soins, et votre audace.*

L'Art de la Guerre de Main de Maître.

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**T**HE end proposed by the introduction of this section is, to accustom unexperienced officers to consider and reflect upon great military events, in order that, if they are in fu-

ture

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ture intrusted with the execution of important and hazardous undertakings, the novelty of the thing may not deprive them of their presence of mind, and that a small difficulty or accident, which it was impossible to foresee, may not alarm them, and cause the failure of the enterprise, by the flurry and irresolution which it might occasion in the Commander.

I formed the plan which is to be the subject of this section immediately after the siege, but a variety of reasons prevented me from laying it before the Russian Generals. My knowledge of the fortress and its environs confirm me in the opinion, that it might have been carried into execution in the latter end of 1758, or the beginning of 1759, but not later; for after that period the works were strengthened, and the garrison reinforced.

If

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If the Russians are employed in offensive or defensive operations in Brandenburg and Pomerania, their primary object ought most certainly to be, the getting possession of Colberg, which, from its situation, must in either case be to them the most necessary and important post in the whole country. Had they in the foregoing campaign been masters of this harbour, they might have received by sea their supplies of all military stores and subsistence, as well as reinforcements and recruits, the transporting of which by land is very difficult and tedious in all cases, but more especially where the distance is so great as in the present instance. This latter circumstance often occasions disappointment in the arrival of convoys, and a consequent dearth of every necessary, of the great disadvantage of which the issue of this campaign is an example. At the siege of Custring the Russians

were

were greatly in want of heavy artillery, particularly of mortars. By means of a plan which they found in the suburb, and from the reports of deserters, they discovered the situation of the powder magazine; and if they could have blown it up, possibly the garrison would have surrendered; but, however expert the corps of artillery might have been, it was impossible to break through the roof of a subterraneous magazine with 24 lb. shells; whereas, if they had had 92 lb. shells, they could certainly have effected it. The scarcity of cannon balls at this siege was also evident, by General Fermer's desiring that they might be spared for the approaching battle. After the battle of Zornsdorf the scarcity of powder and ball was so great, that I believe I am right when I say, that this was the principal reason why the Russians, who were still twice as strong as the Prussians, did not undertake

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dertake more, or, at least, that it was the chief cause of the ill success of the siege of Colberg. Allowing also that it was the want of subsistence which induced the Russians to abandon all Brandenburg and Pomerania, this want, as well as that of ammunition, would easily have been supplied, or rather avoided, by the possession of this convenient harbour.

Another weighty reason for occupying Colberg was, that the nature of the environs is such as to afford a small army an advantageous position, in which it can defend itself against a very superior force: to this the Russians might have retreated, let them have been ever so unfortunate in the campaign, and waited in safety for the arrival of a reinforcement by sea.

The above considerations made it  
natural

natural to conclude, that the foregoing campaign would have opened by the siege of this fortress, but perhaps General Fermer had important reasons for adopting a different plan of operations: these, as well as the reasons which induced him at last to detach four thousand men to Colberg, instead of marching thither with his whole army, I cannot pretend to divine, nor shall I attempt to discover them. All that I purpose in this section is, to shew how the fortress could most easily have been taken, proceeding upon my knowledge of it and the environs.

Colberg, as may be seen in Pl. 10. is surrounded with morasses intersected by canals, and in the spring and autumn, which are in general rainy seasons, it cannot be approached. The only approach to the new town is by a long paved causeway, called the Stettin causeway.

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way. The ground is firmest on the Munde side, yet even there you come to water by sinking an ell deep. This makes it difficult to carry on the trenches; they must be raised by means of fascines if you mean to make them of a proper depth, and these must also be made use of to render the bottom of the trenches firm and dry. This side of the town is the strongest, and it is furnished with a good hornwork. The weakest point of the fortress is on the Lauenburg side, next to the river\*. There is a work there which is separated from the town by a canal, and consists of nothing but a simple parapet, without any ditch, N° 17. Pl. 10. I conclude that it was judged unnecessary to strengthen this part any more with works, because the morais and water make the approach to it so difficult;

\* It must be observed, that I speak here of the year 1758. Since that, this side of the fortress has been greatly strengthened.—*Author.*

but

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but a hard frost would obviate these difficulties; and as you can advance up to the covert way of the adjacent bastion, N° 14. as also to within 200 paces of the above-mentioned work, 17, under cover of houses, gardens, and paling, I am of opinion that it would be possible to surprize and carry the town by storm on this side, provided that the undertaking was executed with proper foresight and resolution.

A regular siege would occasion a great consumption of time and men, particularly as the works are furrounded with broad, deep, wet ditches, which can be filled by means of the batardeaux with which they are furnished.

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The following is my PLAN for surprising and storming the town in the beginning of 1759.

A corps consisting of 8000 infantry, 3000 dragoons, and 1000 hussars, must assemble and march from their winter quarters in the middle of January. They must take with them no other artillery than a few field-pieces, and howitzes, and have as little baggage as possible, in order to be free of all incumbrance. If a sufficient quantity of sledges \* can be procured, it will be very advantageous, as the making use of them will greatly expedite the march †. A convoy of

\* In Poland it is an easy matter to get together a great quantity of sledges; and it would not have been the first time that a Russian corps was moved in this manner.

*Author.*

† Before I proceed any further, it is necessary to observe, that 12000 men were sufficient to execute this enterprise, as at that period there was no Prussian army in Lomera, or the Marche.—*Author.*

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heavy artillery, particularly mortars, must immediately follow, in order that, if the attempt to surprise and storm the place fails, the corps may invest it, and upon the arrival of the heavy artillery begin a regular siege. In this last case the King of Prussia might detach a corps out of Saxony to raise the siege; it would therefore be advisable for the whole Russian army to assemble, and threaten a movement against Franckfurt, or Crossen, which would prevent the Prussians from relieving Colberg, and harraßs their army by a winter campaign.

My reason for proposing the move towards Crossen or Franckfurt, rather than Custrin, is, that the country between Colberg and Custrin was so destroyed in the foregoing campaign as to make it impossible for an army to subsist in it.

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In order to facilitate the execution of the attack upon Colberg, measures must be taken to prevent succours being sent thither from Stettin. The surest method of doing this would be, to feign an attack upon Stettin itself, or some other important place in the neighbourhood, keeping the real intent of the expedition a profound secret, with which no person but the commander of the corps must be intrusted. As Stettin is a fortress equally liable with the other to a surprise and storm, this feint would in all probability have the desired effect, of preventing the commanding officer from weakening his garrison, by sending a reinforcement to Colberg. The corps of 12000 men must, therefore, not move at once against this last mentioned place, but proceed by forced marches to Stargard.

In the New Marche, on the frontiers of Pomerania, a body of 4000 infantry,

1000

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1000 dragoons, and 200 hussars, must separate from the main corps, and take the shortest route by Schiefelbein to Colberg. The rest of the troops proceed to Stargard. Of these latter 1000 infantry, and 200 hussars, will be detached to occupy the important post at Pafskrug, between Piritz and Stargard, and part of them will be stationed in the last mentioned town. 3000 infantry, and 2000 dragoons, will be stationed between Stettin and Colberg, behind the rivers Ihne and Rega, occupying all the advantageous posts and passes, as also the towns that are enclosed with walls, in order to cut off all intercourse between the two fortresses. The different posts must have a free communication, in order to support each other in case of an attack; and to the end that intelligence of an attack may be quickly communicated, beacons must be erected on all the convenient spots.

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The remaining 600 hussars form a chain from Pafskrug to Colberg, and they will be employed in patrolling and reconnoitring.

The several posts must be instructed, how they are to act in every case; how they are to support each other: to what places they are to retire, and where they are to make a stand again, if they should be forced. They must intrench themselves as well as the frost will allow, and those towns which are capable of any defence, must be put in as good a state as possible to resist an attack \*. The commanding officers of these different detachments and posts, must make a report, as soon as possible, to the General commanding this part of the corps, of the exact positions which they have

\* I here refer my readers to that part of my *Field Engineer* which treats of the fortifying, as well as the attack and defence of important posts. *Author.*

taken, and the particular dispositions and arrangements which they have made.

As soon as the detachment arrives at Colberg, the town must be invested on all sides by the dragoons. If the river Persante is not frozen, it will be necessary to construct a bridge of boats over it at Munde: also a bridge must be made higher up the river near the old town. There will, no doubt, be vessels and boats enough found in the harbour and river for these purposes; but as it is possible that the commandant of the fortress might have had foresight enough to take the precaution of sinking or burning them all, it will be proper that the corps should carry eight or twelve pontoons with it. If it should so happen that a violent storm, or some other unforeseen accident, prevents the construction of the bridge at Munde, this will by no means hinder the execution of

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the attack, for it is very possible for a body of troops to arrive on the Munde side of the fortress, by making a circuit by the Lauenburg, and Stubenhagen suburbs.

If the work at the harbour, N° 32. is occupied by the enemy, it must be immediately attacked, which can easily be done from the Munde Field.

The town must be invested, and the suburbs occupied, particularly those of Pfannschmiede, and Stubenhagen, all at the same time \*, with the greatest expedition, by the 1000 dragoons, and 500 infantry, in order that the com-

\* I would not trust to signals from cannon : they are uncertain : for instance, on an occasion like this, if they fired from the town, that might be mistaken for a signal, and such a mistake might in many cases cause the entire failure of an enterprise. I would rather make the commanding officer of each detachment, as well as two other officers of it, set their watches with mine, and let them be regulated by the time.—*Author.*

mandant

mandant of the fortrefs may not have time to fet fire to them, which would render the whole undertaking much more difficult. Thefe troops will be difpofed as follows :

400 dragoons	}	on the Munde fide.
200 infantry		
400 dragoons	}	on the Lauenburg fide.
200 infantry		
200 dragoons	}	on the Muhlen fide.
100 infantry		

The infantry muft be pofted behind the houfes, and covered as well as they can be from the fire of the works. As foon as thefe have taken poft, the dragoons retire to the diftance of a cannon fhoot, and remain there till the troops advance to the ftorm, when they advance alfo to fupport them.

The whole remain under arms, and perfectly ftill, in order to make the  
com-

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commandant of the fortress believe, that a regular siege is going to be undertaken. As the garrison might make a sally to burn the suburbs, it will be necessary that 50 dragoons, and as many infantry, should remain in the streets of the suburbs on each side of the town, as near to the works as possible, and these must be supported by a like number at some little distance in their rear. They must take particular care that no person whatever goes from the suburbs into the town; and if any part of the garrison attempts to make a sally, they charge the troops as they come out with the sword and bayonet, in the most determined manner, but they must not stop to fire.

Some officers must get up into the tower of Saint Nicolas church, and into the granary in Pfannschmiede, as also into the tower of Saint George's church in the Lauenburg suburb, or  
up

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up to the top story of some high house near to the works, and reconnoitre the covert way, observing whether it is occupied or abandoned, which may be easily discovered from the centinels. There must always be two officers together on this service, in order that if an accident happens to one, the report of the reconnoissance may still be made without delay by the other. All persons employed on these occasions must lay aside every part of their dress which is conspicuous, and might lead to a discovery, for the giving any unnecessary alarm to the garrison should be carefully avoided.

These officers endeavour to orienter themselves as much as possible by the plan of the fortrefs and the environs, which will have been previously given or shewn them, and they must take particular

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ticular pains to discover the approaches to the covert-way.

As soon as they have made themselves masters of these circumstances, they send written reports by two dragoons to the commanding General of the corps: they then return to their respective divisions: give the commanding officers of them all possible intelligence concerning the fortrefs; and lead the divisions, when they are ordered to advance to the storm.

I am not certain whether there is any house on the Muhlen side, from whence the covert-way can be reconnoitred; but should there not be one, two officers must be sent from Pfannschmiede to the officer who commands the division on the Muhlen side, with intelligence of the reconnoissance that has been made from the granary and Saint Nicolas church,

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church, which of course will have included the Muhlen side of the fortress.

Great pains must be taken to prevent any person's going from the suburbs into the town, and a chain of posts must be drawn particularly round the Pfannschmiede and Lanenburg suburbs, in order to prevent the inhabitants from discovering the advance of the columns. It must be threatened to shoot every person on the spot, who shall stir out of his house. The best way, indeed, will be to collect the civil officers of each suburb; to inform them, that the commanding officer is much inclined to prevent all plundering, and irregularity; therefore, that the inhabitants must be directed to keep their doors and windows close shut till the next morning, because till then, the necessary guards and sentinels for their protection cannot be posted and properly disposed: and that

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if any of them neglect to obey these directions, and are plundered and ill-treated in consequence, they will have themselves to blame for it.

When the columns which are to storm the place advance, the abovementioned detachments of infantry must take post in such a manner opposite to the gates of the town, that they can attack and drive back any troops of the garrison who may attempt to make a sally, or at least check them till the assailants have time to recover their order, for troops that are storming get sometimes into such confusion, that it is difficult to form them, and to make them stand, in case of a sudden check. These detachments of infantry do not advance to the storm with the columns, but remain in front of the suburbs opposite the gate of the town, as a reserve. The dragoons

dragoons press forward into the town with the assailants.

The storm must either take place on the same day that the town is invested, or, at furthest, on the day following.

From the four thousand infantry, 200 volunteers must be selected \*, to whom large pecuniary rewards must be promised. To these as many officers must be appointed as offer themselves. The more the better.

These 200 volunteers are intended as the forlorn hopes; to advance at the heads of the attacks; scale the works; or in short to act as occasion may require.

\* This is a very easy matter in the Russian army. In the foregoing siege five Rubels were offered to every volunteer, and a greater number turned out than were wanted on a much more hazardous undertaking than this, viz. to cross the ditch on rafts, and make a lodgment in the bastion: also many officers requested to lead the troops on this occasion. — *Author.*

The

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The remaining 3300 infantry form four divisions of attack, according to the following disposition.

600 men on the Munde side.

400 on the side of the Sally  
port gate.

1500 and 150 volunteers on the  
Lauenburg side.

800 and 50 volunteers on the  
Muhlen side.

These troops march as soon as it is dark to their appointed posts, observing the most profound silence, and they remain during the night as near as they can to the works of the fortress, so, however, as to be covered by the suburbs.

The different attacks must be made an hour before day-break, all exactly at the same time, in order that the enemy's attention may be diverted from the real attack.

On

On these occasions it is in general advisable, to make the false attacks one after the other, and the real attack last. The advantage of this is, that the enemy will immediately draw his principal force to the point of the first attack; he will then find it necessary to divide it to repel the second; the third will oblige him to make another alteration in his disposition; and at last he will become confused, and be quite unable to determine which is the real attack. But, as in this instance it is possible that one or other of the false attacks might succeed, owing perhaps to the ice not being broke up in all the ditches, or to some other accident, and, as in such a case the brave troops, who forced their way into the town, would draw the whole force of the garrison upon them, and possibly be repulsed, though so far advanced, unless some measures were taken to confuse the enemy and

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divide his attention, I would advise the making all the attacks at the same time.

In order to prevent the Commandant from entertaining any apprehensions of a storm, it will not be amiss to send him a regular summons, offering to accept a very easy capitulation; but threatening, in case of repulse, to wait the arrival of the heavy artillery, and that no other conditions will then be attended to, but that the town should surrender at discretion.

During the day some shells may be thrown from the Maykuhle wood, and the old town, into the fortress, but not a shot fired in the night.

As long as the garrison is not alarmed, every thing must be conducted with the most perfect silence and tranquillity. The divisions must advance to the at-

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tack without firing; and even those who may be so fortunate as to force into the town, must not fire, but make use of the bayonet against all who attempt to oppose them. As soon, however, as the alarm is beat in the town, all the drums and trumpeters of the attacking divisions must begin to beat and sound: the artillery must keep up a very brisk fire with powder only; and the infantry will fire as quick as possible; but the officers must take care, that, in doing this in the dark, they do not hurt each other, rather than run any risk of which, they should make the soldiers present in the air. The volunteers must not fire a shot, as also the storming party at the head of each attack, but they must remain in good order, and constantly endeavour to press forward. The reserves must likewise keep their fire, and remain in the most perfect order to support the assailants.

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It will make a difference, not in the general disposition, but in the particular arrangement of each attack, if the gar-rison has not abandoned the covert-way. I will, therefore, consider each attack separately, and explain how it is to act in both cases.

1st Attack—600 men—On the Munde side.

First case—supposing the covert-way to be occupied.

This division takes post in the orchard, without making the least noise, and waits in profound silence till the appointed time for the attack arrives. It is divided into three columns, and some pioneers are at the head of each, whose business is to cut down the palisades and open the barrier.

The

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The 1st column of 100 men goes round Pfannschmiede to the right, and passing close by the granary, N° 31. attacks the covert-way at the batardeau, o. Pl. 10.

The 2d of 400 men marches straight up to the gate of the town, and endeavours to force the barrier.

The 3d of 100 men goes round Pfannschmiede to the left, passing close by Saint Nicolas church, and attacks the salient angle of the covert-way of the hornwork, N° 16.

These columns must not fire, nor stop to take prisoners, as that will detain them, and cannot possibly be productive of any advantage; but as soon as the pallisades are cut down, they must dash into the covert-way, and bayonet all who may attempt to oppose them. If

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the enemy's troops offer to retire into the hornwork, the assailants close on them, or rather mix with them, and endeavour to force at the same time into the hornwork, where they will immediately take post. If they should be so fortunate as to penetrate still further, and get into the town, the Commanding Officer of this division, assisted by the Commanding Officers of each column of it, must halt and form the troops as soon as they are through the gate, and not allow a man to stir from his rank, much less to disperse in the streets and plunder. The 1st column will then take post in the bastion, N° 11. The 3d in the bastion, N° 10. And the 2d will march straight to the main guard, and to the house of the Commandant, whom they will endeavour to seize.

The dragoons who will have followed the infantry, must gallop through the streets,

streets, cut down all who have arms in their hands, or who endeavour to make any opposition, and hasten to the other gates, and endeavour to open them, and let down the draw bridges.

Second case—supposing the covert-way to be abandoned.

In that case the intent of this attack can only be to alarm and confuse the garrison; for it will then be almost impossible to penetrate on this side, particularly if the ice in the ditches is broken, and the draw bridges drawn up. These troops, therefore, must be exposed as little as possible to the enemy's fire; however, they must advance as near as they can to the gate of the town; but they may in part cover themselves by the houses and paling, and part of them may lay down at the foot of the Glacis. They remain per-

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fectly still in this situation till the alarm is beat in the garrison, which is a sure sign that the enemy has discovered one of the attacks: they then immediately begin and keep up a very brisk fire, but present high, in order not to hurt any of their own people; they force through the barrier into the covert-way, and examine if the ice is broke up in the ditch, and in that case they try if it is possible to cross at the draw bridge by means of planks.

2d attack—400 men—on the side of the fally port gate.

These troops halt at the tile kilns behind Stubenhagen till the appointed time of attack. They then march in two columns: one of 100 men goes through Stubenhagen, and attacks the salient angle of the covert-way of the bastion, N<sup>o</sup> 10; the other of 300 men marches

marches straight to the fally port gate. They both act in either case like those on the Munde side. If they are so fortunate as to penetrate into the town, 100 men will take post in the bastion, N° 15; 100 men will march directly to the Munde gate, and 200 to the Lauenburg gate, and endeavour to open them. In doing this they must march on the ramparts, and not disperse in the town.

3d attack—800 men, besides 50 volunteers, on the Muhlen side.

Four hundred of these take post in the suburb, and make an attack on the gate of the town, proceeding in either case like those on the Munde side. The remaining 400, together with the fifty volunteers and some pioneers, must take post in the Maykuhle wood in the evening: they will have with them ten or  
twelve

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twelve boats, which must have been collected under the pretext of constructing another bridge over the river. When the appointed time for the attack arrives, they cross the canal called the Holtz-Graben, take up the boats again, and, passing by the Saltworks, proceed straight to the hay and straw magazine; mount the Glacis; cut down the pallisades, and force their way in, which will be attended with no difficulty, as they will not in all probability meet more than 50 of the enemy's troops stationed there. Should the Perfante be froze over, they immediately dash over the ice into the town; if not, they endeavour to cross it, by means of the boats, at that part where there is an opening in the rampart, and where a flight of steps comes down to the water's edge, N<sup>o</sup> 24. Pl. 10. This must all be executed with the greatest expedition, and with as little noise as possible, wherefore,

wherefore, not a shot must be fired, but the bayonets used against any of the enemy who shew themselves, particularly against the magazine guard, of which not a man must be allowed to escape into the town if it is possible to prevent it. As soon as these troops have penetrated into the town, they form and march as expeditiously as is possible, consistent with good order, to the Lauenburg gate, and endeavour to open it. It is of course understood, that the first who cross the river immediately form, and cover the passage of the rest. If, however, this division should find it impossible to force into the town, it will at least set fire to the hay and straw magazine, in order to increase as much as is in their power the confusion of the garrison.

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4th and principal attack—1500 men, besides 150 volunteers, on the Lauenburg side.

First case—supposing the covert-way to be occupied.

A column of 100 men attacks the salient angle of the covert-way of the bastion, N° 15.

Another of 800 men attacks the gate of the town. Besides the pioneers, they have some cannon with them, in order that if they fail in their attempt to force into the town with the enemy as he retires from the covert-way, and if he has time to draw up the draw-bridge, they may let it down again by cutting the chains with the shot.

300 men march as silently as possible, between the gardens and canal by

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r. and s. towards the batardeau, and if the canal is frozen, they endeavour to penetrate into the town near the island, N° 17. Should they find this impossible, they must just support the fourth column in its attack, and follow it into the town : they will, as is hereafter directed, begin their march about eight or ten minutes later than the 4th column, in order that the garrison may not be alarmed on this side, or have any suspicion of an attack on N° 17.

The 4th column consists of 150 volunteers and 300 grenadiers. Each of these latter carries a fascine, which must be very thick, but at most not above 4 feet long. The volunteers have twelve pioneers with them, and twelve long planks.

The three first columns halt near Saint George's church, and let the  
fourth

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fourth begin its march eight or ten minutes before them. They then move on, but they must not fire, even when they come up to the covert-way, nor even should the garrison be already alarmed on the other side, in order to avoid giving any suspicion of an attack on this side. But as soon as the enemy discovers the fourth column, which will be known by his beginning to fire towards its point of attack, the three first columns will immediately begin a heavy fire with cannon and small arms against the two bastions and the curtain, in order to draw the enemy off from the fourth column, and they will further proceed as above directed. The fourth column marches along by D. leaving the canal close to its right, against the work, N° 17. When it arrives at the canal in front of this work, if it is not frozen, the troops try to pass it, by making a temporary bridge with the  
the

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the planks; and if these are not long enough to reach across, they may, by means of the fascines, fill up a part of the canal, and cross it in that manner\*. In order to prevent the fascines from floating away, large stones must have been previously bound up in them, which will make them sink directly. The volunteers lead, the grenadiers follow. They must advance at a quick pace, but not run, as by that they would exhaust themselves and get into disorder.

The volunteers mount the parapet without firing a shot, and bayonet those who may oppose them.

As soon as the 300 grenadiers have crossed the canal, they support the volunteers if these are repulsed; if not,

\* If the canal is not too deep, they may wade through it, which will be more expeditious than filling it up with fascines.—*Author.*

they

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they follow them into the work. As the flank of the small ravelin, N° 18. may annoy these troops whilst they are in the work, N° 17. they must not remain in it a moment longer than is necessary to recover their order, but immediately press forward into the town by the small bridge that there is over the canal, which separates this work from the town; or, should this bridge be destroyed, they must endeavour to pass the canal, which is very narrow, by means of the planks that they carry with them.

When they have penetrated into the town, the 450 men march with a quick pace, but in perfect order, to the Lauenburg gate, which they must endeavour to open. They must keep well together, in order that they may be able to make a good defence if attacked by the garrison.

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As soon as the fourth column has entered the work, N° 17. the third column will cross the canal by means of planks, and follow through N° 17. into the town, in order to support the 4th, in case of a vigorous attack being made upon it by the garrison.

Supposing that the attack of the 4th column is discovered, still it will not have much to apprehend from the cannon fire of the bastion, N° 14. and the ravelin, N° 18. as most of the balls will go over the heads of the troops. The only thing, therefore, of consequence is, the direct fire from the work, N° 17. itself; in order to silence which, they must storm it without hesitation.

The 3d and 4th columns will act in the same manner in either case; but, should the covert-way be abandoned, and the draw bridges drawn up, the 1st

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and 2d columns will proceed nearly as directed in such a case for those on the Munde side, carefully avoiding, however, the giving any alarm till the attack of the 4th column is discovered by the garrison.

The principal objections that can be started against the probability of success in this enterprise are as follow :

1. The Commandant may burn the suburbs.

2. The passage of the canal, which separates the work, N° 17. from the town, may be very difficult.

With respect to the first, this could not hinder the execution of the attacks, though it might occasion a greater loss of men. In such a case the troops must remain at the distance of a cannon shot

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from the works, till the time of attack arrives, and then advance with all possible silence and expedition, and proceed as above directed.

With respect to the second objection, there is a bridge \* from the work, 17. into the town, which the garrison will probably not have destroyed, as it is the only communication between the troops stationed in this work and the town. Should it, however, be destroyed, the Officer who leads this attack, if he is endued with a good share of abilities and courage, will endeavour to effect the passage of the canal by some means or other, and say as Prince Eugene did, when he was attempting to surprise Cremona, and some person advised him

\* This bridge is omitted in the original plan, wherefore we did not think it proper to insert it in ours. Where the Author means that it was, is very plain.—  
*Translators.*

#### 404 Plan for Storming COLBERG.

to retreat in consequence of an unexpected difficulty arising—"Le vin est tiré, il faut le boire \*."

If this enterprise should fail, no other harm will be done, than a few lives sacrificed. The town must in such a case be closely invested, and the arrival of the heavy artillery waited for, in order to undertake a regular siege. In my opinion the siege of Colberg would be attended with less difficulty in January than in October, owing to the season being so much drier; and as the

\* We cannot help thinking that some more effectual means ought to have been provided for crossing the canal; otherwise it is very possible that this attack, which appears to be the one that the Author founds his greatest hopes on, would not have succeeded. Prince Eugene's idea, of a firm perseverance in the execution of what is once undertaken, is, no doubt, just; but forcible sayings, however applicable to the circumstances, will not assist you in crossing a ditch or canal near so much as planks, fascines, pontoons, rafts, or other aids made use of on such occasions.—*Translators.*

covert-

#### SECTION IV. 405

covert-way is not mined, the fortrefs could not poffibly hold out long, if it was attacked regularly and with vigour.

The foregoing fieve \* was certainly conducted with fkill; but fkill is not fufficient, unlefs it is fupported by a good artillery, and a proper quantity of troops.

\* Although in this fieve there was a deficiency of every thing requifite to carry it on, yet they made greater progrefs in it than in the two laft. In the fecond particularly there was no difplay of fkill; but it feemed as if it were expected, that the artillery alone was to take the place.—*Author.*

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

## E R R A T A:

- Page 32. 6th line of the Note, read appellation of Or-  
donnances, for, appellation Ordonnances.
37. 3d line, for Howitze, read, Howitzes.
53. last line of the Note, for rive, read river.
70. 15th line, for, Dirfcha, read Dirschau.
125. 10th line, for, Siritz, read Piritz.
142. 2d line, for, Kutze, read Kurtze.
243. 15th line, for, Springfield, read Springfield.
269. 14th line, for, batadeaux, read batardeaux.
322. last line but one, for, ditch b, read ditch f.



Explanation of Pl. I.

- Fig. 1. Side view of the Schuwalow.  
 2. Perpendicular section through the centre of the piece.  
 3. The gun as viewed from above.  
 4. A horizontal section through the centre of the piece.  
 5. A tin cylinder to introduce the cartridge into the chamber.  
 6. The narrow side of a grape of 3 lb. balls. \*  
 7. The broad side of ditto.  
 8. The narrow side of the small grape.  
 9. The broad side of ditto.  
 10. The cartridge.  
 11. The muzzle.  
 12. and 13. a 3 lb. unicorn.

Explanation of Pl. II.

- A. The King's Palace.  
 B. The great Church.  
 C. The small Church.  
 D. The Church-yard.  
 E. The Electoral Garden.  
 F. The Market-place.  
 G. Arsenals.  
 H. Granaries.  
 I. The Pork-house.

\* The perpendicular diameter of the bore of the Schuwalow, determines the diameter of the ball of the large grape. *Translators.*

Explanation of Pl. 2. continued.

- K. The Work-house.
- L. A Mill worked by horses.
- M. Cavaliers.
- N. Mills on the water.
- O. Gate, called, The Lange Damm-gate.
- P. Gate, called, The Kurtze Damm-gate.
- Q. The Mill-port.
- R. The Kietzer-port.
- S. The Bridge over the Oder.
- T. The Tête de pont.
- V. The short causeway.
- W. Suburb, called, Lange Vorstadt.
- X. The long causeway.
- Y. Fleches, which the garrison threw up in the nights of the 15th and 16th of August.

Explanation of Pl. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII.

Pl. 4.

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <p>A. Russian camp in front of Custrin, from the 15th to the 23d of August</p> <p>B. Russian barricade of Waggon.</p> <p>C. and D. The first position of the Russians after they had raised the siege.</p> <p>E. and F. Second position of the Russians.</p> <p>G. and H. The position of the Russians on the 25th of August.</p> | <p>Fig. 1. The Prussian advanced corps.</p> <p>2. and 3. The Prussian army the night before the battle.</p> <p>4. to 11. The advance of the Prussians.</p> <p>12. to 16. The formation of the Prussians for the attack.</p> |
|---|---|

Pl.

Pl. 5.

I. and K. The Russian baggage and cavalry after having moved out of the square.

Fig. 17. and 18. The 2d position of the Russian cavalry.

19. and 20. Advance of the Prussian avant corps, and batteries which were afterwards advanced to 22.

23. Attack of the avant corps.

Pl. 6.

L. Advance of the Russian right-wing in pursuit of the Prussian grenadiers.

Fig. 25. The broken Prussian grenadiers.

M. Advance of the Russian cavalry for the same purpose.

26. The Prussian cavalry attacking the Russian cavalry.

N. The right of the Russian square, after it was broken.

27. The Prussian cavalry attacking the Russian infantry.

O. The new flank formed by the Russians.

28. 29. 30. 31. Second advance of the Prussian army.

P. Q. R. S. The Russian cavalry which attacked the Prussian batteries.

33. Attack made on and defeat of the Russian cavalry, on the Prussian right.

32. 34. 35. The Russian cavalry attacking the battery on the Prussian left, and the flight of 13 Prussian battalions.

Pl.

Pl. 7.

- T. The breaking of the Russian left. Fig. 36. and 37. The Prussian cavalry, part of which took up the ground that the 13 battalions had quitted and part drove back the Russian cavalry: and the whole afterwards advanced against the square with the infantry.
- U. V. The Russian infantry and cavalry, which formed in the evening, and defended themselves against the Prussians.
38. and 39. The Prussian infantry of the right-wing, attacking and routing the Russians, in conjunction with the cavalry.
40. The Prussian infantry, after having changed its front to the left, endeavouring in vain to force the Russian troops which had formed again as above-mentioned.
41. The Prussian cavalry, stationed near Zornsdorf and Wilckerisdorf, to cover the field of battle against the Cossacks.

Pl. 8.

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| W. and X. The Russian position on the 26th of August.                                 | Fig. 42 and 43. The Prussian position on the 26th of August.                            |
| Y. and Z. The Russian position on the 27th of August, where they fired a feu de joie. | 44 and 45. The Prussian position on the 27th of August, where they fired a feu de joie. |

Explanation of Pl. 9.

- A. The Russian out-posts on the 2d of October.
- B. A small height which the Russians occupied with 200 grenadiers and two pieces of cannon.
- C. A small intrenchment occupied by 400 men, and four pieces of cannon.
- D. 500 infantry to defend the bridge. These troops belonged to the detachment with which Lieutenant Colonel Gerbel had occupied Piritz, from whence he had retired on the 1st of October.
- E. A battery of four cannon, from which the Prussians suffered the most.
- F. A battery of two cannon, which finally obliged the Prussians to retire.
- G. Cavalry under the command of Major General Demikow.
- H. Prussian infantry and grenadiers.
- I. Prussian heavy cavalry and hussars.
- K. Prussian batteries, which were of little effect.
- L. An old Russian redoubt.

M.

M. 1000 infantry under the command of Colonel Berghausen, who arrived on the evening of the 2d, to relieve Lieutenant Colonel Gerbel, and to act as a reserve.

N. Cossacks.

O. The camp of the Prussian army under Count Dohna, to which the Prussian advanced corps retired, as has been mentioned in the 2d Section, after it had sustained a brisk fire from the Russian cannon and howitzes.

### Explanation of Pl. 10.

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| Fig. 1. St. Mary's Church.  | A. A part of the Russian camp by the sea-side.   |
| 2. The Holy Ghost Church.   | a. Three unicorns, from which shells were thrown into the town on the 4th of October.      |
| 3. The reformed Church.   | B. The Russian bridge, constructed, with three Prussian trading vessels.                   |
| 4. The Cloister, and Church.  | C. 1st attack, on the Munde side.  |
| 5. The town-hall.   | b. The opening and progress of the trenches and battery on the 5th of October.             |
| 6. The town-wall with towers.   | c. The lengthening the battery, and the progress of the trenches from the 6th to the 10th. |
| 7. The ditch of the town-wall.  | d. The work of the 7th.  |
| 8. Powder magazines.  | e. Parallel made on the 8th.   |
| 9. Batteries, each with four embrasures, on the salient angles of the bastions, on which bonnets had been lately constructed. |  |
| 10. 11. 12. Three bastions with cavaliers.  |  |
| 13. 14. 15. Three bastions without ditto.   |  |
|   | 16. The  |

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| 16. The horn-work.   | f. 2d battery at St. Nicolas Church, begun on the 11th, and completed the 12th.        |
| 17. A new work, consisting only of a parapet.  |  |
| 18. A ravelin.   | g. Traverses thrown up on the 12th.  |
| 19. The Lauenburg gate.  | h. Third battery and trenches made on the 13th.  |
| 20. The Sally-port gate.   | i. Traverse thrown up on the 14th, which was converted into a battery on the 16th.     |
| 21. The Munde gate.  | k. Trenches and the 5th battery which were completed on the 18th.                      |
| 22. The Muhlen gate.   | l. Sap through the covert way into the ditch on the 19th.                              |
| 23. The hay and straw magazine.  | m. Parallel begun on the 20th.   |
| 24. A flight of steps into the water.  | n. Battery constructed on the 24th.  |
| 25. Place where piles were driven in, and different things sunk to stop up the passage of the river. | o. Sap from the 25th to the 27th.  |
| 26. The garrison [chapel and church-yard.  | D. The second attack, on the Lauenburg side.   |
| 27. The old town church.   | P. Two Unicorns near the old town church, from which shells were thrown into the town. |
| 28. St. George's church.   | q. 1st battery made on the 12th.   |
| 29. St. Nicolas church.  |  |
| 30. The Salt works.  |  |
| 31. The Granaries.   |  |
| 32. A revêted work to defend the entrance of the harbour.  |  |
| 33. A Prussian redout, of which one face was destroyed.  |  |

- r. Barns and other buildings which supplied the place of a trench to the Russians, and under cover of which they began a battery on the 19th.
- s. Trenches made on the 20th.
- t. 2d battery which was completed on the 23d, and to which three embrasures were added on the 24th.
- u. The sap from the 25th to the 29th, through the covert way into the ditch.






## T H E

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*A Russian*  
**SCHUWALOV**  
 — or —  
*SECRET HOWITZ*



ian  
LOW

OWITZ.

Fig. 3.



Fig. 4.




Fig. 11.



Fig. 5.



Fig. 6.



Fig. 7.





Fig. 8.




Fig. 9.



Fig. 10.








# ORDER of of the Russian

Generals  
Lieut. Generals  
Maj. Generals  
Brigadiers


Braun  
Tschernitscheff Dolgorucký  
Fust Olitz Panin  
Leontiew



# ORDER of B of the Prussian Army in Br Field Marshal

Advanced G  
Lieut. Gen.  
Maj. Gen. Kürsel

Lt. Generals Schorlemmer  
Maj. Generals Platen Ziethen



In Custrin


With the Bridge




# *No. 1* **of BATTLE**

Pl. III

*Army the 24<sup>th</sup> of August 1758.*  
*Formed*





# **BATTLE** *Brandenburg & Pomerania.* *Prince Moritz* *Guard*






5000 Feet, or half a German Mile.






S. I. Steele, Sturport, 332, Strand.






Pl. V.



Pl. VI.



Pl. VII.




Pl. VIII.

# CANNONADE

at

## PASS KRUG,

3<sup>d</sup> October 1758.



Lake called  
Priesner See

Strosdorf

Mego

Prof Mill


the Plane

Prilow

PASSKRUG

G







THE BALTIC

The Siege of  
**COLBERG,**  
from 3<sup>d</sup> to 31<sup>st</sup> October,  
1758.

Scale of 1000 Paces  
100 200 300 400 500 Paces

Houses called  
Lions' houses

Munde

The Orchard

Salt Works

Wood called  
the Matze

By Neumun to Logish

The Nun's  
Wood

Pl. X.